THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA

BASIC EDUCATION SYSTEM OVERHAUL (BESO) MID-TERM ASSESSMENT

Submitted under USAID Order No. 663-0014-O-00-8321

by



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August 1998

Executive Summary

USAID is supporting the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (GFDRE) to improve the quality and equity of primary education in an expanded (and expanding) primary education system through the seven year, US\$80 million Basic Education Systems Overhaul program and project (BESO, Nos. 663-0014 and 663-0015). BESO is based on and supports the GFDRE's formal Education and Training Policy, promulgated in April 1994. BESO began in September 1994. This June 1998 mid-term assessment was undertaken to provide guidance on how best to proceed with the implementation of BESO so as to achieve USAID Ethiopia's Strategic Objective 3 and to strategically align the BESO with the country's Education Sector Development Programme (ESDP).

The combined project and non-project BESO resources seek to achieve give sub-objectives, which under USAID's re-engineering are now called "intermediate results" or "IRs." These are:

- IR1: Improved quality and equity of primary school environment;
- IR2: Increased pedagogical effectiveness of the content and quality of educational materials.
- IR3: Improved performance and equity of teacher training graduates.
- IR4: Improved decentralized management of primary education.
- IR5: Increased and more rational and efficient sectoral financing.

In order to achieve these IRs, USAID targeted US\$50 million in non-project assistance (NPA)¹ to the national level to ensure that central policies and resources were mobilized to provide sufficient support to the school-level and to those institutions charged with providing support to schools. The BESO program design identified policy conditionalities in support of all IRs above, but with most of the attention to IR5. The conditionalities have been pursued primarily through USAID-direct policy dialogue, with limited support from the lead contract technical assistance team. As of June 1998, USAID had disbursed two tranches of US\$8 million each in response to the GFDRE's achievement of mutually established policy conditionalities, with an additional US\$8 million already obligated and expected to be disbursed by September 1998.

¹ "Non-project assistance," or NPA, is a mode of USAID assistance whereby U.S. dollar transfers are targeted for debt relief and tied to the government meeting a series of conditions related to policy reform issues. USAID's use of NPA is generally predicated on strengthening African ownership and management of implementing the reform agenda, and is characterized by a systematic and comprehensive approach to influence a sector-wide reform agenda; operated within a multi-donor forum; subject to continuous review by USAID and partners. The BESO NPA is often called "budget support" by Ethiopian partners.

About 80 percent of the US\$30 million in project assistance was targeted to the regional level in focus regions of Tigray and SNNPR, primarily for activities in support of IRs 1 to 4 through three key mechanisms described below. About 20 percent was allocated to the national level and to IR5, through the institutional contract and more limited support for USAID-direct policy dialogue and oversight.

- An <u>institutional contract</u> with the Academy for Educational Development (AED), is providing international and Ethiopian long- and short-term technical assistance (TA); degree and non-degree long- and short-term training; commodities and equipment; and some support costs for Regional Education Bureaus in Tigray (Mekele) and SNNPR (Awassa); Teacher Training Institutes (TTIs) at Adwa in Tigray and Awassa and Arba Minch in SNNPR; and to a more limited extent to the Ministry of Education's central Planning and Projects Department (PPD), and other national institutions such as the Institute of Curriculum Development and Research (ICDR), the Educational Media Agency (EMA), the Educational Materials Production and Distribution Agency (EMPDA), and Addis Ababa University's Faculty of Education.
- Two <u>cooperative agreements</u> with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), one with the Tigray Development Association (TDA), for Tigray, and one with World Learning International (WLI), for SNNPR, are supporting a Community School Grant Program involving provision of training, materials, and very small grants to primary school communities in all zones in Tigray and targeted zones and woredas in SNNPR. TDA will work with 85 percent of the 700 primary schools in Tigray and WLI will work with 45 percent of the 2057 primary schools in SNNPR.
- A <u>Regional Incentive Fund</u> (RIF) of US\$3 million, evenly split for the two focus regions, is disbursed directly by USAID through Project Implementation Letters (PILs) to the Regional Education Bureaus in Tigray and SNNPR based on satisfaction of "reform" objectives at the <u>regional</u> levels as well as detailed plans and budgets for RIF utilization. To date, the REBs have used the RIF primarily to finance procurement of vehicles and other necessary equipment, and for more limited local training costs.

USAID and its implementing agencies AED, WLI, and TDA have collaborated in development of an Ethiopian Government-lead team of national and regional partners in working on all 5 IRs, and have achieved significant successes at the school level with IR1 (school environment) through the Community School Grant Program and the School Leadership program, and IR2 (curriculum development). Achievements under IR3 (teacher training) have been satisfactory, but overall impact on teacher training systems are minimal, and the sustainability of gains to date is now in doubt. Achievements under IR4 (decentralized planning and administration) and IR4 (rational sectoral finance) have been slower, but some progress is now being made.

In furtherance of the 1994 Education and Training Policy, USAID and AED also collaborated with the government in development of the new national Education Sector Development Programme (ESDP) and the related regional ESDPs for BESO's focus regions of Tigray and SNNPR. The assessment team did not find any significant potential differences between USAID and the GFDRE or the Tigray and SNNPR REBs with regard to policy or plans. Current BESO financing and types of technical assistance fit within evolving ESDP implementation guidelines.

While BESO is fully in line with ESDP, however, in order to maintain flexibility while working to further the specific IRs of USAID's SO3, USAID and its implementing partners should collaborate closely with the regions and the central ministry to assure that BESO-financed activities are specified annually, cross-referenced, and integrated in annual plans and budgets. Although some uneven progress may occur as all parties learn to work within the more coordinated ESDP structure, there do not appear to be any significant policy issues or operational issues regarding future collaboration.

Because USAID shares the ESDP objectives, USAID intends to support them in the longer term --- beyond the current BESO contract/CoAgs -- in an efficient manner that meets GFDRE and USAID requirements. In order to do so in a rational manner, the assessment team proposes a two-track approach:

- <u>Track One</u>: Track One would continue activities through the existing completion dates of current BESO instruments, at planned funding levels, taking into account more detailed recommendations of this report. AED would continue to provide TA and training, and TDA and WLI would continue to carry out the CSGP through their current CoAg completion dates.
- <u>Track Two</u>: At the same time that existing BESO results are being achieved on Track One during the remaining two-to-three years of the contract/CoAgs above, USAID will re-assess USAID's assistance to education and the ESDP as part of development of USAID's Mission-wide Integrated Strategic Plan. USAID would move toward integrating remaining BESO funding into an overall Strategic Objective Agreement (SOAG) for SO3 with technical assistance and training (e.g. Project Assistance), and conditioned support (e.g. Non-Project Assistance) linked to achieve defined results.

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GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED

ABEL : Advancing Basic Education and Literacy
AED : Academy for Educational Development
BCCC : BESO Central Coordinating Committee
BESO : Basic Education System Overhaul

Birr : Ethiopian Currency, US\$1.00 = 6.68 Birr BRCC : BESO Regional Coordinating Committee

CD, CDA : Curriculum Development, Curriculum Development Advisor

CJSC : Central Joint Steering Committee

COTR : Contracting Officer's Technical Representative

Cov. : Covenant

CP : Condition Precedent

CSGP : Community School Grant Program

CSP : Country Strategic Plan

DHS : Demographic & Health Survey

EDGE : Education Discussion Group for Ethiopia

EMA : Educational Media Agency

EMIS : Education Management Information System

EMPDA : Educational Materials Production and Distribution Agency

ESDP : Education Sector Development Program
ESLC : Ethiopian School Leaving Certificate

GER : Gross Enrollment Rate

GFDRE : Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

GOTR : Grant Officer's Technical Representative

GPA : Grade Point Average

ICDR : Institute of Curriculum Development and Research

IR : Intermediate Result

IRI : Interactive Radio Instruction ISP : Integrated Strategic Plan

LT : Long Term

M&E : Monitoring and Evaluation

MEDAC : Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation

MOE : Ministry of Education
 MQS : Minimum Quality Standard
 NGO : Non-Governmental Organization
 NOE : National Office of Examinations

NPA : Non-Project Assistance PAP : Programme Action Plan

PIL: Project or Program Implementation Letter

pm : person month

GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED - continued

PMP : Performance Monitoring Plan PPD : Planning and Projects Department

PPMP : Project Preparation and Monitoring Panel

PVO : Private Voluntary Organization

R4 : Results Review and Resource Request

REB : Regional Education Bureau
RSC : Regional Steering Committee
RIF : Regional Incentive Fund
RPT : Results Package Team
SO : Strategic Objective

SNNPR : Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples Republic

ST : Short Term


TA : Technical Assistance

TDA : Tigray Development Association

TTC : Teacher Training College
TTI : Teacher Training Institute
TWG : Technical Working Group
WEO : Woreda Education Office
WLI : World Learning International

ZEO : Zonal Education Office

Map of Ethiopia



Unofficial map- boundaries are approximate

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1. BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY

1.1 Background

USAID Ethiopia is supporting the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (GFDRE) to improve the quality and equity of primary education in an expanded (and expanding) primary education system through the seven year, US\$80 million Basic Education Systems Overhaul program and project (BESO, Nos. 663-0014 and 663-0015). BESO is based on and supports the GFDRE's formal Education and Training Policy, promulgated in April 1994¹. BESO began in September 1994, and as of June 1998 USAID had obligated a total of US\$18.5 million in project assistance (PA) and US\$24 million in non-project assistance (NPA), or a total of US\$42.5 million, in support of BESO objectives.²

Since BESO was initiated, USAID's mode of operation worldwide has shifted from a focus on "projects" and "programs" to a more synergistic, results-based Country Strategic Plan (CSP). In Ethiopia, USAID's current CSP covers the period USFY 1995 through USFY 1999 (USCY October 1994 - USCY September 1999) and includes the BESO purpose, to improve the quality and equity of primary education in an expanded (and expanding) primary education system, as its Strategic Objective 3 (SO3). USAID Ethiopia is now beginning preparations to develop a new Integrated Strategic Plan (ISP) that will cover the period USFY 2000 - US FY 2005 (USCY October 1999 - USCY September 2004), and is identifying options to align its current activities with the new strategy as it unfolds.

Also since BESO was initiated, the GFDRE has developed a new, focussed, Education Sector Development Programme (ESDP) to provide more impetus to the 1994 Education and Training Policy. The objective of the ESDP is to improve overall educational attainment of the population while achieving greater social equity and achieve universal basic education by 2015. The first ESDP Programme Action Plan (PAP) is of five years duration beginning in EFY 1990 (USCY July 1997), and extends approximately two years beyond BESO's original termination date.

^{1.} This report uses the U.S. calendar and U.S. calendar years (USCY) as a common point of reference. U.S. fiscal voits (USFY) and Ethiopian Fiscal Years (EFY) are referenced to the USCY where necessary. Figure 2 in at page 8 provides a "key" to assist readers in this regard.

^{2. &}quot;Non-project assistance," or NPA, is a mode of USAID assistance whereby U.S. dollar transfers are targeted for debt relief and tied to the government meeting a series of conditions related to policy reform issues. USAID's use of NPA is generally predicated on strengthening African ownership and management of implementing the reform agenda, and is characterized by a systematic and comprehensive approach to influence a sector-wide reform agenda; operated within a multi-donor forum; subject to continuous review by USAID and partners. The BESO NPA is often called "budget support" by Ethiopian partners.

BESO is now at the half-way point in terms of both time and funding. Given the shifts in USAID operations and planned new strategy, and the recent inception of the GFDRE's ESDP, the two partners decided it was an opportune time to assess BESO's progress. USAID obtained the services of three consultants for a one month period to assist in this regard. This report is the result of their work.

1.2 Methodology

The general objective of the mid-term assessment is to provide guidance on how best to proceed with the implementation of BESO so as to achieve USAID Ethiopia's Strategic Objective 3 and to strategically align the BESO with the country's Education Sector Development Programme (ESDP). The review is to consider, inter alia: "...progress towards achieving the SO; effectiveness of implementation mechanisms; effectiveness of project/program management; responsiveness to a changing environment and government priorities for the education sector. ... The consultancy will also review the BESO results framework and the development hypothesis to identify implementation gaps and provide suggestions on whether the approach adopted to achieving the SO requires reconsideration." (Assessment Statement of Work, pp 3-4).

The assessment team's full statement of work is found as Annex A. It includes fourteen specific topics to be investigated in Addis Ababa and the two BESO focus regions, Tigray and the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples Region (SNNPR), over an approximate four week period.

The team comprised a Strategic Management Specialist, an Education Economist, and an Education Management and Teacher Training Specialist. The team formed in Addis Ababa during the period 16-25 May 1998, and undertook one-to-two weeks preparation/review of documents in Addis Ababa (team members had different start dates), one week of field work in SNNPR (Awassa and Arba Minch), and two weeks of follow-up interviews, drafting, and revising this report. In addition to interviews with key operational personnel and units, the team benefited from an early meeting with the Minister of Education and the Vice-Minister of Education as well as guidance from representatives of the high-level BESO Steering Committee and more operational Technical Working Group.

The team was unfortunately unable to travel to the focus region of Tigray due to the border conflict with Eritrea, and instead interviewed members of the BESO/Tigray team (Regional Education Bureau, contractors, grantees) in Addis and by telephone. The report incorporates and benefits from the results of these interviews, and identifies where field verification was not possible. The team believes the report to be fully responsive to the statement of work, given the travel limitations involved. The team's full workplan and schedule is found as Annex B, with a list of persons contacted as Annex C and selected documents reviewed as Annex D.

The report starts with a summary description of the program and its USAID and Ethiopian policy and strategic contexts (Chapter 2). This is followed by analyses highlighting the team's findings and conclusions regarding achievement of specific sub-objectives/intermediate results (Chapter 3), cross-cutting themes (Chapter 4), and program management (Chapter 5). The report concludes with an assessment of program impact to date (Chapter 6) and recommendations for strategic realignment to meet emerging needs (Chapter 7).

2. BESO EVOLUTION AND CONTEXT

2.1 Summary Description of Program

2.1.1 Program Design. USAID and GFDRE colleagues formulated the BESO program during the early 1990s as a response to significant declining enrollment and quality at all levels of Ethiopia's education system resulting from domestic political upheavals in the 1980s, and to the opportunities presented by the new Education and Training Policy. BESO addresses the key constraints affecting the learning-teaching situation at the primary school level, based on the hypothesis that strong and sustainable primary education is a function of sound policies, adequate financing, sufficient quality and quantity of school inputs (teachers, curriculum, materials) and effective administration.

The BESO purpose stated in formal September 1994 program documents was to improve the quality and equity of primary education in an expanded (and expanding) primary education system, and this statement has been retained as USAID's SO3 under the current Country Strategic Plan (CSP). The original BESO program was targeted at five "supporting objectives," which have been retained more-or-less intact as "intermediate results" (IRs) within SO3's results framework under the CSP. Figure 1 provides a comparison of the original 1994 supporting objectives and the new IRs that demonstrates this continuity of program vision.

Figure 1 also shows that BESO's conceptual framework clearly encompasses the USAID Bureau for Africa's recommended program dimensions of increasing access, equity, quality, efficiency, and sustainability of primary education. Following GFDRE policy, "primary education" is defined as Grades 1 to 8, although BESO's initial focus was primarily on Grades 1 to 4. Subsequent analyses in this report will demonstrate that these dimensions of primary education remain valid, and key, objectives of evolving GFDRE policy and strategy. The team concludes that the conceptual design hypothesis of a systems approach remains valid, and indeed continues to serve as the basis for new strategies for both the GFDRE and USAID.

Figure 1: Comparison of BESO Initial 1994 Objectives & Current Planned Intermediate Results								
September 1994: BESO Objectives from USAID Program Assistance Approval Document (PAAD) & Project Paper (PP)	March 1998: SO3 Intermediate Results from USAID Ethiopia's Country Strategic Plan, Strategic Objective 3 Results Framework							
Supporting Objective 1: Improved quality and equity of primary school environment.	Intermediate Result 1: Improved quality and equity of primary school environment.							
Supporting Objective 2: Improved efficiency and effectiveness of key quality-related services.	Intermediate Result 2: Increased pedagogical effectiveness of the content and quality of educational materials.							
Supporting Objective 3: Improved quality of preservice teacher training.	Intermediate Result 3: Improved performance and equity of teacher training graduates.							
Supporting Objective 4: Improved decentralized management of primary education.	Intermediate Result 4: Improved decentralized management of primary education.							
Supporting Objective 5: Increased and more rational and efficient sectoral financing.	Intermediate Result 5: Increased and more rational and efficient sectoral financing.							

2.1.2 Program Operations. As detailed in chapter 3 of this report, BESO's designers identified several specific "reform" and "project" sub-objectives for each of the five supporting objectives listed in Figure 1. The operating strategy to achieve these sub-objectives was again based on the systems approach, working simultaneously in two directions, from top-down and from bottom-up. The central "reform" sub-objectives were to be achieved through policy dialogue associated with non-project assistance transfers; "project" sub-objectives were to be achieved through technical assistance, training, and other project support to geographic regions of Tigray and SNNPR, with experience gained in the regions feeding back into the national level reform dialogue for greater national impact. The approach reinforced the decentralized, federal structure that had recently been established. This two-tiered operating strategy has been retained as originally designed, and has been generally effective in achieving identified results.

As further described in chapters 3 and 5, the US\$50 million in NPA was targeted at the national level to ensure that central policies and resources were mobilized to provide sufficient support to the school-level and to those institutions charged with providing support to schools for all five sub-objectives. Policy conditionalities were initially identified in the BESO design documents and have been pursued primarily through USAID-direct policy dialogue, with limited support from the lead contract technical assistance team. As of June 1998, USAID had disbursed two tranches of US\$8 million each in response to the GFDRE's achievement of mutually established policy conditionalities, with an additional US\$8 million already obligated and expected to be approved for disbursement by September 1998.

The US\$30 million in project assistance was targeted primarily to the regional level, in Tigray and SNNPR for activities in support of sub-objectives 1 to 4, and to a more limited extent to the national level and support of IR5, through three key mechanisms:

- an <u>institutional contract</u> with the Academy for Educational Development (AED), is providing international and Ethiopian long- and short-term technical assistance (TA); degree and non-degree long- and short-term training; commodities and equipment; and some support costs for Regional Education Bureaus in Tigray (Mekele) and SNNPR (Awassa); Teacher Training Institutes (TTIs) at Adwa in Tigray and Awassa and Arba Minch in SNNPR; and to a more limited extent to the Ministry of Education's central Planning and Projects Department (PPD), and other national institutions such as the Institute of Curriculum Development and Research (ICDR), the Educational Media Agency (EMA), the Educational Materials Production and Distribution Agency (EMPDA), and Addis Ababa University's Faculty of Education.
- two <u>cooperative agreements</u> with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), one with the Tigray Development Association (TDA), for Tigray, and one with World Learning International (WLI), for SNNPR, are supporting a Community School Grant Program involving provision of training, materials, and very small grants to primary school communities in all zones in Tigray and targeted zones and woredas in SNNPR. TDA will work with 85 percent of the 700 primary schools in Tigray and WLI will work with 45 percent of the 2057 primary schools in SNNPR.
- a <u>Regional Incentive Fund</u> (RIF) of US\$3 million, evenly split for the two focus regions, is disbursed directly by USAID through Project Implementation Letters (PILs) to the Regional Education Bureaus in Tigray and SNNPR based on satisfaction of "reform" objectives at the <u>regional</u> levels as well as detailed plans and budgets for RIF utilization. To date, the REBs have used the RIF primarily to finance procurement of vehicles and other necessary equipment, and for more limited local training costs.

2.2 Conformance with GFDRE Policy

As stated in 2.1 above, USAID and GFDRE colleagues formulated the BESO program during the early 1990s as a response to significant declining enrollment and quality at all levels of Ethiopia's education system resulting from domestic political upheavals in the 1980s. During this same period the GFDRE issued a White Paper on Education that led to the Education and Iranning Policy (ETP) of April 1994, which remains in force today. The ETP provided the policy context for the BESO design, and for many of the reform conditionalities for NPA disbursements. It also:

... represents a major shift of objectives. But major shift of objectives imply the need for the total overhaul of the education system in the country and necessarily calls for the formulation of an appropriate public investment programme as a conscious step

towards implementing the education policy in the near term development of education in Ethiopia. The logical outcome of this is the formulation of the ESDP. The ESDP ... covers the first five years of a 20 year sector development programme aimed at achieving, among others, universal primary education. (ESDP, p. 1)

The formal aim of the ESDP is to improve overall education attainment of the population while achieving greater social equity and achieve universal basic education by 2015. It is considered a comprehensive program affecting all levels of education with special focus on Regions so as to expand basic education and reduce disparity. Its objectives are specifically stated in terms of key recommended dimensions of educational programs:

- expand *access* to education with special emphasis on primary education in rural areas, raising enrollment from 3.1 million to 7 million;
- improve *equity* by improving enrollment ratios for girls to boys and for rural to urban populations by gender sensitive curricula and facilities;
- improve *efficiency* of the education system by institutional development and capacity building;
- improve *quality* and *relevance* by providing books, materials, curriculum improvements, and teacher training;
- improve *financing* for education by increasing public spending on education and facilitating private sector financing of education.

The ESDP and BESO thus share concerns of access, equity, quality, efficiency, and sustainability, and a focus on primary education. The ESDP is experiencing some predictable start-up problems related to operations, rather than concepts. It is grappling with determining appropriate roles, authorities and mechanisms for central-regional technical, administrative, and financial transfers; and with fitting the different policies and procedures of bilateral and international donors, and international and domestic NGOs, within its comprehensive framework. Many of these will be covered in forthcoming "Programme Implementation Manuals," which were not available during the team's visit. The ESDP's greatest problem is likely to be determining and allocating appropriate levels of available resources (human and financial) to achieve desired results, as demands for increased access and regional equity in the form of visible new schools is likely to overshadow the concomitant need for efficient, high-quality, relevant educational supplies and services.

USAID and its implementing agencies have collaborated with GFDRE partners in development of the national ESDP and the related regional SDP's for BESO's focus regions of Tigray and SNNPR. As discussed in subsequent sections of this report, the assessment team has not found any significant potential differences between USAID and the GFDRE or the Tigray and SNNPR REBs with regard to policy or plans. As described in chapter 5, current BESO financing ("channel 1(c)" for NPA, and "channel 3" for PA) and types of technical assistance ("technology transfer/institution building") fit within evolving ESDP implementation guidelines. As shown in chapter 7.2.2, proposed activities in the remaining 2-3 years of the

BESO project fit within ESDP component frameworks, usually as "recurrent" activities. Thus, although some uneven progress may occur as all parties learn to work within the more coordinated ESDP structure, there do not appear to be any significant policy issues regarding future collaboration.

2.3 Levels of Intervention

The BESO design was undertaken during a time of significant change in Ethiopia, as the former strong, centrist state moved to a decentralized, federal mode of governance. Given BESO's intended broad systems approach to addressing education sector needs, it was clear that the proposed USAID financing could not meet all needs at all levels of the federal structure. Designers decided instead to focus about 65-70 percent on national needs, through the planned US\$50 million in NPA and a small amount of the PA technical assistance and training resources, and the remaining 30-35 percent of resources on school, woreda, zonal, and regional needs in two key focus regions. As stated above, experience gained in the regions was to feed back into the national level reform dialogue for greater national impact.

The two regions chosen were Tigray and SNNPR. The choice was made based on a lengthy discussion process in Addis and the field, using criteria that included a combination of need, potential, stability, expressed interest, and accessibility for management purposes. In the end, the two regions chosen presented great contrast and very different opportunities: Tigray is geographically and demographically compact, with a cohesive, homogenous population of about 3 million and one primary language, Tigrigna. Tigray is particularly identified as the leader in the liberation struggle, and with losses incurred during those years. SNNPR is geographically vast with a heterogenous population of over 10 million that records 45 national languages (of which 11 are currently used in teaching). Communications and logistics in SNNPR present a major challenge to execution of any program.

As recorded in contractor and recipient reports, and summarized in chapter 3 of this assessment, BESO activities have progressed at about the same pace in each region in spite of such differences. There is a higher incidence of results in Tigray, due to its smaller size, but in fact many of the quality and equity results are proceeding apace. The balanced results of this unplanned "experiment" bodes well for future progress as ESDP and other national strategies move ahead.

2.4 Congruence with USAID and GFDRE Planning Periods

Figure 2 on the next page provides a summary of the overall "fit" and timing of USAID's primary implementation mechanisms for BESO within the overall BESO framework.

FIGURE 2: SUMMARY BESO RESOURCE FLOW

REFERENCE	E U.S. C/	/LEND/	R YEAR	3		,			1	1				i			REFERENCE U.S. CALENDAR YEARS									ı				ı					4	
	199	4	19	9 5		1	9 9	6		1	9 9	7		1	9 9	8		1	9 9	9		2	0 (0 (2	9 0	0 1			2 (0 0	2		2 0	0 3
US CY	SEP 94	OC7- DEC	Jan- api Mar ju	r se	- OCT P Dec	JAN- MAR	apr. Juh	JUL- SEP	DEC	Jah- Mar	APR- JUH	JUL- Sep	oct. Dec	Jah- Mar	apr- Jun	JUL- SEP	OCT- DEC	Jan- Mar	APR- JUH	JUL- SEP	OCT- DEC	Jan- Mar	· APR ? JUI	- JUL- 138 6	OCT PDE	JAN MAI	- APF R JU	R- JUI H SE	L- OC EP DE	T- JA EC PA	n- a ar .	LPR-	JUL- 938	OCT- DEC	Jan- Mar	APR- Jun
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Figure 2 also serves as a reference for dates as given in the U.S. calendar years (USCY), U.S. government fiscal years (USFY), and Ethiopian fiscal years (EFY). The team underscores that this figure is not meant to confuse readers but rather to enable those with different points of reference to fit the following discussion within a common framework.

Figure 2 shows that BESO NPA policy dialogue and disbursements began a year before the project-financed AED contract and TDA and WLI mechanisms were signed. This means that there is no common "Year 1," "Year 2," etc. within which to discuss BESO, so calendar dates have been used. Chapter 5.1 will discuss how the policy dialogue and NPA support has, in fact, proceeded in some cases somewhat independently of the BESO project assistance components. Chapter 7 includes some recommendations to reduce the imbalance between project- and non-project assistance, to reinforce the regional-national synergy, and to produce more impact overall.

Figure 2 also demonstrates that there are some key differences in phasing that may become important in the future. Simply, the first five year Program Action Plan (PAP) of the ESDP started in mid-1997 and is to run through mid-2002; USAID's current Country Strategic Plan ends in October 1999, with the new Integrated Strategic Plan (ISP) to run from October 1999 through 2004; the current BESO bilateral agreements both terminate in December 2001; and existing BESO contracts/CoAgs with AED, WLI, and TDA are generally targeted for completion in 2000. As stated earlier, the ESDP shares and elaborates on BESO's five objectives/intermediate results, and USAID intends to support it. Chapter 7 will include some recommendations on how to align USAID resources with these USAID and GFDRE shared objectives, to assure achievement of results overall.

3. FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS: PROGRAM OBJECTIVES/RESULTS

3.1 Support Objective/Intermediate Result 1: School Environment

- 3.1.1 Original Design/Plans. BESO was designed around a central principle that any intervention must be designed from the vantage point of the school. Its first supporting objective was thus *improved quality and equity of primary school environment*. The BESO design intended to improve the school environment through four sub-objectives;
 - 1.1: Stimulate parental and community involvement in primary school improvements and provide resources directly to school and communities to develop and implement strategies to improve the school environment;
 - 1.2: Establish an integrated School Leadership Development System:
 - 1.3: Improve teacher motivation; and
 - 1.4: Increase access and success of girls.

The NPA Agreement included a CP4 to the second tranche to "demonstrate that constraints to school-based local decision-making, revenue generation and management have been removed." There were no other NPA conditions associated directly with this IR, although all have an indirect impact on the school environment.

The primary means of achieving this sub-objective was to be through the two <u>cooperative</u> <u>agreements</u> with the NGOs, Tigray Development Association (TDA) and one with the international private voluntary organization (PVO), World Learning International (WLI) to undertake Community School Grants Programs involving provision of training, materials, and very small grants to primary school communities in all zones in Tigray (TDA) and targeted zones and woredas in SNNPR (WLI). The TDA CoAg was signed in September 1995, and WLI in February 1996, to run for five years. Although these are direct CoAgs between USAID and the respective NGOs, the partners have collaborated closely with the REBs in their respective focus regions.

Additionally, the BESO design included one two year long-term TA position in the AED contract for a School Leadership Training Advisor, which was to be split between Tigray and SNNPR. The School Leadership Training Advisor was responsible for:

... designing, organizing and managing a comprehensive program for primary leadership training and support to be undertaken in the two focus regions. ... The ... program... is intended to support improvements in the quality of school effectiveness by improving the nature and quality of primary school leadership and management. ... The Advisor will have to implement the program in both regions ... and... will receive general guidance from and report directly to the Contractor's Chief of Party. On specific operational and coordination needs, the incumbent will receive direction from the REB Directors (AED contract, C.4.7)

The AED contract included funds to support the School Leadership program, including provision for local-hire coordinators in each region to provide continuity while the expatriate advisor was travelling, and local costs for training zonal and woreda supervisors to better support teachers. The School Leadership Training Advisor was assigned one of the seven vehicles originally purchased for contractor use.

- 3.1.2 Evolution & Achievements to Date. As shown in Figure 3.1 at the end of this section, the shift to intermediate result (IR) status did not change the intent of this BESO element, and IR1 became *improved quality and equity of primary school environment*. The sub-IR statements 1.1 and 1.2 simplified the sub-objectives, and became.
 - sub-IR1.1: increased community involvement in primary education; and
 - sub-IR1.2: improved school leadership and management.

Sub-objective 1.4 was integrated into the others, but a focus on women was retained through a new sub-IR1.3: increased females in leadership positions. As described below, this sub-IR

was achieved through both the Community School Grants Program and the School Leadership Training Program.

Sub-IR1.1: <u>Increased community involvement in primary education</u>: This sub-IR is supported by both conditioned NPA and PA funding, the latter through cooperative agreements with NGOs. In response to the performance conditions in the NPA Agreement, the MOE has promulgated guidelines for school management committees concerning revenue generation and resource use. The school management committee structure has been legally established and a handbook prepared defining the roles and responsibilities of school management committee.

As summarized above, the CSGP is implemented through the Tigray Development Association (TDA) and World Learning International (WLI). The cooperative agreements are similarly structured. They are staffed by a core group: director, deputy, training coordinator, and M&E specialist. Four field coordinators and 40 development agents interact directly with the communities. Initial cash grants are provided to qualifying communities based on fulfillment of performance criteria, and subsequent grants are larger and awarded on a competitive basis to a declining number of schools. TDA plans to award grants to approximately 600 schools (approximately 85 percent of primary schools in the region); WLI plans to award 827 (45 percent of schools). The REBs approve annual implementation plans, and the CSGP is overseen by a regionally appointed steering committee.

The Community-School Grant Program is one of the most dynamic and effective activities of the BESO program, rebuilding the linkages between the schools and the community destroyed during the previous regime (often by the community itself). The program uses a three-phase approach to develop community support, strengthen school management and improve the educational aspects of the school. The first phase focusses on the relation between the community and the school, and the functions of the school committees. The second phase requires the school committee to assume more responsibility for school operations, interacting with woreda education officers, and establishing and overseeing school improvement processes (as opposed to infrastructure). The third phase, which has not yet begun, will deepen school committee management skills. Prior to the award of each grant, the school committee meets with the community to identify and prioritize problems, prepare a strategy and action plan, and initiate activities with their own resources. Development agents and NGO personnel provide guidance and training.

The assessment team visited several CSGP schools in SNNPR, conducted interviews with TDA staff via telephone, and reviewed progress reports for both regions. In both SNNPR and Tigray, the evidence of increased community support for the CSGP schools is striking. While the degree of support and specific activities vary among schools, all participating schools: are reported to have increased financial support to the school by matching or exceeding the grants in cash contributions; have financed in cash, materials and labor the repair or construction of new school facilities; have improved quality inputs, through the purchase of school supplies

and instructional materials; have improved school operations by managing the budget, requiring teacher lesson plans and monitoring teacher and student attendance and behavior; and have provided a more welcoming environment for girls by providing separate latrines, and forming a task force to support girls, discourage harassment and provide counselling. Several schools in SNNPR have even hired local teachers to staff new classrooms and paid to send them to teacher training workshops conducted by WLI with their own resources.

The scope of this evaluation can hardly do justice to the effectiveness of the CSGP, but the brief anecdotes from some SNNPR schools may provide the reader an idea of community creativity and enthusiasm for their schools and CSGP:

- 90 percent of the community has paid 5 birr per household to the school, including families whose children are not yet old enough to attend as an investment in future schooling;
- after the completion of each school improvement project, parents are invited back to the school to see what their funds and labor have accomplished. They are inspired and proud of the visible change: "...it looks like a real school and we did it ourselves, with our own resources;"
- parents stop by the school to check that their children are there ("no truancy tolerated"), and teachers must hold make-up classes if they are absent, which is closely monitored;
- the community has planted maize, coffee and eucalyptus seedlings to generate income; a tea room has been opened on the school grounds;
- a girls' sports program has been introduced, and the school committee introduces its top-ranked first and second grade students, both girls;
- parents of students, whose schooling was interrupted by civil strife, want to attend the newly opened 6-8th grade classes that they helped build;
- neighboring non-grant schools apply to CSGP school for guidance, study CSGP criteria and undertake improvements.

Increased community support and involvement are paying dividends in student enrollments and participation. A comparison of enrollment increases in three SNNPR zones between CSGP and total schools shows that enrollments in CSGP schools have increased at a faster rate for all children, but particularly for girls: this is notable in an area where girls' enrollments are low and the gender gap is wide. In a 19 school survey, TDA reported that the girls' drop-out rate in its schools decreased 3 percent, and found a decrease of 4 percent in repetition overall (although no baseline is provided).

Despite these achievements and the good relations with the community and woreda education offices, there are problems which mainly stem from a disconnect between the CSGP bottom-up approach and the REB top-down operation. A number of REB personnel interviewed by the team expressed an ambivalent mixture of skepticism, suspicion, and indifference toward the CSGP. An anonymous complaint to the regional council caused the REB to conduct two "secret evaluations" of the CSGP. Encouragingly, both times the REB found and reported that

the CSGP was a "good program that helped the schools." REB concern about the CSGP has contributed to some of the problems the CSGP is now facing, such as:

- <u>Timing</u>: The CSGP in SNNPR experienced a year's delay in start-up because of REB delays in approving the work plan and authorizing WLI to hire staff. In Tigray, negotiations over the latest rounds of school awards with the steering committee (headed by the REB) has resulted in a five month delay. Both recipients now must accelerate their programs to fit within the CoAg time frame.
- Size, scope and purpose of the awards: In SNNPR, the REB -- with WLI concurrence decided that competition for the second round of awards would "discourage" newly-motivated communities; this has had implications for the amount of the award and the number of schools covered. In Tigray, the steering committee suggested to TDA that it substantially increase the amount of the grants, after the REB expressed concern that communities would not have sufficient funds to construct classrooms according to REB norms. The concern is that the REB may see the CSGP as a means of augmenting its own construction program, rather than as a community mobilization fund. The import for TDA is that fewer schools can be assisted, and does raise questions about the approach of the program.
- Local partners: The selection of TDA as a recipient necessarily means that local capacity, structure and expertise to support school-community linkages is in place. In SNNPR, the WLI proposal to work with local NGOs was rejected by the REB on the grounds that this would increase program overhead. However, the management and delivery structure WLI has put in place does not have a secure future or institutional home.

Looming large over the CSGP in the south is the question of its sustainability because WLI is an international PVO and has not, to date, been able to formally engage Ethiopian NGOs in the program. This issue has been raised by REB officials, woreda staff, WLI and communities alike. One school committee member said they feared the program would end before they achieved an 8th grade at their school, but stated that they are determined to continue their effort even without CSGP support. Communities repeatedly stated that they could do without the award money but that they would sorely miss the assistance of the development agents. CSGP grantees stated that they hoped sustainability would be assured by the new awareness and skills they were working to instill in the school committees. REB officials in SNNPR simply noted that the program was not sustainable, but did not elaborate.

Sub-IR1.2: Improved school leadership and management: This sub-IR was implemented as a somewhat separate initiative by the Tigray and SNNPR REBs with the assistance of one AED expatriate advisor, who split her time between the two regions, and one Ethiopian coordinator hired by AED to maintain program momentum in each region. The expatriate advisor is now finishing her tenure and the program will be continued by the REBs as part of leadership initiatives envisioned under ESDP. The school leadership program will

thus be one of the first test cases of BESO's "sustainability of actions" as expatriate advisors, and the vehicles and other resources they convey, leave the REB.

The program defined "school leadership" narrowly at first, as the school headmaster and vice headmaster. It became evident early on that this definition unfortunately meant that few women ended up in the program, as there were no female headmasters. The definition was expanded to include headmasters, vice headmasters, and a senior teacher or unit head, and organizers strongly encouraged inclusion of at least one woman among the three. In this manner, out of about 1800 people trained, the program was able to assure more female participation and has reached 26 percent in SNNPR and about 40 percent in Tigray.

In consultation with the REBs, the program has worked in 19 "model" schools in Tigray (about 2 per zone) and about 60 in SNNPR (about 1 per woreda, for those participating). They have participated in a series of 5 trainings for zonal, woreda, headmaster, and senior teacher training. (The program learned early that it was important to include zonal and woreda officers to assure a strong supervisory and support structure for school leadership).

The program now comprises a series of widely decentralized (some site-based) trainings in a number of skills, with manuals and training norms well established. Under ESDP, the MOE is promoting more formal "school leadership" training for headmasters. The BESO focus region REBs will incorporate the curricula from the BESO program into this more formal structure, and in SNNPR the priority for headmasters to be trained for MOE certification will be given to those who have had the BESO leadership training.

The SNNPR REB expects to make one of the existing leadership schools in each woreda (there are now 60 leadership schools in 77 woredas) into the nucleus of a "cluster schools" model in the future, with 3 schools in each woreda participating. These cluster schools will continue to apply and expand the strategies from the "pilot", importantly moving from teacher-centered to pupil-centered methods like small group teaching in applying the new integrated curriculum in Grades 1 to 4. Although the team was unable to visit Tigray and speak with the REB leadership, AED reports that Tigray is also moving to the "cluster school" model, increasing participation to an estimated 35 schools.

Although there has been no overall impact evaluation, several case studies and zonal and woreda officers interviewed all support the view that participants are definitely applying skills learned. The REBs now need to move toward utilizing the model in a larger environment. The need for site-based in-service teacher-training is definitely recognized, and this model appears effective. USAID and the REBs need to closely monitor its evolution to a mainstream REB program.

3.1.1 Lesson Learned& Opportunities for Future.

CSGP: The priority of the CSGP over the remainder of BESO is to assure the continuation of its community and school support efforts, if not the program itself. To this end, some options are:

- WLI and TDA should work to improve linkages with the REB by involving them more in the CSGP. There are no serious gaps, although in the south, efforts to involve the REB were stymied by the REB's busy schedule and ways should be explored to increase its understanding of the program. Engaging the Planning Department in shared research activities could provide a venue. The NGOs should work with their respective REBs to assess certain programs (e.g., in-service teacher training) to incorporate approaches and lessons such as cost-recovery into the REB-managed site-based programs.
- WLI and TDA should foster increased woreda support of schools: Woredas were uniformly positive about and appreciative of the school grants program, regularly attending school meetings and grantee workshops and seminars, but their participation was generally as official spokespeople and observers. The NGOs could undertake to help interested woredas to develop their own school-community support action plans (in keeping with their budgets) and provide training.
- Both NGOs should increase community-community support: This is already happening on a very informal basis. Future interaction could be encouraged by gathering all schools at a woreda-based meeting to discuss what the CSGP school have done and how. CSGP and non-CSGP schools could be twinned, and partnerships developed, with the CSGP school committee providing training and guidance to its partner.
- USAID should facilitate increased national level support for the CSGP: It appears that relatively little is known about the CSGP at the national level, with the faint possibility that any CSGP practices will be adopted by other regions. USAID should consider supporting a workshop with a broad range of top officials (at the Prime Minister's Office, MOE. Women's Affairs, etc.) and donors to inform them of the successes of the program, as well as to brainstorm about how this could packaged into an MOE-supported program. One option could include national training of senior women teachers as mentors. Also, donors may want to work with the MOE to establish a foundation to fund work with schools.
- USAID should revisit the IR and sub-IR indicators, as indicators at the sub-IR level are too management-intensive to be useful for on-going decision making. The Mission should consider regional-level rather than CSGP-specific measures, particularly at the IR level, as these would be a more meaningful measure of impact on the primary school system overall.

For school leadership:

- The AED Curriculum Advisor in the north and either the Curriculum Advisor or Awassa TTI advisor should mentor the School Leadership Coordinators as the program moves into the cluster school mode. The program is at the "take-off point" and will need careful shepherding to expand without losing its impact.
- AED and the REBs should work to strengthen the program's "fit" within the ESDP teacher training component in subsequent annual REB plans, with particular attention to creating linkages between site-based training and certificate programs for Headmasters.
- USAID, in consultation with ICDR and the MOE Teacher Training Panel, should consider financing a "best practices" survey of in-service programs nationally, which would include an assessment of impact of BESO's school leadership efforts, to find which models/methods are cost-efficient and effective. Given the national debate on pre-service training (see chapter 3.3.3), carefully designed in-service programs are essential supplements. The qualitative achievements possible through experiences such as the BESO School Leadership pilot effort should not be lost as broader ESDP quantitative targets are pursued.

Figure 3.1: IR1: Improved quality and equity of primary school environment.

Indicators: • % of CSGP schools that improved their physical infrastructure: Tigray: FY-96-0%; FY97-100%

- % of CSGP schools that increased availability of procured educational materials: Tigray FY96-6% FY97-25%
- % of CSGP schools with initiatives to enhance girls education: Tigray: FY96-9% FY97-21%

PLANNED IN PAAD/PP 9/94	RESULTS FRAMEWORK (reported 3/98)	ACHIEVED 6/98
Sub-Objective 1.1: Stimulate parental and community involvement in primary school improvements and provide resources directly to schools and communities to develop and implement strategies to improve the school environment.	SUB-IR1.1: Increased community involvement in primary education.	SUB-IR1.1 is being achieved in Tigray and SNNPR regions: Tigray: 382 schools Phase 1, 144 Phase 2 SNNPR: 92 schools Phase 1, 30 Phase 2
Reform Objectives: Establishment of a legal framework for school governance and improvement. Improve the capacity of schools and communities to raise and retain revenue. Project Objectives: Development of school strategic plans. Provide incentive grants to schools. Assess interest and build the capacity of local partners. Facilitate the coordination and dissemination of lessons learned at the school level	Performance Indicators aj. These sub-IR indicators measure various degrees of "involvement" ranging from financial contributions to time spent in meetings among the school communities working with USAID recipients Tigray Development Association (TDA) in Tigray, and World Learning International (WLI) in SNNPR.	Reform Objectives: See IR 5.2 Project Objectives: Participating communities: - match/exceed grant sum - levy & pay "fees" - maintain school - purchase learning materials - manage income generation - pay for teacher training - hire local teachers - track students, monitor teachers - recruit/mentor girs - manage school/maintain supervisory presence - train other communities In SNNPR, enrollment growth increased 19% for CSGP, 15% for the region; and 31% girls enrollment increase as compared to 21% for the region.

PLANNED IN PAAD/PP 9/94	RESULTS FRAMEWORK (reported 3/98)	ASSESSMENT 6/98
Sub-Objective 1.2: Establish an integrated school leadership development program.	SUB-IR1.2: Improved school leadership and management.	SUB-IR1.2 is being achieved in Tigray and SNNPR.
Reform Objectives: • Establish terms and conditions of school director selection, recruitment and service: • Reform policies that mitigate against omen assuming leadership positions.	Performance Indicators Note: These are new indicators for which a baseline will be established in 1997/1998. The denominator is all primary schools in Tigray and SNNPR. Reporting will be based on REB statistics.	Over 1800 school headmasters, viceheadmasters, senior teachers, and zonal and woreda officials in 19 sites in Tigray (2 per zone) and about 60 sites in SNNPR.
Project Objectives: • Development of continuous, field-based in-service training for school leaders.	a. % of school directors that motivated teachers to improve classroom instruction through one initiative.	
 Development of local peer support networks. Development of site-based management teams 	b. % of school directors that motivated teachers to improve classroom instruction through two initiatives.	
	c. % of school directors that motivated teachers to improve classroom instruction through three or more initiatives.	

Sub-Objective 1.3: Improve teacher motivation.	Sub-IR1.3: Increased females in leadership positions.	Sub-IR 1.3 is being achieved.
Reform Objectives: Revised and improved terms and conditions of teacher service. Project Objectives: Enhance the role of teachers within the school environment. Improve teacher support services.	Note: "Leadership position" not defined. Performance Indicators: 1. % of females in leadership positions. Baseline 1996 to Achieved 1997 Tigray: 0.3% to 0.3% SNNPR: 0.25% to 0.25%	School leaderhips training achieved 25% in SNNPR and about 40% in Tigray in women's participation. Indicator requires re-definition and clarity.
Sub-Objective 1.4: Increase access and success of girls.	Not retained.	Not retained.
Reform Objectives: Establish minimum equity standards. Project Objectives: Understand local reasons for ow participation and poor performance of girls. Identify and take appropriate action at each level of the system that enables girls to be successful students and women to be successful teachers and leaders.		

3.2 Support Objective/Intermediate Result 2: Pedagogical Effectiveness

- 3.2.1 Original Design/Plans. Ethiopia initiated a major reform of its primary school curriculum in EY 1987 (USCY 1994-1995), and BESO was designed to support the reform in terms of curriculum development and testing as well as production of related educational materials (print and media). The original supporting objective statement for this BESO element was improved efficiency and effectiveness of key quality-related services. There were two sub-objectives which related to both the focus regions and the national capacities to support the regions:
 - 2.1: Develop the technical capacities of the regional curriculum, education materials, and mass media departments;
 - 2.2: Institutionalize mechanisms and technical capacity to monitor and evaluate the pedagogical effectiveness and assess the cost-effectiveness of quality related services.

The planned reform and project objectives to achieve these sub-objectives are reflected in Figure 3.2. In terms of <u>reform</u> objectives related to NPA disbursements, decentralization had only recently been promulgated through Proclamation 41/1993 and BESO designers were not sure how quickly it would be implemented. USAID thus included Covenants in the NPA agreement to assure that as regional capacities increased to develop, produce and disseminate curricula and education materials, the role of central state organs would contract accordingly. In order to promote such system efficiency particularly with regard to textbook printing by EMPDA, the NPA Agreement included one Condition Precedent "to undertake steps to encourage private sector procurement of education goods and services, and remove barriers to market entry."

The BESO design identified the AED contract as the primary mechanism to provide assistance in support of <u>project</u> objectives. It included funding for two years each of Curriculum Development Advisors (CDA), one each in Mekele, for Tigray, and Awassa, for the SNNPR. The CDAs were to be assigned to the respective REBs. They were to:

...provide on a daily basis guidance on curriculum development, implementation and evaluation practices, particularly as this applies to the primary system. While the CDA will receive general direction and oversight from the Senior Policy and Planning Advisor [of the AED contract], the Curriculum Department Head [of the REB] will serve as his/her counterpart. The CDA must provide advice and technical support for the strengthening of skills and procedures in all aspects of the primary education curriculum development process ... (AED contract, C.4.5.)

To help achieve this IR, the AED contract included funds to support local costs associated with the Advisors' activities, such as workshop and training materials, 18 person months of short-term TA, some of the contract's for U.S. and African study tours, and U.S. Masters degrees, and an unspecified amount of funds for procurement of equipment and materials for

3.2.2 Evolution & Achievements to Date. As shown in Figure 3.2, this BESO element's shift to Intermediate Result status also included a minor shift in the concept. The IR statement is increased pedagogical effectiveness of the content and quality of educational materials, thus strengthening attention to pedagogy and content, and dropping the concept of "efficiency" at the IR level. However, as shown in Figure 3.2, the sub-objective statements remained about the same when they shifted to sub-IR status, so concerns of efficiency were not lost.

USAID has decided to measure achievement of the IR annually through two indicators related to curriculum content, and USAID's March 1998 Results Report cited substantial increases in such content in each region. However, USAID has not defined the measures adequately. It appears that the regions report independently, with different criteria for measurement, and the reports have little context due to lack of comparable national data. The assessment team suggests that USAID work with the BESO and REB teams to more clearly define these indicators for future more comparable reporting.

In spite of some confusion on indicators, achievements under this IR are among the most successful of BESO to date. This conclusion was strongly communicated to assessment team members by informants at all levels, including senior GFDRE officials at the center; the SNNPR REB Head; REB departmental technical personnel; TTI principals and instructors from Adwa, Arba Minch, and Awassa; and SNNPR Zonal and Woreda officers, school headmasters and teachers. (We remind readers the assessment team did not travel to Tigray). Both the Director of ICDR in Addis, and individual technicians from the REBs, noted that based on output and on contributions to national workshops and conferences, the Tigray and SNNPR REB Curriculum Departments are clearly among the strongest in the country in terms of knowledge and skills related to high quality curriculum development and relevant materials production.

The assessment team adds the caveat that the curricula being produced are only being fully phased in this year (and grades 1 and 2 are already being revised), so true "effectiveness" cannot yet be measured in school settings. However, testing in "tryout" schools and the recognized strengths of regional professionals in Tigray and SNNPR to develop and produce relevant, quality curricula and materials suggest that achievement of an effective curriculum in widespread use is highly likely. In service teacher training in application of new materials is now critical to assure "effectiveness" throughout the regions.

Much of this success is due to the strength of the AED long-term Curriculum Development Advisors in the focus regions. AED was able to fill the positions on schedule with well qualified personnel, and the REBs were able to utilize their skills and provide a supportive working environment. Both Tigray and SNNPR REBs have found the TA useful enough that

they have decided to extend the CDA position for an additional two years each. The assessment team endorses these position extensions to continue the momentum of efforts to date. The final primary school curriculum reforms will be completed this year, and a new textbook policy supporting decentralized production should be promulgated. Two more years of effective TA in the new policy context should assure that educational materials developed in support of the new curriculum can be produced and disseminated by the REBs in a cost-effective manner.

The individual CDAs have worked closely with their counterparts to apply relevant national policies and guidance at the respective REBs in research, development, testing, and revision of the new "integrated" primary school curriculum for the first cycle (Grades 1-4) and new linear curriculum for second cycle (Grades 5-8). All new curriculum promotes active learning and is gender sensitive. In close collaboration with ICDR at the center, they have worked with "tryout" schools to test and improve curriculum and assure it is geared to the pupils' environments. In close collaboration with colleagues at the REBs, and in spite of very high staff turnover in both focus regions, they have provided numerous trainings throughout the focus regions to transfer skills and knowledge of content and process to REB and Zonal officers, staff, and frequently used commissioned writers. Each of the focus regions are developing a "critical mass" of technical personnel (full-time REB and Zonal, as well as part-time commissioned writers) to be able to continue this research-development-testing-revision process in the future.

In support of these core activities at the regional levels, AED has deployed TA in a number of ways: the REBs have undertaken some field survey research themselves (e.g. studies of the use of radio in the regions), and other long-term AED TA have added specific topics, such as Distance Education, to their workloads. In 1997, AED utilized contract short-term TA to undertake an initial study on cost options for regional production of text books in SNNPR, and it is planning a similar study in Tigray. These will prove useful as the REBs increase their ability to produce camera-ready copy. In early 1998 AED provided 3 pm short-term TA to EMA in development of interactive radio curriculum for English, and each focus region REB sent personnel to work with the experts at EMA. This work appears to have been well-received although it is too early to measure any results.

In terms of support to the BESO <u>reform</u> objectives, decentralization has progressed rapidly and the roles of ICDR, EMA, and EMPDA are not as important an issue as at the time of design. ICDR, in curriculum, and EMA, in radio, have prudently realigned their mandates to support regions, and both are providing useful support to the BESO focus regions as requested. Because primary school curriculum and textbooks have moved to regional authority, EMPDA has become much less of a player in direct provision of services. Based on studies funded by Japan through the World Bank as part of a related program, the Ministry of Education was convinced that opening the door to the private sector could increase improvement in the quality and timeliness of distribution of educational materials such as textbooks, furniture, and school supplies. It has implemented its 1995 proclamation that private firms can compete for

providing these services, and now requires EMPDA to advertise and actively solicit bids from the private sector.

The assessment team found that in the focus regions, REBs are desk-top publishing and/or relying on local printers for most materials for "tryout" efforts without the involvement of EMPDA. However, due to the uneven ability of printers in both regions to produce high quality materials in a timely manner, EMPDA is still called upon to fulfill a "brokering" role in competing large print runs in Addis and other regions. Both regions plan to pursue further studies to determine the most cost-effective options for future materials production within the focus regions.

Through the AED contract, BESO funding provided for international study tours in curriculum design and development for 20 persons in two groups (19 men, 1 woman) to Colorado; in multilingual curriculum and methodology for 12 persons (11 men, 1 woman) to South Africa; interactive radio instruction for 7 people (5 men, 2 women) to South Africa and Lesotho; and innovative materials development for 6 people (5 men, 1 woman) to Uganda. Participants and non-participants interviewed in this assessment claimed that these study tours have been generally beneficial to the individuals and the institutions with which they work; many cited use of materials and/or application of pedagogical techniques obtained abroad as evidence.

One of the three BESO-financed Masters degree candidates in the U.S. is studying curriculum development in multilingual situations. The Ministry of Education, the BESO Chief of Party, and USAID have recently determined that U.S. Masters degrees are not the most cost-effective means of providing this level of training, and that in-country capacity to provide masters in Curriculum Development and in Education Management should be developed. The assessment team was informed that some BESO training funds under the AED contract will thus be shifted to develop two Distance Education master's programs to provide for 20 scholarships for regional level and 25 for central level personnel to obtain such degrees from Addis Ababa University's Faculty of Education. It was not clear to the team where the funds for technical assistance for the development of the Faculty's capacity to provide these courses, nor funds for the supervision and counselling for students would be found.

3.2.3 Lessons Learned & Opportunities for Future. The success of the combination of project and non-project resources to increase pedagogical effectiveness of the content and quality of educational materials should continue at least for the next two years, as AED Curriculum Development Advisors continue their work in the REBs, in close collaboration with ICDR at the center, and with regional TTIs and Zonal and woreda officers in the focus regions. Both incumbent CDAs have worked closely with their Departments and the overall REB in future planning, so a "fit" with the ESDP component activities in curriculum development should not be a problem. This is a clear case where BESO, REB, and central resources are being well managed to achieve results.

Future progress to achieve this IR will continue the curriculum improvement process, but move more to a production and dissemination focus. Regional production of materials -- both print and other media -- remains important in both regions due to use of national languages as primary school medium of instruction through Grade 8. Both regions have had recent experience with producing camera-ready copy and expect to improve their abilities in the next two years. In Tigray, this will be easier as the educational media staff moved into the curriculum department about one year ago, and have participated in much training to date. In Awassa, the textbook and media (radio and TV) staff are in the separate Educational Services Support Department, and have less day-to-day contact with the curriculum development

process and the desk-top publishing efforts. The SNNPR REB needs to review this structure

to assure that the most efficient means of production is found.

In Tigray, use of Tigrigna orthography is well developed and print materials are not generally problematic. In SNNPR, however, the 1994 Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia identified approximately 45 languages. Eleven of these, including Amharic and English, are currently used in the schools, and development of curricula in some others is underway. The REB has recently welcomed a new Multilingual Advisor from the Summer Institute of Linguistics, who should provide invaluable insight to REB, Zonal, and woreda efforts in curriculum and materials development and production. Given the ESDP emphasis on equity, efficiency, quality, and relevance, however, especially in SNNPR but also in Tigray, continued study of different cost options for regional desk-top or other types of production is merited, and should be supported by BESO.

As the Curriculum Departments move toward camera-ready copy and, possibly, local production, as part of the SDP they must begin to provide more coordinated support in to ongoing interactive radio instruction in their regions. In Tigray, the REB has recently staffed up for media. It has a functional recording studio but this has been generally using programs associated with the old curriculum. Now that the curriculum reform is complete, the Tigray REB can start producing programs geared to the new curriculum, and its print colleagues will assist in complementary materials production.

In SNNPR, Irish Aid has recently refurbished a new 10 KVA transmitter in Yirgalem, and EMA is maintaining the relatively new one in Woleita Sodo. The REB Educational Support Department has proposed structures for the two broadcast stations, and for a new recording studio that is in storage at EMA until staffing is approved. As stated earlier, in SNNPR the Educational Support Department and the Textbook and Media Divisions therein are separate from the Curriculum Department, and have not been fully staffed until recently. However, the Department is now staffing up, and merits BESO attention in carrying out its responsibilities in the SNNPR SDP. Within the confines of the ESDP budget, and in keeping with the idea of "value-added" for expatriate TA, the AED long-term CDA should be ready to provide assistance in script and complementary materials production to the interactive radio programs as part of her IR2 responsibilities.

FIGURE 3.2: IR2: Increased pedagogical effectiveness of the content and quality of educational materials.

IR Indicators:

- From 1995 to 1997, Tigray region increased from zero to 15% and SNNPR from 5% to 30% in the level of student-centered content in environmental science, mathematics, and national languages materials for Grades 3 and 4
- From 1995 to 1997, Tigray region increased from 0 to 20% and SNNPR from 50% to 70% in content relevant to pupils environment found in primary school educational materials.

Note: These indicators were used in USAID's March 1998 Results Report. USAID needs to work with the REBs and AED Advisor to clarify definitions and means of measurement.

PLANNED IN PAAD/PP 9/94	RESULTS FRAMEWORK (reported 3/98)	ASSESSMENT 6/98
Sub-Objective 2.1: Develop the technical capacities of the regional curriculum, educational materials, and mass media departments.	SUB-IR2.1: Improved technical capacity of regions to develop curriculum, educational materials, and mass media programs.	Sub-IR 2.1 is being successfully achieved.
Reform Objectives: Commitment to improved regional curriculum, textbook and media capacity. Project Objectives: Improved regional curriculum development capacity. Improved regional textbook and media design and development capacity Improved capacity of central institutions to support regions. (ICDR, EMPDA, EMMA, "possibilities will be explored AAU)	Performance Indicators a. Increased regional capacity to produce textbooks and educational materials. Proxy: % of types of textbooks prepared in camera-ready copy. Baseline 1995 to Achieved 1997 Tigray: 0 in 1995 to 30% in 1997 SNNPR: 0 in 1995 to 5% in 1997 b. Average number of times resource center used. Baseline 1995 to Achieved 1997 Tigray: 0 in 1995 to 2 in 1997 SNNPR: 0 in 1995 to 4 in 1997	 Reform Proclamation 41/1993 defines the respective power and duties of the Central and Regional education offices, and these have been respected and refined. Project REB, Zone, and woreda full-time personnel and commissioned writers have been trained and are producing national language textbooks and other educational materials. Tigray has collaborated with local printers to desk-top publish, and SNNPR should issue its first textbooks in cameraready copy next year. More work needs to be done with interactive radio instruction through existing facilities in both regions in the coming years. ICDR and EMA routinely provide technical and material support to regional efforts. EMPDA is no longer a major player in primary school texts although it facilitates competitive procurement on behalf of the REBs. Discussions are underway with the Faculty of Education at AAU to provide Distance Education Masters programs.

PLANNED IN PAAD/PP 9/94	RESULTS FRAMEWORK (reported 3/98)	ASSESSMENT 6/98
Sub-Objective 2.2: Institutionalize mechanisms and technical capacity to monitor and evaluate the pedagogical effectiveness and assess the costeffectiveness of quality-related services.	SUB-IR2.1: Established institutional mechanism and technical capacity to promote and evaluate the cost-effectiveness of quality services.	Sub-IR 2.2 is being successfully achieved although emphasis on assessing cost-effectiveness of different combinations of media and materials for effective pedagody must be reinforced.
Reform Objectives: • Commitment to evaluate the cost effectiveness and pedagogical effectiveness of educational services. (COV)	Performance Indicators Note: Each region had 30 ICDR tryout schools as of 3/98.	Reform NPA Agreement Covenents and CP 10 on cost savings through competitive procurement was deemed to be met as part of the release of the second tranche of NPA in July 1997.
 Pursue cost savings through competitive procurement and greater private sector provision of services. (CP 10) Project Objectives: Development of permanent, decentralized capacity to monitor and evaluate the pedagogical effectiveness of educational inputs and interventions. 	a. Proportion of tryout schools involved in providing feedback on the curriculum of total tryout schools. (Baseline 1995: Involvement of schools in providing feedback on the curriculum non-existent in both regions.) Baseline 1995 to Achieved 1997 Tigray: 0 in 1995 to 100% in 1997	Project REBs in focus regions have used BESO assistance to provide 2-3 trainings/year for Zone, woreda and school personnel to increase capacity in monitoring and evaluation. Tryout schools are not BESO specific, but are tangible evidence of strong REB-ICDR cooperation in curriculum development. BESO will assist both Tigray and SNNPR REBs to expand curriculum testing to additional schools in coming
 School-based capacity to monitor pedagogical effectiveness. Evaluation of cost-effectiveness of textbook production and distribution. 	1 1gray: 0 in 1995 to 100% in 1997 SNNPR: 0 in 1995 to 100% in 1997	years Tigray will increase to 10% of its 700 schools and SNNPR to 62, or almost one per each woreda in this large region. Both regions have commissioned a series of studies to assess the cost options for textbook production and distribution.

3.3 Support Objective/Intermediate Result 3: Teacher Training

- **3.3.1 Original Design/Plans**. The original supporting objective statement for this BESO element was *improved quality of pre-service teacher training*. There were three initial sub-objectives which related to both the focus regions and the national capacities to support the regions:
 - 3.1: Recruit better quality entrants into teacher training;
 - 3.2: Increase the number of women entering and completing pre-service teacher training;
 - 3.3: Improve the quality of pre-service teacher training instructional program;

An original sub-objective 3.4 was eliminated early in the program as USAID determined it was redundant with the overall supporting objective.

The planned reform and project objectives to achieve these sub-objectives are reflected in Figure 3.3. With reference to the figure, in terms of <u>reform</u> objectives related to NPA disbursements, the NPA Agreement included three Conditions Precedent (CPs) to disbursement and several Covenants. The first CP was to "produce an acceptable plan of action for teacher certification." Two others related to demonstrating annual increases in the recurrent budget of TTI budgets. Covenants related to increasing the TTI's control over recruitment of trainees; increasing the proportion of female TTI entrants and providing support systems for female trainees; and improving TTI curriculum in line with primary school curriculum reform.

The BESO design identified the AED contract as the primary mechanism to provide assistance in support of <u>project</u> objectives. It included funding for five years each of three Teacher Training Advisors (TTAs) assigned to specific TTIs, one each at the Adwa TTI, for Tigray, and the Awassa TTI and the Arba Minch TTI, for the SNNPR. The TTAs were to:

...guide the leadership and staff of the TTIs in the complete reform of their programs. ... to accomplish a new program of instruction which matches student teacher learning and performance objectives and articulates well with the primary school curriculum. ... The incumbent will serve as an advisor to the TTI Principal on all institutional reform and improvement matters. The TTA will also interact with other TTI administrative and instructional staff to guide the implementation of agreed upon plans. (AED contract, C.4.6.)

The AED contract also included provision for 16 person months of short-term TA in teacher training, to be drawn as needed. Also, some of the AED contract's provision for 60 pm of U.S. and 80 pm African study tours, and 14 two-year U.S. Masters degrees was to be

allocated to this sub-objective, and as was an unspecified amount of funds for procurement of equipment and materials for the TTIs.

3.3.2 Evolution & Achievements to Date. As shown in Figure 3.2, this BESO element's shift to Intermediate Result status also included a significant shift in the concept. The IR statement is *improve performance and equity of teacher training graduates*, which broadens BESO's concern from the early <u>pre</u>-service work to broader <u>in</u>-service training as well. As described below, this shift has only started to be implemented, with important plans for future years. As shown in Figure 3.3, in spite of the significant shift, the sub-objective statements remained about the same as they shifted to sub-IR status, concentrating on TTI recruitment (IR3.1); women students (IR3.2); and improved pre-service TTI program (IR3.3).

As background, as part of the decentralization actions following the Proclamation No. 41/1993, responsibility for primary school teacher training was delegated to the regions along with responsibility for primary schooling. There were 12 teacher training institutes (TTIs) in Ethiopia at the beginning of BESO, of which one (Adwa) was in Tigray and two (Awassa and Arba Minch) were in SNNPR. TTI's are one-year programs to train teachers to the Certificate level for Grades 1-4. Teacher Training Colleges (TTCs) are two-year programs to train teachers to the Diploma level for Grades 5-8. There is a new TTC in Tigray, at AdiAdi, and a TTC in Awassa, on the same grounds as the Awassa TTI. The original BESO design did not specifically address assistance to TTCs.

As described in chapter 3.2 above, first cycle primary education (Grades 1-4) uses an "integrated" curriculum and second cycle (Grades 5-8) has a more traditional "linear" curriculum. Thus knowledge and methods required for the two levels of primary school are different. Teaching second cycle (Grades 5-8) requires two-year Diploma status (although not all such teachers have it), and thus is associated with higher status and better pay than teaching first cycle (Grades 1-4). In the established teacher career ladder, in fact, the formal, desired progression is to move from teaching Grades 1-4 to teaching Grades 5-8. Structurally, there is no particular professional status or career incentive to remain a first cycle (grades 1-4) primary teacher.

Sub-IR3.1: Better qualified entrants into teacher pre-service training recruited. This sub-IR assumed that when entry level skills are closely matched with the teacher training curriculum, there would be less time devoted to remediation and more time given to content and teaching process. However, BESO did not initially address the issue of differential incentives between first and second cycle teaching. This sub IR3.1 focussed primarily on TTls and thus first cycle teachers, and was achieved through a combination of project and non-project assistance.

The central GFDRE issued recruitment guidelines and forwarded them to the regions to adapt them according to local conditions. The regions in turn have worked with the zonal and

woreda education offices and the TTIs to follow and implement the guidelines. The TTIs have been empowered to prepare entrance examinations, and to administer and process results. In the BESO focus TTIs each has done so somewhat differently, and each has improved levels of entrants over time. The general criteria include high school grade point average (GPA); scores on the Ethiopian School Leaving Certificate (ESLC); and performance on the TTI entrance examination. Each TTI has set its own weights for these criteria, and they vary slightly. Adwa TTI has also undertaken a study of the predictive power of different entry requirements that suggests that high school GPA is more important than ESLC, and is adjusting criteria accordingly. Although Awassa TTI still has to negotiate some entrants with zonal officials, for the most part this sub-IR is being achieved. The results shown in Figure 3.3 demonstrate significant improvement in trainee entry levels and performance.

Achievement of sub-IR3.1 was also supported by one NPA CP, to "produce and acceptable plan of action for teacher certification," and one Covenant related to increasing the TTI's control over recruitment of trainees. As stated above, these conditions were met and contributed to different NPA disbursements.

Sub-IR3.2: <u>Increasing the number of women entering and completing pre-service</u> teacher training, has been achieved in the focus regions. As show in Figure 3.2, the Government applied a 30 percent admission quota which has been surpassed in all cases. Also, the grade point average for female trainees is increasing as more girls apply, and the differential between male and female trainees is decreasing.

The 1994 Education and Training Policy gave priority to gender equity in schools. In Awassa and Arba Minch TTIs, female enrollment has increased from 35 to 40 percent since 1994/1995. In Awassa TTI, women trainees constituted 53 percent of the 1997/1998 intake. Arba Minch TTI women's enrollment increased from 31 percent in 1994/1995 (pre-BESO) to 37 percent in 1997/98. In Adwa, which does not have dormitory facilities, there is a steady increase in female enrollment.

Each of the three BESO-supported TTIs has improved physical facilities and psychic support for female students. The physical facilities include improvement/increase in number of women's toilets, showers, and dormitories (in Arba Minch and Awassa). All three schools have also established tutorial programs, which have been expanded to include men. All three also undertake gender sensitization efforts with teachers, and among male and female students. At present there is one female instructor each in Adwa and Awassa, and a recently recruited female counselor in Arba Minch. These teachers have taken the lead in assessing specific problems of female students, and helping devise means to overcome them. The Arba Minch counsellor undertook a needs assessment which led to a work-study program for all destitute students. This attention to needs, provision of role models, and active outreach and mentoring, has also contributed to increasing self-esteem and reducing drop-out rates among female students.

In Adwa, the BESO Advisor has promoted a broader network among women teachers and with the Tigray Women's Association, to provide a supportive environment for female teachers after they leave the TTI. The Advisor also worked closely with the AED Addis Ababa office to arrange a study tour for five female primary school teachers from Tigray and five from SNNPR to Kenya, in collaboration with the Forum of African Women in Education (FAWE). The tour was by all accounts a rousing success, and the teachers are now serving as the nucleus of a wider support network for women teachers in their regions.

Sub-IR3.3: Improved quality of pre-service teacher training. The 1994 Education and Training Policy and the 1997 ESDP objectives are congruent with BESO's support for first cycle teacher training at the TTIs. BESO assistance, primarily through the efforts of the three AED Advisors, comprised:

- instructional support resources and facilities;
- student support system academic and welfare;
- curriculum development revision and refinement;
- staff training -- improving teaching and learning;
- staff development -- workshops, in-service, exposure, further education.

In Arba Minch, AED funds also contributed to significant physical upgrading, primarily of womens' dormitories and facilities but also provision of a stand-by generator and provision of screening for all dorms and classrooms, to reduce the very high morbidity rates due to malaria. AED also help the TTIs acquire and/or rehabilitate vehicles to facilitate student teaching and supervision activities. AED is now financing preparation of a Master Plan for new construction and long-term development of Adwa TTI; actual construction will be funded by other means under the ESDP.

Mention should also be made of the close collaboration between REB Curriculum Departments and TTIs in both focus regions, in terms of testing curriculum and training student teachers in its use. Also, there has been impressive collaboration among TTIs, WLI, and Zonal and Woreda Education Offices (ZEOs and WEOs) in the SNNPR in some of the "model schools". Student teachers from the TTIs are working in supportive school environments fostered through the CSGP efforts of WLI and its ZEO and WEO colleagues, and will apply these experiences in their future careers. This close collaborative work among contract advisors, TTIs, REBs, ZEOs, WEOs, and local communities at the grass roots is, in fact, one of the more exciting parts of the BESO program (see chapter 3.1 on the school grants program).

The central ICDR, the MOE Teacher Education Panel, and TTI principals and instructors at the three TTIs all acknowledge the outstanding contributions made by the AED Advisors and related contract support. Some achievements include, in brief: developing new curriculum materials for staff and trainees to help achieve more student-centered learning, and to make teacher training more appropriate for first cycle (Grades 1-4) curriculum; training the TTI staff

on the methods of student-centered teaching and methods of curriculum integration within and between subjects; establishing tutoring centers in the TTIs; establishing instructional resource centers; providing computer skills training for developing teaching and learning materials; and developing action-research skills to improve teaching. TTI principals and instructors have also participated in AED-sponsored study tours in Africa and the US. Participants and non-participants claim the returnees are using knowledge gained from these tours in their work in Ethiopia.

In terms of "reform" objectives, the NPA agreements have included to date two CPs related to demonstrating annual increases in the recurrent budget of TTI budgets. Although USAID has deemed these to be achieved, informants told the assessment team that these CPs were not well stated and the definition of what constitutes "recurrent costs" was confusing. One TTI pointed out that although salaries had increased, a number of non-salary recurrent costs that had decreased, including those for electricity and water, as his student population increased, and questioned whether this was the intent of the CP? The team recognizes that not all budget line items can be increased within a fixed resource scenario. However, rational allocation of resources to TTIs will become increasingly important as more TTCs are opened and compete for scarce resources with TTIs. The team recommends that USAID link the CP wording more closely to specific codes in the chart of accounts, and monitor them closely with the TTIs.

Another "reform" objective for this sub-IR was to undertake a "critical analysis of the implications of the proposed two levels of primary schooling and teacher training" and a related "reform of TTI curriculum." These are currently very controversial issues. The TTI curriculum has been generally reformed to respond to the new "integrated" curriculum for first cycle (Grades 1-4) and linear curriculum of second cycle (Grades 5-8). However, because of the ambitious requirements for new teachers under the ESDP, there is a lot of pressure to increase the number of second cycle (Grades 5-8) teachers. Second cycle is still a linear curriculum, and includes content areas that are not covered in TTIs (specifically biology, chemistry, and physics). There is some pressure to include these content areas in the TTI curriculum for first-cycle, to enable the TTI graduates to move up to TTCs. In this case, some have asked whether TTIs are developing first cycle teachers, or simply undertaking college preparatory work?

The TTI course is currently one year, which due to the time taken to deliver the entrance exam, score it, and conduct interviews, is actually only about 6 to 7 months of curriculum. The government is now planning to shift the current "one year" course that follows Grade 12 (the "12 + 1" option) to a two-year TTI curriculum following Grade 10 (the "10 + 2" option) in two or three years. Any current curriculum assessment and arguments need to take these plans into account, particularly given their ramifications in terms of projected numbers of graduates/year (the 10+2, at current TTI capacity, will effectively cut annual output in half) and cost-per-graduate (the 10+2 option will almost double costs).

The AED Advisor for Awassa TTI is also working closely with the MOE to develop a distance education course to upgrade the south's uncertified teachers. Given the important and occasionally heated national debate on pre-service curriculum, it was not clear to the assessment team what the proposed distance education curriculum base -- integrated or linear -- or the course content would be. The whole sub-sector of pre-service training clearly needs more careful assessment prior to any commitment of additional USAID resources.

- 3.3.3 Lessons Learned & Opportunities for Future. In order to make the BESO contribution more sustainable, the following issues should be addressed:
 - Pre-service training curricula and norms for both first cycle (Grades 1-4) and second cycle (Grades 5-8) must be assessed and harmonized on a national basis, with due attention to the up-coming 10+2 program, prior to embarking on any new initiatives in developing distance education or other training programs. A mechanism for transferring pedagogical experience of BESO to the new 10+2 TTIs needs to be devised. Some of this might form a useful and meaningful CP for future NPA funding.
 - In support of this harmonization exercise, the principals, instructors, and advisors from three BESO focus region TTIs form a strong nucleus to help move ideas along. They should be encouraged to get together and develop a strategy, or strategy options, to help the national level reach closure on syllabi, curricula frameworks, and norms. There is no particular need to bring in more technical assistance to address this issue, given the Teacher Training advisors and well-trained staff in country. In addition, both remaining AED Curriculum Advisors have undertaken teacher training, are keenly aware of the issues, and highly valued by ICDR. These advisors and their colleagues in the REB Curriculum Departments should also be viewed as key resources in resolving the debate.
 - USAID, through BESO, has spent money, time, and expertise working in the two regions. As of this writing, the fate of the Awassa TTI is not known, and the REB Head was not able to provide any clarity during the assessment team's visit. The Region is constructing a new TTI in Bonga, but it is not clear if the Awassa TTI will move there intact, or whether Bonga will be a new TTI and Awassa will retain some students. This should be decided prior to allocation of any further USAID funds for either Awassa TTI or TTC, or Bonga.
 - Also, in accordance with the terms of the BESO Project Grant Agreement, the use and disposition of commodities and equipment provided to Awassa TTI must remain devoted to the objectives of the project (e.g. strengthening <u>TTIs</u>) and USAID and the GFDRE should assure that this remains the case if Awassa TTI is closed.

- Similarly, the SNNPR ESDP indicates that one other existing TTI will be converted to TTC status in 1999-2000. If the one chosen is the Arba Minch TTI, what will happen to USAID's investment in TTI facilities and in skills development of the TTI's staff?
- ◆ The assessment team recognizes that the BESO design did not adequately address training of second cycle teachers, and that USAID should consider their needs. However, we caution that there appears to be some assumption that BESO funds should finance new capital equipment for all new TTIs and TTCs in BESO focus regions, regardless of the presence of TA or concomitant staff development plans. Again, we strongly recommend that USAID collaborate with its partners to i) undertake an assessment of "best practices" for in-service teacher training in Ethiopia to determine what makes the most sense for USAID to finance; and ii) carefully "manage for results" by identifying specific resources (funds, TA) that would achieve its stated IR, which relates to quality of teacher training graduates, in any future funding for pre-service training at TTIs and TTCs.
- In this regard, the development objectives for first cycle (Grades 1-4) teacher training in the ESDP include:
 - "support the TTIs to offer summer programs to increase the output to at least 1800 teachers ever other year." USAID assistance, if any, should be thoughtfully planned and budgeted in view of its desired quality-oriented results.
 - "upgrade unqualified instructors through distance and residential programs; a specially selected cadre of experienced TTI instructors should be trained as instructional leaders." BESO's contribution and mandate concerning this program must be clarified with respect to AED/BESO Advisors' time, and with regard to possible CPs and Covenants as stated above. A contract modification to formalize the change in the Awassa TTI Advisor's role may be in order.

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FIGURE 3.3: IR3: Improve performance and equity of teacher training graduates

Indicator:

- % of graduates scoring over 2.75 GPA, out of 4, by gender
- Average achievement gap between male and female graduates (not yet used)

PLANNED IN PAAD/PP 9/94	RESULTS FRAMEWORK (reported 3/98)	ASSESSMENT 6/98
Sub-Objective 3.1: Recruit better quality entrants into teacher pre-service training.	SUB-IR3-1: Better qualified entrants into teacher pre-service training recruited.	SUB-IR3-1 is being successfully achieved.
Reform Objectives: Critical analysis of implications of the proposed six step teacher career structure. Critical analysis of the appropriate school leaving level for primary teacher training. Establishing stricter admission criteria and strengthening the role of TTIs in recruitment and admission of training candidates. Project Objectives:	Performance Indicators a. Overall grade point average of TTI entrees in the Ethiopian School Leaving Certificate Examination by sex. Baseline 1995 to Achieved 1997 Adwa: Male: 2.30 to 2.77 Female: 1.86 to 2.08 Awassa: Male: 2.32 to 2.40 Female: 1.75 to 2.00	Student recruitment guidlines are strictly followed in most zones and woredas. Entrance examination weight is being defined with more emphasis. TTIs are empowered with authority to recruit TTI students by preparing entrance exams, administering, correcting, and general managing the process. Workshops conducted for ZEOs, WEOs with
Support to policy reforms	Arba Minch: NA	TTIs assure good follow-up.

PLANNED IN PAAD/PP 9/94	RESULTS FRAMEWORK (as of 3/98)	ASSESSMENT 6/98
Sub-Objective 3.2: Increase the number of women entering and completing pre-service teacher training.	SUB-IR3.2: Increased number of women entering and completing pre-service teacher training.	SUB IR 3.2 is being successfully achieved.
Reform Objectives: Increase in the TTI entry quota for women. Development and implementation of a support system for female TTI students. Affirmative action to recruit more female TTI instructors. Providing academic remediation when required. Project Objectives: Support to policy reforms. Development of female student teacher support systems. Analysis of the constraints and problems faced by female TTI students and primary school teachers.	Performance Indicators: a. Male/female graduates as compared to total male/female who sat for final examination respectively. Baseline 1995 to Achieved 1997 Adwa: Male 95% to 93% Female 84% to 92% Awassa: Male 96% to 96% Female 83% to 92% Arba Minch: NA b. Female share of enrollment (entrants) in TTIs. Baseline 1995 to Achieved 1997 Adwa: 36% to 31% Awassa: 32% to 34.2%	Reform A. 30% intake approved by the REBs - at TTIs arrangements made to increase female students - minimum number women recruits achieved at all TTIs in focus regions - women recruits all met minimum criteria for adminission. B. development and implementaiton of a support system - support in academic fields - support and encouragement through counselling system - number of female instructors not yet realized (1 in Adwa, 1 Awassa, 1 cousellor at Arba Minch) - provision of sanitary facilities, living and rest
• Study of positive cases.	Arba Minch: 38.4% in 1997 (B)	rooms improved.

Sub-Objective 3.3: Improve the quality of preservice teacher training instructional program. Reform Objectives: Establish criteria for TTI staff recruitment and strengthen the TTI role in hiring and managing their personnel. Improve conditions of service for TTI instructors. Provide opportunities for staff development. Critical analysis of the implications of the proposed two levels of primary schooling and teacher training. Reform Objectives: Establish criteria for TTI staff recruitment and strengthen the TTI role in hiring and managing their personnel. Provide opportunities for staff development. Critical analysis of the implications of the proposed two levels of primary schooling and teacher training. Reform Objectives: A Proportion of curriculum moving from theory to practice. (Note: ICDR National Standards are Theory: 60%, Practice 40%) Baseline 1995 to Achieved 1997 Adwa: Theory: 70% to 66% Practice: 30% to 40% Avassa: Theory: 80% to 60% Practice: 20% to 40% Arba Minch: Theory: 90% 1997 (B) Practice: 10% 1997 (B) Practice: 10% 1997 (B) SUB-IR 3.3 is being successfully on theory to practice teacher training instruction instructional resource center estat opportunities provided for staff docally and outside country, devel TTI instructional materials are pareform packages. Sub-IR 3.3 is being successfully on theory to practice: (Note: ICDR National Standards are Theory: 60%, Practice: 30% to 66% Practice: 30% to 40% Arba Minch: Theory: 90% 1997 (B) Practice: 10% 1997 (B) Sub-IR 3.3 is being successfully on theory to practice. (Note: ICDR National Standards are Theory to practice: (Note: ICDR National Standards are Theory to 66% Practice: 30% to 66% Practice: 20% to 40% Arba Minch: Theory: 90% 1997 (B) Sub-IR 3.3 is being successfully on theory to practice: (Note: ICDR National Standards are Theory to 66% Practice: 10% 1997 Adva: Theory: 90% 1997 (B) Baseline 1995 to Achieved 1997	
 Establish criteria for TTI staff recruitment and strengthen the TTI role in hiring and managing their personnel. Improve conditions of service for TTI instructors. Provide opportunities for staff development. Critical analysis of the implications of the proposed two levels of primary schooling and teacher training. Reform of TTI curriculum. Availability of adequate resources for instructional improvements, maintenance of facilities and improved recurrent operation. a. Proportion of curriculum moving from theory to practice. (Note: ICDR National Standards are Theory 60%, Practice 40%) Baseline 1995 to Achieved 1997 Adwa: Theory: 70% to 66% Practice: 30% to 34% Awassa: Theory: 80% to 60% Practice: 20% to 40% Arba Minch: Theory: 90% 1997 (B) Practice: 10% 1997 (B) b. Shift from teacher-centered (TC) to learner-centered (LC) teaching methods, as measured by percent of instruction time students are engaged in activities, assignments, projects, etc. 	achieved.
Project Objectives Improvements in TTI curriculum. Professional development of TTI staff. Improvements in the instructional environment. Improved TTI administration and management. Adwa: LC 20% to 30% TC 80% to 70% Awassa: LC 10% to 35% TC 90% to 65% Arba Minch: LC 10% 1997 (B) TC 90% 1997 (B)	olishment, evelopment opment of

PLANNED IN PAAD/PP 9/94	RESULTS FRAMEWORK (reported 3/98)	ASSESSMENT 6/98
	SUB-IR3.3: Improved quality of pre-service teacher training instruction programs.	SUB-IR3.3 is being achieved.
	IR3.3 Performance Indicators - Continued:	
	c. Percentage of training time devoted to primary classroom experience, as measured by time spent in primary schools for observation and teaching, including micro-teaching and class management.	
	Baseline 1995 to Achieved 1997	
	Adwa: 15.6% to 16.5%	
	Awassa: 12.5% to 12.5%	
	Arba Minch: 12.5% 1997 (B)	

Sub-Objective 3.4: Improve quality of teachers produced by TTIs.	Sub-IR Not retained.	
Reform Objectives: • Development of a professional teacher certification system.		
• Availability of adequate resources to ensure operationalization of certification and graduate follow-up and support systems.		
Project Objectives: • Development of permanent TTI capacity to monitor and evaluate the performance of graduate teachers.		
• Improve TTI graduates' methods in assessment of student learning and in evaluation of instructional effectiveness of different methodologies, materials, and inputs.		

3.4 Support Objective/Intermediate Result 4: Decentralized Management and Administration

3.4.1 Original Design/Plans. The Government's decision to move to a federal system and its rapid devolution of decision-making authority and responsibility for the delivery of primary education to the regions played a major role in the design of BESO. Regionalization caused major redefinition of roles and functions of the MOE, the restructuring of the education management system in the regions, including the creation of new offices at the zone and woreda levels, and the re-assignment of personnel, often resulting in an inadequate level of trained personnel. Recognizing the dual challenge posed by the Government's declared commitment to increasing access to primary education and the institutional re-organization, BESO was designed to strengthen central, regional and sub-regional planning, management and administrative capacity in support of primary education.

The original design has experienced no change in intent or structure since agreements were signed. The anticipated results (IR and sub-IRs) remain identical to the support objective and sub-objectives specified in design documents. The BESO strategy is to improve the management and administration of the primary education sub-sector in the newly decentralized system by a number of sub-objectives:

- ●4.1: Strengthen the institutional capacity of the Planning and Projects Department of the MOE so that it can serve as the policy and coordination center for Ethiopia's education system;
- 4.2 and 4.3: Improve the key administrative and management functions of the Tigray and SNNPR Regional Education Bureaus (4.2) and of selected Zone Education Offices (4.3):
- ●4.4: Improve school support functions of selected Woreda Offices (4.4).

The indicators of achievement, however, have changed, been reduced and finally (discussed in USAID's USFY 2000 R4 report produced in March 1998) eliminated pending redefinition, reflecting some of the problems experienced with this IR.

The BESO Program supports this sub-objective/IR both through conditioned NPA and project assistance. Three conditions (see Table 3.4) address the issue of administrative authority, resource allocations, and budget organization. The project assistance component provides for AED long-and short-term TA at both the center (i.e. MOE) and regional education bureaus in Tigray and SNNPR; various study tours abroad and site-based training; and commodities (primarily computers). The sub-objective/IR claims the highest proportion of the AED contract's long-term technical assistance, totalling 20 person-years. Under USAID financing, AED is to provide a Policy/Planning Advisor to the MOE Policy and Planning Department for four years; and four years each of a Planning Advisor and a Finance Advisor to each focus region REB.

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3.4.2 Evolution & Achievements to Date. This sub-objective/IR has proved the most challenging and comprised the most controversial components -- policy and planning -- of BESO. Moreover, the Mission's dissatisfaction with, and subsequent abandonment of, its performance indicators for both the IR and sub-IRs as a means of measuring achievements in this area further complicates assessment. In the absence of concrete indicators³, especially for the IR, the following sections discuss (i) whether the relevant performance conditions of NPA were fulfilled, and (ii) the extent to which the reform and project objectives defined in the original BESO design are being met at the sub-IR level.

Sub-objective 4.1: Strengthened institutional capacity of PPD: The BESO design anticipated the profound implications of decentralization on the role and functions of the central Ministry of Education. As regions assumed responsibility for operational planning and delivery of primary education services, the MOE, and in particular its Planning and Projects Department (PPD), was expected to concentrate on policy development, standard setting and coordination of national and donor support to the regions. To date, the regions have assumed responsibility and are making progress in improved delivery of services. However, PPD's mandate and responsibilities for policy analysis and planning, both within the MOE structure and with regard to the regions, remain somewhat ambiguous and need serious attention as the ESDP moves ahead.

The original BESO reform objectives called for (i) a clear articulation of central and regional authority (an NPA tranche 1 Condition Precedent, or CP) and (ii) the development of a policy mandate for PPD to enable it to undertake the necessary data collection, policy analysis and resource projections to propose policy and investment alternatives to the MOE, Ministry of Finance and Prime Minister's Office charged with charting sectoral development. The intent of these objectives was in part to lay the bureaucratic groundwork for the BESO project, and in particular for to ensure/codify the role of PPD in the policy development process.

In fulfillment of CP1, the Government (MEDAC) presented to USAID the required description of the authorities vested with the different ministries (e.g. MOE, MOF), the regional education bureaus and sub-regional offices, various MOE institutions or departments (e.g. ICDR, EMPDA), and BESO central coordinating committee, responsible for overseeing or carrying out the BESO reforms. The MEDAC document described PPD as "charged with responsibility for coordinating the activities of all the departments and agencies of the Ministry," which noted its own sectoral authority to formulate national policies, set standards, and provide technical assistance to the REBs.

In this case the letter of the reform, rather than the intent, appears to have been met. CP1 -- a clear articulation of central and regional authority -- was achieved through the MEDAC letter.

³ The assessment team concurs with the Mission that the earlier indicators, such percentage of capital budget expended, would contribute little to assessing IR achievements.

However, the second reform objective (CP2) — developing a policy analysis mandate for PPD — has not been met. PPD's role within the MOE was loosely defined and its policy analysis role implied rather than specified, with emphasis on its <u>coordinating</u> responsibilities. PPD's role has continued to be coordinative and its responsibility in the development of the ESDP was that of compiling regional plans and reviewing them for conformance to budget ceilings and some basic standards; its role or responsibility in examining policy options that eventually became the foundation of ESPD appears to have been minimal.

MOE's tacit decision not to foster development of a policy analysis unit both minimizes the importance of policy analysis/planning and diffuses the locus of policy analysis/planning activities. The inaction seems to be based on its ambivalence about the need for policy analysis, as well as a reluctance to build up a big (i.e. 7 person) policy group that could usurp the authority of its related institutions, such as ICDR or EMA. One senior MOE officer advised the assessment team that "PPD can't be master of all things", and other departments or institutions are better equipped to set standards in their area and analyze policy implications than PPD. PPD itself defines its role narrowly, emphasizing the primacy of the regions in setting goals and determining strategies, and of higher authorities in assessing and selecting policy options. The regions and other central agencies, however, recognize the need for central guidance in policy matters, and express support for the MOE assuming that role.

This ambivalence about the need for and locus of a policy analysis unit has constrained BESO's ability to achieve its objective of strengthening institutional capacity in PPD. Although PPD comprises six "panels", only one -- the Planning Panel -- is functionally appropriate to serve as the nucleus of a policy/planning unit, and this small three person team has been pre-occupied with the consolidation of regional plans for ESDP. Individuals were too busy and thus unavailable for AED "capacity building" activities, but the structure of PPD impeded BESO efforts to create and institutionalize more efficient planning and analysis procedures and systems. For example, the application and use of a computerized planning model, developed under an early pre-AED bridging activity, has languished, and now is considered "too sophisticated", despite a month-long seminar conducted for MOE/PPD personnel in the U.S. In fact, given high turn-overs, there is no one remaining in PPD who even took the course.

In spite of a lack of counterparts and an ambiguous institutional locus, AED TA worked both with PPD and with other MOE departments to introduce some fundamental planning and policy coordination tools. (See Table 3.4) These have met with varying degrees of receptivity, and none can be said to be far along in its development or institutionalization. The most advanced is the School Mapping activity, which has been largely propelled by its development in the regions. The EMIS unit at PPD has supported its expansion to other regions (Amhara, Oromo and BG Regions) and assisted in developing the related data base.

The BESO design also introduced the idea of Minimum Quality Standards (MQS) as a means by which to plan the expansion of access and ensure basic levels of quality. Largely independent of any BESO input, the MOE developed an inventory of desired school attributes and inputs, which it ultimately rejected as too expensive and impossible to monitor. The MQS was not shared with the regions nor is it reflected in the ESDP, although the idea has attracted regional interest and has even been proposed as a BESO NPA Tranche 4 performance condition by the head of the Tigray REB. PPD maintains that, in principle, it presents a viable option for planning.

The AED long-term Policy and Planning advisor introduced a Learning Assessment activity, aimed at the development and use of criteria referenced tests to track student achievement in primary school, as currently the only standardized test for primary school is the Grade 8 leaving exam. This has been well received by the MOE, and advanced beyond the concept paper stage to a proposal to work with the National Office of Examination (NOE) to design the tests and prepare a pilot program to be trialed in the focus regions. There are some issues, however, with the methodology and the Tigray region has suspended its participation until questions about price, magnitude and technical assistance are resolved. AED is pursuing plans to support NOE on test development.

In summary, progress in developing a policy and coordination center at MOE has been proscribed by structural reasons. Efforts to strengthen overall capacity of the ministry in policy analysis and planning have been hampered by MOE's reluctance to see policy and planning as priority needs and to be considered a "testing ground" for new and relatively untried ideas, although several mentioned that their appreciation has increased in terms of what policy formation entails.

Given the ambiguities in the setting, the effectiveness of AED TA has been limited by its inability to respond to MOE priorities and relate planning and policy initiatives to institutional operations and needs, despite appreciation expressed for the energetic communication of ideas and preparation of concept papers. The absence of AED involvement with central ESDP formulation signifies a notable missed opportunity to assist the Government in the very areas where BESO was designed to focus. Finally, the long-term advisor position was vacant from November 1997 until shortly after the assessment team's departure in late June 1998, thus compounding the missed opportunities as ESDP implementation gets underway.

In response to an early draft of this report, the MOE stated "please see the center's plan on this issue which are the prioritized interests during the ESDP implementation period." The team encourages the center and the new AED advisor are able to translate these prioritized interests into concrete results as ESDP moves ahead, so that ambiguities of the past are soon forgotten.

Sub-objectives 4.2 and 4.3: Improved administrative and management functions of the Regional Bureaus and Zone Education Offices: The Regional Education Bureaus have assumed many of the functions once filled by the MOE; they are now responsible for planning and providing for the expansion and improvement of primary education; hiring, training, and paying teachers; constructing schools; procuring and managing materials, supplies, and equipment; developing budgets and managing expenditures; etc. BESO reform objectives called for (i) a functional approach to the development of REB responsibility and capacity, and (ii) development of a rational basis for sector planning (Tranche 2 CP8). The intent of these reform objectives was to shape the structure of the REBs and link their planning and budgetary functions for the efficient provisions of primary education.

The scope for BESO to influence the functional structure of the REB was limited, and by the time the AED TA team arrived the REBs were already in place and had been organized according to a pre-set plan. However, AED advisors have been able to positively impact the operations within the existing structures at the REBs. In SNNPR, a preliminary AED-supported functional audit of the REB has contributed to a more coherent and better articulated role for the Planning Department, providing for integration, coordination and "quality control" of REB departments. The Department plans to incorporate a research unit to assess impact and provide feedback on educational inputs (as well as BESO-funded innovations at the school levels, such as model schools) and inform planning. However, with personnel and funds in short supply, this step is based on the appropriation of a research unit and researcher from the Curriculum Department, which itself requires a continued research capability if it is to carry out its mandate. A more in-depth institutional and functional audit to the woreda and school levels is proposed.

In Tigray, a functional audit of the Planning Department is in progress. To fill staffing shortfalls, the REB has proposed that AED pay for three planning staff, to be absorbed into the civil service at a later date. Further, the REB Head is said to want a functional audit conducted of other departments, quoted as saying he wants "table with four legs at the same height." A functional audit of the Tigray Finance/Administration Department had been conducted by AED two years earlier, approved by the REB, and has informed BESO support activities (discussed below). SNNPR has not undertaken such an activity, although the head of the Finance/Administration department is eager for AED assistance in this area.

As an outcome of "rational planning", the performance condition in the NPA agreement requires the development of strategic national plans linking capital investment and recurrent financing needs. The development of the ESDP (both at central and regional levels) served as a catalyst and proof that capital investment plan did not occur in isolation, outpacing the ability of the education system to supply the associated recurrent needs, such as building schools without hiring adequate number of teachers. The iterative review process and scrutiny the regional plans have undergone over the past year tends to corroborate the Mission acceptance of MOE proof in June 1997. In SNNPR, AED assistance in the development of a viable (even

lauded) ESDP has been considerable. The use of a computer projection model ensured that capital and recurrent inputs have been considered in tandem. The development of the highly praised Tigray ESDP was done uniquely by the REB head, but was heavily based on the AED-supported school maps and data bases. These "master" plans, coupled with the REBs' commitment to developing their Planning and Finance department bode well for future improvements.

The support activities of the AED team in Planning and Finance have proceeded at an uneven pace, due to the changes in REB personnel (including Heads), and delays in fielding long-term advisors (SNNPR went 12 months without a Planning Advisor and the Finance Advisor's position has been vacant for almost a year). Nonetheless, both regions demonstrate appreciable progress in developing and institutionalizing the tools, practices and operational procedures of sound planning and financial management (see Table 3.4).

In planning: School mapping was pioneered in these regions, with the result that data bases were developed and maps prepared, and their use was important to the development of ESDP. The REBs achievements were showcased at a national education conference, and inspired three other regions to initiate their own mapping activities, with other donor funding. Learning assessment action plans are or have been developed, although as mentioned above, concerns about methodology have temporarily slowed full implementation in Tigray. Both REBs are eager to proceed with MQS development.

The enthusiasm displayed for these activities is a positive outgrowth of BESO efforts to introduce data-based planning and information systems. The utility of this information was brought home sharply by the ESDP exercise, and by the REB's direct responsibility for providing education services (in contrast to the MOE). In SNNPR, the statistical data base has been computerized, the data collection instrument refined/adapted to reflect local reality (local languages), and statistical yearbooks for the past three years have been produced (EY is 1990 underway). However, data accuracy and timeliness are still considered problematic and are being addressed. In Tigray, the preparation of the EY 1989 and EY 1990 yearbooks has lagged, reportedly due to the ambitious development of new data collection instruments and data entry program that expand on the more familiar MOE models. Despite the robust BESO-supported school census and workshop that form the basis for the ESDP, it appears that Tigray has made less progress with computerization of its data base. The REB has set aside a computer room and plans to assign personnel to this task.

In Finance and Administration: With an AED advisor in place since the beginning of the project, Tigray has made significant progress in developing its personnel data base and computerizing its personnel system and payroll — a central function as the lions' share of REB resources are for salaries. For the first time, the REB has data on teachers assigned by school and woreda, and salaries were paid on time. New materials management and inventory procedures are in place, with manuals developed and staffed trained. A computerized budget

and accounting system -- connected with the personnel system -- has been developed, and REB and the regional Bureau of Finance trained in its use, although the latter is not yet computerized. A computer support function has also been established, although "temporarily" staffed with BESO funds.

The SNNPR Finance and Administration Department has not made the same progress. The Department head is new, and scheduling conflicts did not permit an interview with the principal staff member who could address BESO contributions during the two years of the long-term AED advisor (who left almost one year ago). Nevertheless, SNNPR is eager to have another advisor position and has outlined that it specifically wants to focus on payroll, disbursement procedures, and inventory control. (This fairly basic list raises questions about achievements during the first advisor's tenure). During the hiatus, the SNNPR has been included in several Tigray-organized activities, participating in a materials management workshop and a US study tour.

At the Zonal Offices: The reform objective — to limit zone staffing — appears to be moot point given the shortage of staff and funds to hire them in the regions. To date, BESO activities in neither region have specifically targeted the Zonal Education Offices on an institutional level, although they have been included in various training seminar and workshops for CSGP, school leadership, curriculum development, and those that have implications for REB operations, such as data collection, school mapping, etc. In Tigray, ZEO personnel are included as a matter of course in finance/management workshops, and a needs assessment resulted in a budget preparation and implementation workshop aimed at strengthening this process at the zonal level. However, neither region appears to have yet developed a program targeted to the lower administrative levels in the system.

Sub-IR 4.4: School support functions of Woreda Offices: Reform objectives targeted (i) the limitation of woreda staff, (ii) the adequacy of recurrent financing for woreda operations (Tranche 2 CP9), and (iii) definition of norms for school support functions. As with the Zone Offices, the over-staffing issue appears to be moot and woreda offices are reported to be severely understaffed and underqualified in their administrative and school support functions. The performance condition required evidence that woreda offices received increased resources for school support functions. Neither region was able to provide the necessary data to respond to the letter of the condition, but USAID accepted as proof SNNPR's documentation of increases in non-salary budget to the zone offices, reasoning that some of this would find its way to the woreda. Tigray argued successfully that increases in its salary budget was due in part to assigning staff to woredas and that its decision to retain school fees compensated for lack of increase in woreda non-salary budget. It is impossible for this assessment to determine validity of these arguments.

Several BESO activities are centered on improving woreda support of schools, but few have been operationalized under the planning and finance components addressed under this IR. In

general, these components have not yet included support for training in data collection, budget management or other administrative activities appropriate to woredas. Woreda personnel have received training and attention through school leadership activities (see chapter 3.1), community mobilization/school grants (chapter 3.1), curriculum development and testing (chapter 3.2), TTI student teaching placement and supervision (chapter 3.3) and regional gender workshops (chapter 4.1). Woreda staff were uniformly appreciative of these activities, expressed satisfaction with their training and displayed a sound understanding of both the problems confronting the schools and the support activities.

3.4.3 Lessons Learned & Opportunities for Future. In general, both the reform and project objectives named under the sub-IRs have been or are in the process of being achieved. The notable exception is sub-IR 4.1, strengthened MOE capacity in policy analysis and planning. Some suggestions for future options are discussed below:

IR vision and measurement: The above discussion focussed on the sub-IRs, in part because no reform objective, benchmarks or measures were provided by which to gauge overall progress toward improved decentralized management and administration. The policy matrix in the original BESO design described in general terms the policy and operational changes desired, but the indicator suggested for the support objective/IR level (capital budget expenditure rate) neither captured the scope of reformed operations or the specific impact of the BESO activity. The USAID Mission is cognizant that some measures must be devised. This should be done as soon as possible with MOE and REB partners, but depends in part on a unified vision of what will be supported in terms of institutional development at the center.

MOE capacity in policy analysis and planning: This failure of BESO to have appreciable impact in this area has been attributed to its concept as "being ahead of its time" in expecting a greatly curtailed MOE to readily embrace national planning and policy analysis as it is trying to grapple with its new role. To some extent, it appears that one means of dealing with its reduction of centralized planning authority has been to abrogate or downplay its proactive planning function. This component of BESO has also been criticized as "too late", in that the ESDP has already been formulated. The implication is that the MOE defines policy as policy declarations, does not consider that it has a role in informing policy choices that occur at the strategy formation stages, and that ESDP, while a blueprint and policy map, cannot anticipate all the strategic and operation decisions that will occur over the next five years. Some options for consideration are:

• Seriously re-assess chances for impact in this area. The new advisor's scope of work should be supplemented within the first 30 days with a detailed, timebound workplan and schedule that identifies specific products to be produced (manual development has often been mentioned), and specific capacities and skills to be transferred to identified individuals and/or units (e.g. through "mentoring" contracts). USAID should request a signed agreement from department principals as well as MOE direction regarding the detailed

workplan and schedule. Serving as a "general advisor" to the minister undermines BESO's and USAID's philosophy of building institutional capacity and systems.

- Consider diversifying the focus of BESO support. The role of the BESO Advisor in the MOE needs to encompass planning and policy-related functions of all departments and agencies of the MOE. Some options are:
 - Working with other departments to assess policy options and build analytic capacity. Include these departments in the BESO advisor work plan (see above).
 - Providing assistance to the Women's Affairs Office within the MOE. The national strategy and action guidelines needs dissemination and operationalized action plans in the different regions. Targeted short-term/local assistance could help activate the national strategy.
- Continue the development of a capacity building plan for central MOE staff, but define it more broadly than the distance education master's degree program. Have AED advisors give practicums linked to the program. As part of individual or unit-wide "mentoring contracts," undertake additional practical site-based training programs based on producing products or reforms identified as a department priority.

REB. Zone and Woreda Planning and Financial Management: As noted, although progress has been uneven, this component of BESO seems to be on track, assuming the BESO annual plans are implemented as planned. The regions seem comfortable with the idea of technical assistance in planning and finance (even if they are not always pleased with the individuals), have high expectations, and appear receptive to structural and operational changes. Some considerations are:

- Provide SNNPR with some form of Budget/Finance assistance immediately. Given the fact that only two years are left in the AED contract, consider eliminating the position for a long-term advisor and instead utilize punctual, focussed local or Africa-regional short-term assistance in stead. Consider assigning some support or supervision duties for SNNPR to the Tigray advisor, and hire short-term staff to complement his efforts. Determine the feasibility of using Tigray's computerized personnel system model in SNNPR.
- Integrate BESO planning and finance activities into REB operations by preparing joint annual plans with BESO plan as an annex (as done in SNNPR Planning Department). Define BESO results annually as opposed to only listing steps to be undertaken to achieve a result.

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- Use ESDP implementation and monitoring needs to complete BESO support on EMIS systems and development of planning model. Determine extent to which Tigray EMIS is problematic and share SNNPR planning model.
- Pursue transfer of BESO funded local-hire REB positions (e.g., computer support, possible planning staff) to the REB payroll.
- Develop a Zone specific support program in planning and finance, and Woredaspecific support program in budgeting, accounting and data collection.

FIGURE 3.4: IR4: Improved decentralized management and administration of primary education.

Indicators: None

PLANNED IN PAAD/PP 9/94	RESULTS FRAMEWORK (reported 3/98)	ASSESSMENT 6/98
Sub-Objective 3.1: To strengthen the institutional capacity of the Planning and Project Department of the MOE so that it can effectively serve as the policy and coordination center for Ethiopia's education system.	No sub-IRs retained.	 Sub-objective not achieved: Policy analysis mandate loosely formulated and not operationalized. Delineation of central and regional authority articulated, but interpretation does not provide for MOE/PPD policy analysis. PPD policy coordination consists of compilation of regional plans. Policy analysis and advisory unit not operational.
Reform Objectives: Development of a policy analysis and coordination mandate for the PPD. Clear articulation of the delineation between central and regional authority and responsibility. Project Objectives: Conduct an information needs assessment, develop an information system and improve information use. Development of a policy analysis and advisory unit within the MOE.	No sub-IR indicators retained.	BESO-Supported Accomplishments. Minimum Quality Standardes concept introducted; some initial actions taken. Learning Assessment concept introducted and accepted; plan developed. Computer-based Planning Model developed, personnel trained. School mapping undertaken, data based developed. PPD equipped with computers.

RESULTS FRAMEWORK (reported 3/98) - NO SUB-IRS RETAINED. PLANNED IN PAAD/PP 9/94 ASSESSMENT 6/98: Sub-objective Status: Significant improvements achieved or underway in REB Sub-Objective 4.2: Improve key planning and finance systems and operations, although progress is uneven between regions and between administrative and management functions of planning and finance. the Tigray and SNNPR Regional Education Boards. SNNPR: BESO-assisted Planning Tigray: BESO-assisted Planning Reform Objectives: • Functional audit of planning department • Functional audit of planning department conducted; Functional approach to the development of department restructured to include research underway. REB responsibility and capacity. department; duties expanded and defined. • Development of a rational basis for sector • School mapping-data base developed; maps • School-mapping data bases developed; maps prepared and used: planning. • Learning Assessment concept introduced; prepared and used: implementation framework and pilot study plan • Learning Assessment concept introduced/accepted; Project Objectives: • Develop school mapping, EMIS, sectoral action plan development underway. prepared; approval pending. • EMIS-1988 (US96) school census and data sets • EMIS-information data base computerized; planning, and budget development and Statistical yearbooks developed for EY 1988, 1989. financial management functions in the REB. prepared and statistical handbook published: 1989 and 1990 statistics under preparation. and 1990; data collection instrument being • MOS concept introduced and accepted, action refined/adapted. plan to be developed. • MOS concept introduced; plans to develop standards underway. Tigray: BESO-assisted Finance/Administration • Computerized planning model (spread sheet) • Functional audit of finance/administratin developed and used. department conducted. • Regional ESDP developed by Planning Dept. • Computerized personnel system under • REB staff trained in computer use. development; personnel data base developed and computerized: SNNPR: BESO-assisted Finance • Materials management procedures developed, • Recurrent budget structure revised. manual prepared, staff trained; Budget officers trained through study tour. • Computerized budget/accounting system • Materials management-staff trained in Tigray developed, staff (including Bureau of Finance) workshop. trained;

Computer support function established in REB.

PLANNED IN PAAD/PP 9/94	RESULTS FRAMEWORK (as of 3/98)	ASSESSMENT 6/98
Sub-Objective 4.3: Improve administrative and management functions of selected Zonal Education Offices.	No sub-IRs retained.	Sub-Objective Status: Systematic training program and support activities not yet developed or implemented.
Reform Objectives: Limitation on development of zone staffing based on functional analysis of operational requirements. Project Objectives Develop selected ZEO capacity in information use, planning, budget preparation and management as required.		Tigray: BESO-assisted Planning School mapping: staff trained in data collection. Tigray: BESO-assisted Finance Zone Needs Assessment conducted. Budget preparation/implementation- staff trained with REB personnel. Material management staff trained with REB personnel. SNNPR: BESO-assisted Planning School mapping-staff trained in data collection. SNNPR: BESO-assisted Finance some training with Tigray REB staff.

PLANNED IN PAAD/PP 9/94	RESULTS FRAMEWORK (reported 3/98)	ASSESSMENT 6/98
Sub-Objective 4.4: Improve the school support functions of selected Woreda Education Offices.	No sub-IRs retained.	Sub-objective Status: no reported woreda support activities through planning/finance structure; see IR 1 (school environment)
Reform Objectives Limitation on WEO staffing based on functional analysis of key school support. Definition of operatoinal norms for WEO priority school support functions. Availability of adequate recurrent financing for WEO operations. Project Objectives Improve WEO capacity to channel resources to schools. Development of WEO capacity to support school directors and to organize and provide regular school director professional development. Develop WEO capacity to monitor and assess school-based initiatives and the support services they provide to schools.	No sub-IR indicators retained.	 BESO Accomplishments in Tigray and SNNPR: Woreda personnel trained in school leadership. Woreda personnel trained in community mobilization. Woreda personnel trained in Regional Gender Workshops.

3.5 Support Objective/Intermediate Result 5: Rational Finance

3.5.1 Original Design/Plans. Since 1993/94, the Ethiopian government has shown its commitment to education and primary education through increased budgetary allocations to the sector. Nonetheless the percentage of public resources going to the sector is relatively low compared to African and regional averages. If Ethiopia is to pursue its strategy of rapidly expanding primary school enrollments without compromising quality, it will have to both increase the resources going to the sector and optimize their use and impact.

The original design has experienced no change in intent, although it has undergone a slight reorganization. With one exception, the anticipated results (IRs and sub-IRs) remain identical to the support objective and sub-objectives specified in the PAAD/PP. The BESO strategy calls for the increased and more rational and efficient sectoral financing through:

- 5.1: the increased availability of non-salary resources for primary education;
- 5.3: the more cost-effective and efficient use of resources within the education sector; and
- 5.2: the reduced burden on public sector financing of education.

This last sub-IR5.2 was recently dropped by the Mission, due to some concern about being able to meet the performance criteria. It is reported on below.

Much of the success of this IR depends on government decisions about how to allocate resources, as opposed to developing capacity or instituting procedures. USAID thus planned to achieve this IR through the use of conditioned non-project assistance (NPA), to date in eleven performance conditions for two tranches. While the project-funded AED contract and the NGO-implemented community school grants program also support the better management of resource flows and the capacity of schools to raise and use resources, most of these activities are discussed more fully in chapters 3.1 and 3.4 on IR1 and IR4.

3.5.2 Evolution and Achievements to Date.

<u>Increased sectoral financing:</u> Both the measures of success of this IR and the action to achieve it deal with the allocation of resources and the policies governing their allocation. The two indicators of success for this IR are "increasing the percentage of the national budget devoted to education" and "increasing the percentage of the education budget devoted to primary education."

Although these indicators are measured in simple quantitative terms, the interpretation of these figures is not as straightforward. Between USFY 1994 and USFY 1996, the percentage share of the education sector did increase from 14.8 percent to 16.2 percent, surpassing the USFY 1996 condition target of 16 percent. Given the meager 9 percent of the budget designated to education a few years earlier, this does signal progress. However, USFY 1997 (15.7 percent)

and estimated USFY 1998 (14.0 percent) figures indicate a decline in budget share, although in absolute terms the budget for education has increased approximately 25 percent over the same time period. The budget share going to primary education has risen from 47.3 percent in USFY 1994 to 51.0 percent in USFY 1998, with a notable decrease last year. It will now have to grow at a faster rate to reach the target of 60 percent for USFY 2002.

In general, it appears that the sectoral financial envelop is growing as desired and it would be premature to conclude that the government is turning away from its commitment to education based on two years' data. Indeed, the ESDP calls for the education budget to double within the next few years, and although no direct causality with BESO NPA or PA actions can be claimed, the government's introduction of a systematic approach to increasing financing to the sector is significant. Particularly given the ambitious ESDP plans, these two USAID IR indicators cannot substitute for a more in depth analysis of sectoral resource allocations to determine if resource allocation are supportive of declared goals.

Sub-IR5.1: Increased availability of non-salary resources for primary education: Despite hopes that per student expenditure would increase, and performance conditions to the contrary, the share of non-salary recurrent expenditure for primary education has steadily fallen from 8.4 percent in USFY 1994 to 5.5 percent in USFY 1997, although the budget amount has increased modestly. This means that fewer resources are available on a per student basis to purchase quality-enhancing inputs for schools. This is hardly surprising given the growth in enrollments and the government's accent on access, and, indeed, the MOE has made attempts to mitigate the trade-offs. It has promised to give directly to the schools (to ensure use for instructional purposes) a 6-to-9 birr per student supplement. Similarly, the SNNPR requires zones and woredas to transfer school budgets to the schools, to reduce administrative transaction costs. The government has also set basic standards in the ESDP such as student:teacher ratio and textbook:student ratio, and the MOE has drafted Minimum Quality Standards (see chapter 3.4 on IR4 for discussion) in response to a BESO NPA performance condition. AED has supported better management of resource flows in the regions with computerized budgeting systems (see chapter 3.4).

Sub-IR5.2: Reduced burden on the public sector for the financing of education: Although this sub-IR has been dropped, the MOE has taken notable steps in support of diversifying and re-apportioning the financial burden of education. Associated with a BESO performance condition, the government passed a law legalizing the operation of private schools. Unfortunately, there are no data beyond the base year to determine to what extent this law has had an impact. The ESDP implies that expectations for private provision are modest as five percent of the total resource package is expected to come from private sources (comprising for-profit as well as non-profit, NGO and community resources).

The concept of cost-sharing was introduced in the earlier in the Education and Training Plan. Spurred by the financing requirements of ESDP, the government has decided to require tuition payment from higher education students, as part of a cost recovery scheme to direct more

public resources to primary education. The importance of this decision cannot be understated. Throughout Africa, governments have shied away from such a controversial action and few have had the political will to enforce it in any meaningful way. While Ethiopia's program is not yet in effect and its ability to deal with the consequences remain to be seen, the government should be lauded for this course of action.

At the other end of the spectrum from the wealthier, mostly urban university students, the government is also facilitating the ability of local communities to raise and retain their own resources (per a BESO performance condition). A handbook on school management committees roles and responsibilities has been widely distributed (WLI uses it in its community school training programs). SNNPR has changed its requirement that locally raised resources must be remitted to the Bureau of Finance for later release back to the school; instead it asks communities to purchase for a nominal cost a receipt which remains on record. Both BESO school leadership and community school grants programs have trained school committees and staff on tracking and planning the use of resources (see chapter 3.1 on IR1 for discussion), and community grantees are required to keep financial logs and account books.

Sub-IR5.3: More cost effective and efficient use of resources: One of the most effective means of improving education system efficiency is through the manipulation of the student:teacher ratio. The MOE has established 50:1 as the optimal ratio, although it acknowledges the wide diversity in reality. Using this as a planning standard, it can estimate the number of teachers needed and ensure that existing schools are adequately staffed. USFY 1998 data from Tigray show that it has achieved a 52:1 ratio, with relatively modest variation among the zone (ranging from 49:1 to 56:1). Based on dramatically increasing enrollment, SNNPR has stated in its ESDP that its standard is now 57:1. Overall, it is an encouraging sign that the regions are taking these planning norms seriously.

With regionalization and the creation of new administrative structures (such as zones and woredas), the administrative overhead threatened to take a disproportionate share of public education resources. In their response to a performance condition, the regions explained how they believe they are reducing costs. Tigray reduced the number of woredas from 87 to 36, and SNNPR cited some administrative "belt-tightening" measures.

A cluster of BESO conditions (1) and covenants (2) address the promotion of private sector involvement in the provision of educational goods and services. Until the government issued a USFY 1995 proclamation authorizing private firms to respond to tenders for books, furniture and supplies, most of these materials were produced and distributed by government entities. Although text book studies have shown the price issue to be problematic as EMPDA sets its prices based on externally subsidized paper and sunk infrastructure costs, it is expected that even if prices do not fall, efficiencies will be gained in quality and timeliness of delivery. The new policy has resulted in private sector competition, although no data were available to the team, and EMPDA itself is now soliciting work from regions as a competitor.

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Analyses were also to have been carried out on the effectiveness of EMPDA, ICDR and EMA services per a covenant. USAID has done little with EMA except for provision of short-term AED assistance in the IRI English course, although other donors are more involved and could assist in this regard. ICDR itself initiated a series of workshops on its new role in the decentralized system, and it is not clear what further analyses are required. It is only EMPDA whose operations have been systematically studied, as part of developing a new textbook policy, and that with assistance from the European Union, not USAID.

There are no data on student wastage, repetition or drop-out rates to determine overall system efficiency. The inclusion of such indicators under this IR is inappropriate, as they do not measure the use of resources within the sector but rather as a result of all the elements of the reforming education system.

- 3.5.3 Lessons Learned & Opportunities for Future. Overall both the structure of education finance and the policies governing it seem to be changing, albeit modestly, in the ways promoted by the BESO program. More resources have been received by the sector in absolute terms, and the resource indicators tend to go in a positive direction (with some fluctuation). The major exception is non-salary recurrent expenditures: both the budget share and the per unit figures have fallen over the course of BESO. Given the emphasis of BESO on quality, this is of considerable concern, but is perhaps unrealistic in a country where political priorities and pent-up demand due to long periods of civil strife combine to results in dramatic growth in enrollments. However major policy changes have occurred which will presumably expand the resource envelop for education and, if enforced or acted upon, should result in more efficient use of education. Some recommendations are:
 - Re-examine the sectoral investment framework to assess the congruency of some BESO goals with what has been planned and what will govern future resource flows, and revise targets. For example, given the ESDP it is likely that the 60 percent target for the share of primary education will increase, as will the percentage share of education. Reconsider different indicators for the same result: it may be better to use a per unit figure for non-salary expenditure and expect that it be maintained, rather than looking solely at budget share. A student:textbook or teacher: textbook ratio may offer another alternative.
 - Monitor and measure the results of the policy initiatives. For example, determine to what extent they have been enforced (e.g. number of private school applications process, percent of textbooks procured from the private sector) and the extent to which they have resulted in some cost-savings or efficiency (e.g. price of books falls).
 - Link project support more closely with some of the desired outcomes, such as studies, to ensure that the type of study produced responds to the intent of the conditions and that the MOE and regions are engaged in the analysis. Several of

the BESO covenants calling for studies seem to have been commissioned by USAID, and their utility and impact on MOE or regional decisions are unclear.

• Reinstate the result, or at least the indicators, on reduced burden on public sector (sub-IR 5.2). The reform objectives named are essential to a healthy sectoral investment package. Although cost recovery may not be as significant to the REBs, because higher education does not figure in their portfolio, it does impact primary education and should not be dropped. Similarly, a key component of the BESO program is to enable schools to attract more community support and is measurable (a least on a sample basis); it is puzzling why these objectives have been dropped, particularly since the US\$7 million in cooperative agreements to NGOs for the CSGP has not been.

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FIGURE 3.5: IR5: Increased and more rational and efficient sectoral financing.

IR Indicators: • share of national education budget out of total government budget.

FY1994: 14.8% FY1995: 14.9% FY1996: 16.2% FY1997: 15.7% FY1998: 14.0% (estimated)

• share of primary budget out of education budget.

FY1994; 47.3% FY1995; 49.7% FY1996; 51.0% FY1997; 45.9% FY1998; 51.0% (estimated)

PLANNED IN PAAD/PP 9/94	RESULTS FRAMEWORK (reported 3/98)	ASSESSMENT 6/98
Sub-Objective 5.1: Increase availability of non-salary resources for primary education.	SUB-IR5.1: Increased availability of non-salary resources for primary education.	Sub-IR not achieved, share of non-salary resources has decreased over life of BESO
Reform Objectives: Increase expenditure on non-salary, school-level, quality-enhancing inputs for primary education. Establish minimum standards for school quality. Project Objectives: Improved management of resource flows.	Performance Indicators a. Share of recurrent budget for non-salary expenditure, national level. Baseline 1995 = 7.9% Achieved 1997 = 5.5%	a. Share of non-salary recurrent budget of primary recurrent budget: Nat'l: FY94-8.5%, FY95-7.9%, FY96-7.8%, FY97-5.5% Per student: FY95-12.5(b); FY96-10.8 b. MOE develops draft MQS; established standards for ESDP c. Ministry promulgates policy to channel 6-9 birr per primary student directly to schools d. Zones and woredas trained in budget implementation in Tigray
		e. SNNPR requires zones and woredas to give budget allocated for school operations directly to schools f. SNNPR non-salary allocations to zones increase progressively since FY1995

PLANNED IN PAAD/PP 9/94	RESULTS FRAMEWORK (reported 3/98)	ASSESSMENT 6/98
Sub-Objective 5.2: Reduce the burden on the public sector for the financing of education.	Sub-IR5.2: NOT RETAINED AS OF 3/98: Reduced burden on public sector financing of education.	Positive progress.
Reform Objectives: Promotion of private provision of education. Establish mechanisms for cost recovery and cost sharing at higher levels of education. Improve the capacity of primary schools to raise, retain and use resources. Project Objectives: none stated	Performance Indicator Schools opened by private investors. (Baseline 1996 = 61 applied and 31 approved)	 a. Law allowing private schools to operate passed. b. Cost recovery policy for higher education included in ESDP; university students require to starting 9/98. c. MOE promulgated guidelines for school management committees concerning revenue generation and resource use. d. CSGP provided resource management and book-keeping training to school committees

PLANNED IN PAAD/PP 9/94 Sub-Objective 5.3: Rationalize the allocation and use of resources within the education sector.	RESULTS FRAMEWORK (reported 3/98) Sub-IR5.3: More cost-effective and efficient use of resources within the education sector.	ASSESSMENT 6/98 Positive progress.
Reform Objectives: Rationalized primary school teacher assignment and redeployment. Reduction of administrative and other overhead costs. Reduce repetition and dropout in primary grades. Declaration of policy guidelines intended to promote and facilitate greater private-sector provision of educational services. Project Objectives: Support for policy reforms.	Performance Indicators a. Pupil/teacher ratios (MOE standard for pupil/teacher ratio is 1:50) Baseline 1995 to Achieved 1997 Tigray 1:48 in 1995 to 1:49 in 1997 SNNPR 1:33 in 1995 to 1:53 in 1997	 a. Pupil:teacher ratio in Tigray FY95-1:48 FY98-1:52 b. Teacher:section ratio in Tigray FY98-1:0.89 c. Woredas reduced from 87 to 36 in Tigray; fill woreda staff positions d. Cost effectiveness analyses of central education services and pedagogical inputs. e. 1995 Government proclamation that private firms can bid to provide educational services.

4. FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS: SPECIAL CONCERNS

4.1 Gender

Equity is both an implicit and explicit goal of BESO. The structural inequities caused by the focus on higher levels of schooling and on an urban bias in the provision of education services has been largely addressed, if not yet remedied, by the re-orientation of the education system to primary education and by regionalization which places education resources closer to rural populations. Consequently, the most obvious and articulated target of the BESO program is gender equity. Its focus is on primary school-aged girls and on the women who teach or plan to teach them. In this respect, BESO is in complete alignment with MOE policy goals, actual policy, and interests.

Within the BESO design, gender is seen as a cross-cutting issue and is integrated into the first four IRs (IR5 primarily deals with sectoral financing), and both its SO and IR indicators either deal explicitly with female participation in schooling or are disaggregated to demonstrate and track progress toward gender equity. The risk of any cross-cutting issue is that it is so ubiquitous that it is forgotten. This has emphatically not been the case with BESO, due to both the goals and design, but also to the commitment and energy of the female AED advisors and BESO recipient NGOs.⁴

The BESO program uses both conditioned NPA and project assistance (including grants) to support increased female education in primary schooling. For the NPA, although three of the four performance criteria relating to gender have been expressed as covenants rather than more forceful and binding conditions, they have been or will be met by the MOE and regions, including a national policy to establish a quota for female TTI entrants. The team has been advised that no quota has yet been set for TTCs; this presents an excellent opportunity for an NPA condition in the near future.

BESO project activities focus on three main areas:

School environment: The treatment of girls at school and in the classroom can have a profound impact on performance, persistence and even families' decisions to enroll their daughters. The community school grants program work with communities, school management committees, and teaching personnel to sensitize them to girls' needs and help them develop strategies. Both WLI and TDA report that girls' enrollments in their schools have increased beyond regional averages and that attrition is down, although quantitative data on both indicators need to be provided. Communities have been active in addressing girls' issues by designating grant funds to build latrines for girls and establishing Female Task

^{4.} These AED advisors have ensured that at least one woman be included on different study tours, and generally supported affirmative action when female candidates did not meet the strict qualifications for selection in various capacity building or training activities.

Forces at the school to support female students, inhibit harassment, monitor female student participation and encourage families to send or keep their daughters in school. School management committees have been active in recruiting female students and working with woreda official on difficult issues (such as abduction in the SNNPR). Girls' sports programs have been started, and girls' academic success has been showcased at school assemblies and even in the market places.

The BESO School Leadership Program has featured girls' issues as part of its training workshops, and provided a forum for discussion and brainstorming among teachers, education officials and other sector representatives.

Female teacher and teacher trainee support: The BESO School Leadership program provides training and supports female teachers in or to assume leadership positions, in a society and a system which often overlooks or neglect their professional development. A study tour for a group of primary school teachers to Kenya, organized by the AED Adwa TTI advisor, recognized these women for the first time and has helped to create a core group of female teachers in Tigray who are mentoring others. A regional conference and five zonal workshops have brought female teachers together and have resulted in practical solutions to problems that constrain girls' participation.

The entrance qualifications and non-supportive environment at the TTIs is a barrier to female entry into the teaching profession. As described in chapter 3.3, in association with a BESO performance condition, the MOE raised the entry quota from 20 to 30 percent to TTIs, and TTIs have lowered entry qualifications for females.⁵ They have also introduced female trainee support systems, to varying extents. The three TTIs in the BESO focus regions have pioneered these efforts by developing remediation programs to help the weaker female students who have entered under the lower standards; the programs have attracted some boys needing remediation as well. They also offer counseling and support to girls, and construct facilities such as separate dormitories and latrines. The Adwa TTI has developed a Physical Education Syllabus for girls, with the result that girls' are now playing field sports. A newly-formed Girls' Club has tackled the issues affecting young women, such as AIDS and contraception.

<u>Curriculum:</u> The BESO project has supported the development of gender-neutral or girls-positive syllabi and instructional materials. The AED curriculum advisors believe that the materials are improving in term of gender balance, but suggest that more refinement is indicated. Commissioned writers have received abbreviated training in gender issues as related to curriculum. A curriculum monitoring and evaluation program in Tigray examined gender dynamics in the classroom and analyzed interaction patterns. As a result, the REB department head and subject specialists now introduce the issue of gender in work session with zonal and

⁵ The Vice Minister advised the assessment team that there is some interest in increasing the quota to 50 percent women in the coming years.

woreda personnel. On a study tour in two other regions, the Tigray team selected gender as the issue on which their team made a presentation.

Positive results are beginning to be seen. Both the CSGP schools and the focus region TTIs report that female attrition rates have diminished. However, data from the past three years do not show that ranks of women in the teaching profession has increased either nationally or in the focus regions. Girls' enrollment ratios in the focus regions are higher and their growth has outpaced the national average for girls (see chapter 6 for figures), although the gender gap between boys and girls is increasing in SNNPR and only modestly narrowing in Tigray.

These data suggest that although the BESO-financed activities are encouraging, they have not yet reached a critical mass in the focus regions or nationally to attract girls to school or into the teaching profession, and many structural and demand-side barriers remain. Some options for consideration are:

- Expand outreach nationally by supporting with targeted technical assistance (short-term, local or international) the Women's Affairs Office within the MOE to help it help the regions develop their own strategies and action plans. A national strategy on female education and action plan was developed by the MOE, based on a FAWE research study and national conference. It is up to the regions to develop their own strategies using the suggested guidelines. Assistance could be provided through the Women's Affairs Office to the regions to develop action plans in support of the national strategy.
- Work with the MOE to develop a publicity campaign package that can be implemented in the regions to reach all sectors of society, not just educators. Some USAID support was given earlier for the development of songs in regional languages, but they did not seem to be integrated into a dynamic national campaign. [Note: an earlier attempt to partner with USAID's centrally-funded Girls' and Women's Education project was not successful because of resistance to another "awareness" program which emphasized working directly with the private sector, and the creation of another office. A reexamination of the specific objections to the approach and program should inform any BESO initiatives in this area.]
- Extend the experience of all the TTIs (not just the focus regions) in supporting female trainees by compiling "best practices", developing a manual, and working with the MOE to develop certain actionable norms.
- Ensure that focus region planners include girls' issues in the further development and implementation of their ESDPs. While the SNNPR Planning Department indicated that separate latrines are a norm for new schools, the Tigray REB has reportedly not considered this. Planners from neither region had considered school schedules (although one indicated that the use of double shifts was a strategy aimed at girls) or the placement of schools.

- Work specifically with zone and woreda personnel to develop action plans for their support of girls' education. Although they have been included in workshops and seminars, it appears that they have not been assisted or tasked with developing their own support strategy.
- Develop better indicators and track them. The current indicators at the sub-IR levels are much too input specific. Report on TTI female admission and completion rates and class rank; on the share of female primary school teachers; on girls persistence. This should be done nationally and regionally, and would make an excellent benchmark for the ESDP.

4.2 Participation

BESO was developed through a strong participatory planning process, and it continues to operate in a team-based manager. The "core" USAID Strategic Objective (SO) team in Addis includes USAID, Ministry of Education, AED, and WLI representatives, with a TDA representative participating when he is in town. This core team provides day-to-day management of BESO, with frequent informal small meetings and/or telephone conversations.

The core team for USAID's SO3 relates to a BESO Technical Working Group (TWG), that includes members of the USAID core team plus representatives from ICDR, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation (MEDAC). The TWG is chaired by the Head of the Project Preparation and Monitoring Panel (PPMP) in the Planning and Projects Department (PPD) of the MOE. The TWG is supposed to meet quarterly to undertake periodic monitoring of NPA conditionalities and project activities, as well as to resolve specific problems as they occur. In practice, it convenes less regularly, but still performs a valuable function as needed to review key management issues.

The TWG has undertaken field trips in the regions and reviewed annual plans. In fact, a key TWG function is to review and compile the annual plans for the major BESO Central Coordinating Committee (BCCC). The BCCC is chaired by the Vice Minister of Education, and comprises senior representatives from the GFDRE. It meets annually each July, at the beginning of the Ethiopian Fiscal Year. The TWG can be characterized as the BCCC secretariat, with more operational functions and a more frequent meeting schedule.

Supplementing the TWG and BCCC at the center are a number of special interest groups, including the Gender Core Group, and a technically oriented Education Discussion Group for Ethiopia (EDGE), both of which include government, donors, and NGOs. While EDGE is not BESO-specific, both groups provide a useful forum for information sharing and communication among key BESO actors.

Deserving special mention at the center is The BESO Newsletter, issued periodically by USAID and the MOE. This full-color desktop-published newsletter is a professional summary of recent BESO activities and is circulated widely among BCCC and TWG members. Indeed, the assessment team saw copies in almost every office visited. The newsletter is a positive attempt by USAID to foster transparency and open communication about BESO activities. Given printing facilities now available in Curriculum Departments at Tigray and SNNPR REBs, regional personnel might consider producing similar newsletters, in Amharic and/or Tigrigna, for BESO and other activities as ESDP gets underway.

Both Tigray and SNNPR have formed BESO Regional Coordinating Committees chaired by the Regional Council Social Sector Head. The BRCCs include AED and WLI or TDA representatives (depending on the region) as well as REB and other executive branch officials, as needed. The assessment team was not able to meet any Regional Council members due to scheduling conflicts, but was told that BRCCs meet and are viewed as effective conduits for information sharing and problem solving.

In addition to the BRCCs in the regions, BESO decision-makers benefit from inputs from special interest fora, including Teachers Associations at the regional, zonal, and woreda levels, the Tigray Women's Association, and other associations and/or NGOs. Again, these are not BESO specific, but provide a network for information sharing and communication that facilitates and strengthens BESO-financed work. Associations and other organizations operating at the woreda level, including CSGP school committees, are particularly important in helping transmit views of BESO's ultimate beneficiaries — families with children — up the system to BESO decision makers.

The formal USAID-GFDRE and BRCC-TWG-BCCC mechanisms appear to be respected as important decision-making fora by all key BESO actors, and appear to include all appropriate BESO partners. Should additional funded partners become important to BESO operations, such as the Faculty of Education of Addis Ababa University for Distance Education, their participation should be solicited.

As the ESDP progresses, the utility of separate BESO-specific coordinating mechanisms should be periodically reassessed. Especially in the regions, it is likely that Regional ESDP Steering Committees will have the same role as the BESO-specific BRCCs, and redundancy should be avoided. At the center, however, the proposed ESDP Central Joint Steering Committee (CJSC) may not be as useful to BESO as is its own BCCC. The CJSC is assigned a broad, macro-level role, and there is consideration of having one CJSC for both ESDP and its health-sector equivalent, the HSDP. The BCCC may thus need to be retained, at least for review of annual BESO plans and conditions, in future years. Given USAID's particular modes of operation and the efficacy of the TWG, it is also likely that the BESO-specific TWG will remain useful for the foreseeable future as a participatory forum to solve mutual problems on a more operational level.

4.3 Institutional Sustainability

The design of BESO is predicated on fostering <u>sustainable</u> changes in the basic education system at all levels, and chapter 3 discusses how these are being achieved. A summary of some key concerns related to sustainability follows.

Chapter 3.5.2 discusses some of the fundamental issues regarding the need for improved rational sectoral financing, and chapter 3.5.3 provides recommendations to enhance the likelihood of sustainable achievements. To quote 3.5.3, "More resources have been received by the sector in absolute terms, and the resource indicators tend to go in a positive direction (with some fluctuation). The major exception is non-salary recurrent expenditures: both the budget share and the per unit figures have fallen over the course of BESO. Given the emphasis of BESO on quality, this is of considerable concern, but is perhaps unrealistic in a country where political priorities and pent-up demand due to long periods of civil strife combine to results in dramatic growth in enrollments. However major policy changes have occurred which will presumably expand the resource envelop for education and, if enforced or acted upon, should result in more efficient use of education." We have added the italics to emphasize that policy change cannot just be decreed, but must be implemented if results are to be sustained. USAID should include requirements for workshops to discuss implementation of policies and to develop mini-action plans as part of any future policy conditionalities.

Chapter 3.4.2 discusses some of the improvements, and problems, with assuring sustained quality operations and provision of education support services by the REBs, zones, and woredas, and chapter 3.4.3 provides some recommendations to enhance the likelihood of sustainable achievements. Chapter 5.2.2 below recommends that AED work to integrate its annual plans and budgets, and those of the individual advisors, into those of the focus region REBs to assure smoother implementation now, and to increase the likelihood of sustainability in the future. Chapter 5.2.2 also recommends increased attention to harmonizing REB and AED practices on payment of honoraria and per diems for workshops and supervision missions; this is important in order to avoid creating possible dependencies which would create difficulties when AED leaves.

Chapter 3.3.2 discusses improvements to three teacher training institutions and raises a number of issues regarding their sustainability, given the fluid situation with the status of each of the TTIs and new TTCs in the focus regions. USAID and the government must consult closely over the disposition and use of project-financed equipment, and the redeployment of trained instructors and staff, if the gains made to date are not lost. Equipment purchased for TTIs should remain with TTIs, or be reallocated in keeping with the objectives of the program, in close consultation among partners. Instructors who are not moved to TTCs should at least be considered for work at the REB or another TTI, instead of being sent back to secondary schools, if any sort of sustainable systemic change in teacher training is desired.

Chapter 3.2.2 discusses improvements in the curriculum research, design, testing, revision, and applications process in the two regions, and suggests that a critical mass of personnel has been trained that is likely to sustain new knowledge and skills over time. Of issue here is identifying cost-effective options for production and reproduction of educational materials, including textbooks and IRI teachers' aids, so that these are not dependent on donor financing. Both REBs have commissioned thoughtful studies in this regard, and the center should assure that these examinations also take into account positive experiences from other regions. If necessary, USAID might consider some assistance to private printers in the focus regions — possibly through a Global Bureau small business development program — to upgrade capability and assure a competitive printing industry to support schools' needs.

Chapter 3.1.2 discusses exciting achievements under the Community Schools Grants Program (CSGP) and the School Leadership program, and 3.1.3 comments on sustainability of both.

- The CSGP is an exciting and innovative way for the Regional Councils to harness the energy and other resources of the independent sector, particularly NGOs, to help achieve the ESDP goals. NGO participation has proven critical to education sector development in many countries worldwide, particularly in terms of increasing access, through marshaling local resources for school construction and rehabilitation, and in assuring quality, through encouraging parental involvement, peer support, and more localized and site-based activities than government might be able to achieve.
- Under BESO, TDA's efforts are essentially sustainable: it is a local NGO, it appears technically capable, and it appears to have strong constituency in Tigray, in Ethiopia, and outside to assure financing over time. The challenge is for the REB -- and government overall -- to find ways to accommodate the contributions of TDA into the somewhat strict ESDP financial portfolio.
- Sustainability of WLI is more of an issue due to the SNNPR REB's decision to limit its collaboration with local NGOs. The team strongly recommends that this issue be reopened in policy dialogue so that local NGOs' knowledge and capacities can be developed and the innovative strategies and unique non-governmental contribution is not lost when WLI leaves. USAID should collaborate directly with WLI, the REB, and others to begin to develop a WLI "exit strategy" that would assure continuity of actions.
- In both cases, the team emphasizes that much knowledge and skills have already been transferred and will be sustained regardless of TDA or WLI, by parents and parent-teacher committees at the CSGP schools. The possibility for further nurturing of these fledgling associations by NGOs should be encouraged to the extent possible, to stimulate community involvement and provide for low-cost replication of efforts.
- For <u>school leadership</u>, as stated in chapter 3.1.3, the AED Curriculum Advisor in the north and either the Curriculum Advisor or Awassa TTI advisor should mentor the AED

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School Leadership Coordinators as the program moves into the REB-managed "cluster school" mode within the ESDP teacher training component. The program is at the "take-off point" and will need careful shepherding to expand without losing its impact. USAID, in consultation with ICDR and the MOE Teacher Training Panel, should consider financing a "best practices" survey of in-service programs nationally, which would include an assessment of impact of BESO's school leadership efforts, to find which models/methods are cost-efficient and effective. Given the national debate on pre-service training (see chapter 3.3.3), carefully designed in-service programs are essential supplements. Experiences such as the intense School Leadership pilot should not be lost in the haste to meet ESDP targets.

5. FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS: MODALITIES & MANAGEMENT

5.1 Non-Project Assistance

5.1.1 Structure and Objectives. As stated in chapter 1, BESO includes US\$50 million in direct program (budgetary) support, or NPA, to the GFDRE, which represents over 60 percent of the total anticipated life-of-program BESO funding of US\$80 million. The NPA disbursement is scheduled over an eight year period (USFY 1994 to USFY 2001), payable in seven tranches, upon achievement of agreed upon policy reforms. The NPA amount was determined based on an analysis of Ethiopia's balance of payments, and on sectoral resource needs.

The BESO Program Authorization envisaged that tranche review and release would occur on an annual basis, with the first disbursement occurring at the end of the first year of the program. To date, two tranches have been disbursed, totaling US\$16 million. The NPA funds are deposited into a special dollar account established by the GFDRE to be used to pay USG debt service as a first priority, with repayment of multi-lateral development banks or multi-lateral lending institutions from any remaining funds. MEDAC serves as the lead coordinating entity for the program effort and the MOE serves as the main implementing body, with REBs and Bureaus of Finance in the focus regions taking the required actions and supplying proof of performance as specified.

The purpose of the BESO NPA component is to: (I) contribute to filling sectoral budgetary shortfalls associated with the reform effort; (ii) leverage more funds for the sector, particularly for primary education; and (iii) motivate the GFDRE and assist the MOE to undertake the specific reforms designated in the BESO Policy Reform matrix, and (iv) complement the BESO project efforts to form a comprehensive assistance package.

5.1.2 Performance Conditions and Covenants. The BESO PAAD/PP specified the conditions precedent (CPs) and covenants for the first two tranches of NPA. Conditions and covenants for disbursement of subsequent tranches are established on the basis of periodic joint USAID and GFDRE review of progress and negotiation, and defined in a program

implementation letter (PIL), with separate letters to the two focus regions defining the intent, terms and requirements of the CPs and Covenants, and designating which REB departments are responsible for action. The first tranche required action on 8 CPs (of which four were "procedural") and 6 covenants; the second tranche, 9 CPs and 6 covenants; third tranche, 6 CPs and 5 covenants. A listing of the CPs and Covenants according to tranche and IR is provided in Annex F.

Condition Precedent, or CP, designation is based on status as a key policy reform or action leading to it; all the financial or resource allocation objectives are CPs. Covenants are used for reforms or actions that are either not so fundamental in effect, or for preliminary activities that presage future policy reforms or actions which will required in a future tranche. Third Tranche CPs and covenants were identified according to the BESO Policy Reform Matrix, and were selected and assigned CP or covenant status according to six criteria: I) importance for achieving quality and equity improvements; ii) level of government commitment; iii) feasibility of achieving within tranche time frame; iv) ability to demonstrate achievement; v) potential for national-level impact; and vi) synergy and complementarity with other candidate reforms.

5.1.3 Responsiveness to the Conditions. GFDRE proof of performance is compiled by the TWG on behalf of the BCCC, with data and evidence provided by the appropriate MOE departments and the REBs, under the supervision of MEDAC. MEDAC generally undertakes to compile the national and some regional financial data. MEDAC submits to USAID a letter asserting compliance, accompanied by narrative summary of fulfillment/achievement for each CP and covenant with substantiating documentation annexed.

The assessment team's review of the GFDRE submissions for the first and second tranches (and of preliminary documentation for Tranche 3, not yet formally submitted) raises issues with (I) timeliness and (ii) viability/completeness of proof of performance, (iii) Mission assessment of compliance. In (iv), we provide some suggestions about managing the Tranche 3 and future conditions.

(I) <u>Timeliness</u>: Within a year of the signing of the ProAg (September 1994), the government presented its evidence of satisfaction of the CPs and covenants to the Mission (September 1995), having previously provided proof of compliance with administrative or procedural conditions, e.g. setting up a bank account. Less than two months later, in November 1995, USAID funds were disbursed. However, the government did not meet the established timetable for the second tranche, which was concomitant with Year 2 of the BESO Program, and submitted its proof of compliance nearly six months after the review date in February 1997. Because the performance evidence was incomplete, USAID did not approve disbursement until July 1997. Due to some miscommunication between USAID and the MOF regarding the specific debt accounts to be paid, disbursement was not effected until February 1998.

The schedule appears to be improving: in September 1997, a new PIL designating the Tranche 3 conditions and covenants was signed; preliminary data have been unofficially submitted for USAID feedback; and the formal review is expected to occur in August 1998.

However, due to the delays with the second tranche, the NPA component is now one year off schedule. This delay has important implications for BESO operations and management. First, the disbursement schedule should be re-examined. Given that most of the performance conditions are or will be based on annual budgetary or resource allocation data and that some of the anticipated actions will require time to implement, it is unlikely that the pace of the NPA component can be accelerated. Further, more delays are likely if the Mission's review process becomes more rigorous (see below). An option could be to increase the tranche amounts to assure all can be made within the time remaining. Second, the reporting requirements and the target levels for some of the conditions should be adjusted. For example, the conditions dealing with sector finance require annual comparisons of expenditures/budget to demonstrate increases in resources. A hiatus of one year often makes the levels set in the condition meaningless or confusing. For example, the annual comparison that is likely to be skipped is 1997-with-1996, a period that primary education's share of the education budget plummeted.

(ii) <u>Viability of Proof of Performance</u>: The documentation submitted by the government to support its compliance with conditions is at times confusing, incomplete, and — in some cases — does not respond to either the letter or intent of the condition or covenant (although the latter is not binding). There are some understandable factors that may contribute to the problem: documentation must be translated from Amharic into English, some of the data are not readily available or easily compiled (e.g., administration or overhead expenses), and the regions and sub-regions lack the financial systems and capacity to respond as requested, and initially there was some confusion about central and regional reporting responsibilities. In addition, some of the USAID CPs and covenants were unclear or did not correspond to the MOE and REB budget structure. Not surprisingly, some of the supporting evidence submitted does not adequately or convincingly document performance.

Some examples of incomplete and missing data include: data were presented for one region but not for another; a request for an annual comparison was met with just one year of data (Tranche 2, C9); and aggregated data were provided instead of the requested unit data for non-salary recurrent school expenditures (Tranche 2, CP3). Additionally, there was use of anecdotal data instead of region-wide, for Tranche 2, CP3, when a sample of four schools was submitted in lieu of full regional data for all schools.

Data were also sometimes inconsistent. For example, it was difficult to ascertain what was included in the non-salary recurrent expenditures of the three TTI for Tranche 1, CP7, and the data presented by MEDAC on national budget allocations did not always agree with the MOF data published in the *Negarit Gazetas*, which is considered the official and more reliable source of budget data.

The problems listed above pertain to the financial or resource conditions and covenants which call for quantifiable responses, and are consequently easier to evaluate (although not to compile). The conditions requiring more qualitative responses (e.g. "an acceptable plan of action") pose a greater challenge, because it is often easier with these type (e.g. "undertake a study...") to meet the letter of the condition rather than the intent. In some cases, the analysis was not undertaken: the MOE admits not having conducted the analysis of teacher norms, although it acknowledges the problem (Tranche 2-COV6). In other cases, there appears to be no follow-through: an initial definition of MQS was prepared by MOE, but later dropped (although some basic planning norms were used for ESDP) (Tranche 2-COV4); the teacher certification plan is reported not to have been implemented; and, as noted in 5.1.2, the sectoral investment reforms appear to be reversing themselves. Finally, action is only partially fulfilled in some instances: the national plan for TTI curriculum is only a "skeleton framework" and still subject to debate (Tranche 2-CP6).

It should be emphasized that although there were some problems with the documentation and proof provided by the government, USAID's HID office has taken an activist role in assisting the MOE and regions to understand the requirements, and that representatives of the TWG made special efforts to collect the necessary regional data to respond to the conditions.

The contribution of NPA to achieving the BESO objectives, and USAID's IRs, is included in the findings and conclusions for each IR in chapter 3.

(iii) <u>USAID Assessment of GFDRE Compliance</u>. In general, using a strict interpretation, the government has not always been in full compliance with stated conditions. In some instances cited above, the government simply has not provided the adequate supporting information, and often the arguments they present in its stead are not compelling. Discussions with USAID staff and written USAID analyses of government responses show that USAID had carefully scrutinized the data and was aware of the deficiencies therein. However, the Mission made a careful distinction between the "letter" and the "intent" of a condition, and opted to take a lenient view if they felt that the intent had been fulfilled. The Mission chose to give the government the "benefit of the doubt", taking into account contextual factors, while stating in writing their concerns and requests for future follow-up information.

The Mission's reasoning has been carefully documented, and this approach is congruent with the experience of other USAID education sector support programs working with governments in early stages of reform. Often the data needed are not readily available, capacity is low and the government is not familiar USAID expectations of data and proof. In some instances, technical assistance has been tasked with assembling government data and drafting its response. Encouragingly, this is not reported to be the case in Ethiopia.

However, as USAID and the Government approach the Tranche 3 review, it is important that both parties raise their standards to ensure that the agreed upon policy, institutional and operational reforms are put in place. Continuing to agree to a series of "near misses" in the

conditions and covenants will not provide the critical mass of reform actions on which the BESO development hypothesis is based and could be interpreted by the government that USAID is not a serious partner in the reform program. Further, the issue of "ownership" of the conditions is frequently mentioned in the context of BESO; it is unlikely that government ownership will occur if it believes that it need make little effort to satisfy the conditions.

The government is now familiar with the modality of conditioned assistance and its requirements, and the Tranche 3 conditions were selected and agreed to by the parties actually responsible for implementing them, unlike Tranches 1 and 2 which were developed at the design stage. Discussions with the MOE and REB officials in SNNPR and the AED Finance Advisor in Tigray indicate that the data and the systems for obtaining them are in place.

(iv) <u>Tranche 3 Conditions and Covenants</u>. As mentioned, some of the earlier conditions and covenants were unclear, vague, unrealistic or overly demanding in terms of what the data systems could provide (e.g., data on administrative costs at the woreda level). Some of these problems have been remedied with the Tranche 3 conditions and covenants. A review of some preliminary documentation from the regions for the Tranche 3 response shows an improvement in the presentation and data, but problems remain, particularly in the area of non-salary recurrent expenditures (Tranche 3, CPs 1 and 4) and in the evidence of what constitutes an acceptable plan or study. The Mission should take a proactive stance and provide detailed guidance now on how to structure the responses.

For the financial data, the Mission should:

- provide a tabular format of how the data should be presented (e.g., columns for total budget, recurrent budget, non-salary budget, number of students, per student expenditure);
- define the methodology and criteria for the line item (e.g., does non-salary include capital costs, such as desks, etc. or should it limited to instructional materials; can the data combine public resources with private resources or those provided by donors); all parties should agree the budget line items from the chart of accounts should be included;
- indicate whether region-wide data are required or whether a sample is acceptable;
- specify the criteria for an acceptable sample (e.g., number of zones, woredas and schools) to ensure it is representative;

- agree on the data source and assure that it is used consistently (e.g., MOF gazetted data or MEDAC data)
- require that any anomalies in data be explained (e.g., if a mid-year supplement to budget is made that would not be indicated in MOF budget, this should be noted)

For the plans and studies required, the Mission should require evidence that:

- the studies are rigorous and conform to prevailing standards required to make informed and data-based decisions (i.e., they included financial data, cost projection, etc.);
- the studies are prepared by qualified personnel;
- the study or studies compiled are part on a national or regional policy initiative, rather than an *ad hoc* collection of material;
- the studies or action plans have been undertaken, approved and accepted by the entities responsible for implementing them;
- the plans are official with proper authorization and sign-off, rather than a narrative explanation what is intended to be done or a recitation of a loose series of actions that may contribute to the policy objective.
- 5.1.4 Issues and Recommendations for Future Tranches. There are several issues and factors which compromise the effectiveness and impact of the NPA portion of the BESO Program. Most stem from the challenge of using the NPA modality within a federal system, and a newly federalized one in which the different entities are still defining their roles. Most of USAID's experience with the use of the NPA modality for education sector support is in countries that are still highly centralized, despite some movement toward decentralization. In those countries, policy reforms need only be negotiated with the ministries of education and finance; policy-making authority and implementing responsibility are closely tied; and the incentives i.e., NPA funds are more visible to those tasked with responding to the conditions. The situation in Ethiopia is quite different. Some of the issues are addressed below with some recommended options for improvement.
- (I) MOE Ownership of BESO policy reforms: Discussions with key officials of the Prime Minister's Office and the MOE indicate an aloofness from the policy and institutional reforms expressed in BESO conditions and covenants. There are several reasons for this. First, it seems that some education reform actions were deferred until the ESDP was finalized, despite the 1994 Education and Training Policy and discussions with USAID at the time of BESO design. Second, the very visible presence of the AED technical advisors seem to attract more attention and concern than the \$50 million of NPA tied to education reform. Third, it is frequently pointed out that the NPA funds are never physically transferred to the MOE and therefore seem to escape notice (except by the MOF). Finally, it seems that the primary type of action that is elicited by the conditions and covenants from the MOE is one of information gathering for the conditionality report, rather than thoughtful plotting of how to achieve the policy objectives or where the conditions fit into the reform agendas or day-to-day operation of the MOE. The responsibility for the BESO conditions and covenants shift to those charged

with reporting, i.e., the secretary of the TWG of the BCCC, rather than those who should be implementing the reform actions themselves.

The GFDRE does not meet USG criteria for direct sectoral disbursement, so it is not an option to transfer NPA funds directly to the MOE. The Minister of Education indicated that she was satisfied with the present arrangement with the MOF. But there are several options for "relinking" the MOE with BESO reform objectives:

- The MOE's request for BESO "re-alignment" with the ESDP offers an opportunity to revisit MOE priorities and BESO objectives. Comparing the BESO policy matrix with that of the ESDP, perhaps during the annual review process, would serve to establish MOE priorities and put BESO back on the MOE policy map. A flowchart linking policy objectives to operational policies and institutional actions could serve to get MOE attention and commitment.
- Redistribute the effort involved in responding to conditions, so that pressure is on those who are responsible for effecting change, not just reporting it. Negotiation of condition for future tranches should involve more than consensus on their selection, and should require a mini-plan of action with specific steps, timeline, responsible institutions and staff, as well as the evidence or data needed for proof of performance at the end of the tranche period. Those with key responsibility should indicate concurrence, with signature, and be assigned reporting duties.
- If national-level change is desired, then the focus regions should not be used as proof of achievement of a condition. This allows the MOE to pass responsibility off to the regions. If national change is viable, then evidence of the center's action <u>plus</u> data from other regions (on a sample or selected basis) should be used.
- Keep the performance <u>objective</u> on the "front burner" with some form of assistance or review. The Mission has regularly offered BESO resources to support the MOE in following-up with partially-met performance conditions and covenants, but apparently the offer has not been accepted. If conditions/covenants are accompanied by the mini-action plans suggested above, some BESO technical assistance could be programmed into it.
- Make implementation a part of MOE conditions. For example, if a condition calls for a study, it should be presented and discussed at national workshop with a list of recommendation and action plan.
- Place some of the condition responsibility with MOF or the Prime Minister's Office. As discussed in chapter 3.4, PPD does not really make policy, that it is done at higher levels. These levels should then be involved in the relevant conditions.

(ii) Focus Regional Ownership of BESO policy reforms: The majority of the BESO conditions place the burden of performance and proof on the two focus regions. Until USAID instituted the Regional Incentive Fund (RIF), the benefit that the regions felt from the NPA was slight, if at all. This was exacerbated by the MOF's decision to "offset" the regional budgets by the dollar value of the USAID project package, including both commodities and technical assistance. The technical assistance has since been exonerated, and the RIF is not included in the "offset."

In summary, it appears that there is not a problem with ownership or motivation in the regions at this stage, because (I) the conditions seem to reflect more closely the agenda and work plan of the REBs, (ii) the TWG has assisted in pulling together difficult performance data for the conditionality review, and (iii) the RIF has been effective as a reward. Should the performance conditions become more difficult, the reviews more exigent or the RIF eliminated, this may change.

Many of the suggestions in the above section also pertain to the regions. The key additional recommendation is that USAID should base future BESO conditions for the regions on their ESDP and annual work plans, and make sure that any studies or analyses to be undertaken as a condition or covenant are also part of the REB work plan within the ESDP framework.

(iii) Reinforcing the link between the BESO NPA and the BESO Project. Allocation of BESO NPA and project resources are not always clearly linked to achievement of the BESO purpose and objectives, and USAID's SO3 and intermediate results, and there appears to be a disconnect between the BESO reform objectives, as expressed by the conditions and covenants, and some of the elements of the BESO project. For example, BESO support of curriculum development for primary school (IR2) through the AED contract, and the Community School Grant Program (IR1) through TDA and WLI have the potential for policy, institutional and operational reforms at the national and regional levels, yet have not been included in either the conditions of covenants of the three tranches. Considerable project resources have been allocated to these activities and they have enjoyed notable success. It is unclear whether these activities will figure in future conditions and covenants.

Not all NPA-supported reforms should or need to be supported with BESO project resources. For example, the budget and resource allocation actions required to achieve IR5 would benefit from BESO project support only indirectly -- through building capacity in planning and financial analysis at the MOE and REBs. All reforms should, however, contribute to BESO objectives/IRs which are common to the NPA <u>and</u> project funding.

Options for improving linkages between NPA and other elements of BESO include:

- USAID and its partners should program a role for project support and technical assistance as needed in the conditionality action plans suggested in the above section. If studies are required, BESO project resources and expertise should be considered as sources of assistance and quality control.
- USAID and its partners should increase the use of BESO project resources to facilitate policy dialogue at the national level (i.e., with the center and other regions) on priority reform objectives, through workshops or colloquia, etc.
- In consultation with the TWG, USAID should consider options for future conditions and covenants that would extend the curriculum development, school leadership and community support work to the national and (other) regional level.
- (iv) Conditionality management, negotiation and selection: USAID has taken an activist role in managing the NPA component and its conditions and covenants. Staff have worked closely with a wide range of players to ensure that the conditions and covenant are understood and met. For Tranches 1 and 2 they met several times in workshops to explain the intent of the conditions and the evidence required, and have provided feedback and guidance to the REBs and TWG on the draft and final documentation presented.

Tranche 3 presented the first opportunity to select and negotiate the conditions on an annual basis. The process USAID followed is exemplary by Agency standards, and should be "exported" to other missions. Two meetings were held with representatives from the center (MOE, MOF, MEDAC) and the focus regions (REB, Planning Bureau, Bureau of Finance, Regional Council) to review past performance conditionality and progress made, and to develop candidate Tranche 3 conditions, based on the BESO Policy Matrix. Some condition options were rejected immediately as inappropriate (higher education cost recovery) or unworkable (administrative cost reduction). Others were ranked according to a defined set of criteria. Top priorities were assigned condition status; others were selected as covenants for Tranche 3 or the year after. The recommendations were submitted to the BCCC for approval, and included in the USAID PIL. The TWG sent a letter of notification to the regions, delineating the specific regional condition and covenants. Workshops were held in each region to review and explain the intent and requirements of the conditions and covenants. The REBs have presented preliminary documentation to the TWG, and HID has been asked for feedback.

This review found little room for improvement in the process, with exception of including other key Mission personnel in the review process. Suggestions for improved guidance in responding to conditions is presented in 5.1.2 above. A major future consideration, however, is the process, role, and definition of performance conditions and benchmarks in light of the ESDP multi-donor coordination and annual review process. It is impossible to make

recommendations until the landscape becomes a bit clearer, but the Mission should consider some of the following options:

- Include other donors in the conditionality reviews and workshops, as discussants and observers. This could be particularly helpful in the regions where BESO and other donors may be pursuing similar objectives, i.e., GTZ in school support in SNNPR.
- Base the selection of conditions and covenants on a revised and more focussed Policy Reform Matrix that is congruent with ESDP.
- If possible, reduce the number of conditions and covenants (although if considered separately for national and regional levels, they are not excessive). Develop a flowchart of the policy changes that need to occur in priority areas, to ensure a tranche-to-tranche continuity.
- Re-examine the policy changes that need to occur in order to optimize and institutionalize those areas that have not been previously addressed in the conditions and covenants (i.e., curriculum development, school leadership, community support).
- Redefine how national impact is documented. Expand to include other regions in addition to the focus regions. In some cases, all regions could be included (certain financial indicators); in other, representative regions could be selected (e.g., Amhara, Oromo).
- As stated in chapter 3.5, re-examine the sectoral investment framework to revise budget condition targets
- Also as stated in chapter 3.5, re-examine and redefine the scope for quality improvements in light of ESDP priorities and financial realities. Using unit non-salary recurrent expenditures may not be feasible in light of budgetary pressures; or a floor amount could be set.
- Focus the conditions on enabling policy or institutional reforms, particularly at the regions. For example, rather than using non-salary recurrent expenditures, use policies or actions that put in place the conditions for improved quality, such as development of a site-based teacher training program, definition of a policy on how community contributions will be used in planning and budgeting, or development of a zone and woreda school-community support strategy.

Finally, experience with conditionality and institutional reform demonstrates that requiring internal management change is generally inappropriate as the subject of conditionality. It is not advisable to include in conditions changes that have been resisted in the past. This will only lead to obfuscation or non-lasting changes. Conditions, such as requiring the PPD to

develop its policy mandate, should probably be avoided in future tranches and funds reprogrammed if the situation is untenable.

5.2 Project Assistance: TA Contractor and Cooperative Agreement Recipients

5.2.1 Selection of Modes. The BESO design identified the preferred modes for project assistance as one lead institutional contractor and one or more PVO/NGO partners for the community schools component. The selection of modes was based on standard USAID procedures and followed USAID international norms for project assistance. The selection was approved through GFDRE signature in September 1994 of the Project Grant Agreement, which succinctly described these modes in the Annex 1, Amplified Project Description. Subsequent to competitive procedures, AED was awarded the institutional contract, and TDA and WLI were awarded Cooperative Agreements (CoAgs).

During the more recent ESDP planning process, donor "types of TA" and "methods of financing" have come under some scrutiny. With reference to descriptions included in the earlier drafts on Implementation Arrangements for ESDP, and on the latest DRAFT Programme Implementation Manual for the ESDP (29 May 1998), USAID's methods of financing are essentially Channel 1° for NPA and Channel 3 for project assistance. USAID's type of TA is the "technology transfer/institution building" for all three BESO PA mechanisms, e.g. AED, WLI, and TDA. The former operates within government structures, and the two NGOs are undertaking both governmental and non-governmental institution building, particularly at the grass-roots level. As suggested in chapter 5.2.3 below, these latter two NGO mechanisms might be viewed as models for ESDP as NGO and community participation guidelines are drawn up.

As shown in chapter 2 of this assessment, the three PA mechanisms each have two years to two-and-one-half years left to run. Because they all fulfill recognized TA roles within the ESDP, because the method of financing is also recognized in the ESDP, and because they are implementing ESDP components, there appears to be no need to make any significant changes for the remainder of the time. With reference to chapter 7, any proposed follow-on work would need to be assessed separately within the evolving ESDP framework.

5.2.2 Contractor Performance. The AED contract is a completion type, level-of-effort, cost-reimbursable contract in which AED is to provide specific inputs (TA, training, commodities, local support costs) to assist the Government of Ethiopia in achieving the five BESO supporting objectives. There are no contractual performance benchmarks or targets, although AED was to "formulate a monitoring and tracking system, including development of progress and success indicators, for measuring the impact of Contractor services ..." early in the contract (AED contract). The process that has evolved is that AED reports to USAID and the TWG, with copies to the regions, through quarterly and annual reports which have increasingly been tied to accomplishments under its annual workplans. Individual AED

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advisors also work with their counterpart departments and USAID to respond to USAID's Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP) reporting requirements (see chapter 5.5 below), although these are usually more general for focus regions and do not necessarily represent "contractor-responsible" accomplishments.

More detailed discussions of efforts, contributions, and perceptions of the different long- and short-term AED advisors, trainings, etc. toward each of the supporting objectives/IRs are found in chapter 3.1 - 3.5 of this assessment. As shown therein, the overall impact from the early years is mixed. This is partially due to events beyond AED's control (e.g., customs clearance procedures for commodities, lengthy personnel and workplan approval procedures), and partially due to events within its control (slow recruitment of qualified replacement candidates, definition of Advisors' roles and responsibilities, integration of Advisors' efforts with REBs). However, prospects for the remaining two years of the contract are positive. All parties, including USAID, Government TWG members, REB officers, and AED advisors stated that the parties needed time to learn to work together, but things are now moving ahead.

As part of this forward movement, AED needs to assure that efforts of its advisors, as individuals and as central or regionally based teams, are more specifically tied to regional ESDP plans and budgets. Figure 6 at the end of this report provides an initial summary of how this can occur. The team was advised that as successive drafts of this assessment report were prepared, AED and the government were successfully merging plans. We emphasize this is essential for both planning and for enabling the government to monitor AED achievements within its own ESDP results framework.

Chapter 3.4 provides some options for how the new AED Policy/Planning Advisor might relate to the center, and the team hopes that a mutually agreeable "fit" is found for this important task. In the regions, the team found the most recent (June 1998) draft AED Annual Plans for Tigray and SNNPR are still AED-specific. They both mention that they support the ESDP and have been developed in collaboration with counterparts, but they follow the AED format and breakout, advisor-by-advisor. The assessment team has discussed this with AED and is assured that it is re-working its plans to more visibly and specifically tie them to the regional ESDP documents by REB department. The assessment team recommends that future AED reports also be tied to ESDP reporting needs. The team believes that this simple editorial effort will make subsequent integration of AED and REB efforts, plans, budgets, and achievements much smoother and eliminate some past miscommunication.

As these more integrated plans and reports are developed, USAID should also require AED to develop "mentoring contracts" between individual advisors and counterparts or other personnel to be mentored, as part of their annual workplans. Progress under mentoring contracts would be reported on quarterly, as addenda to ESDP-linked reports. One complaint among some people interviewed was "I haven't been advised" or "I haven't been capacitated." In order to respond to such concerns, some of the advisors have set specific schedules for staff development sessions, and others have undertaken specific one-on-one mentoring

arrangements. Formalizing arrangements like these into written, timebound individual mentoring contracts, and reporting on participation by both sides, might help AED better measure and report on the extent of "capacity building" that occurs.

The assessment team was told about a number of on-going administrative issues between AED and the REBs, regarding use/disposition of equipment and payment of per diems and honoraria. On equipment, AED is required in its contract to maintain records on the use and disposition of commodities it purchases, and this should certainly be utilized as goods are assigned to the care and custody, if not ownership, of the REBs. Also, the AED Financial Advisor in Tigray is developing a property management program in Amharic which may help the REBs manage all equipment under their purview. USAID should assure that AED adheres to its contractual responsibility and maintains clear and timely records about use and disposition of all property, and should encourage the REBs to adopt similar systems. In terms of honoraria and per diem, USAID should encourage the MOE to establish standard policies as part of the ESDP implementation plan, to minimize disputes between and among REBs, center, and donors.

Given the number and seeming efficacy of participatory fora for resolution of disputes, the assessment team regrets that such relatively mundane input-related matters are still unresolved almost three years into the contract. The team was assured, however, that all sides are working hard to eliminate such issues and focus on managing for results (instead of inputs) in the future.

5.2.3 Recipient Performance. Performance of WLI and TDA under their respective CoAgs is discussed in chapter 3.1 under the Community School Grants Program (CSGP). As stated therein, the assessment team was not able to visit Tigray and thus information on TDA is drawn from written reports and telephone interviews. Based on the team's review, both recipients appear adequately staffed to meet the program requirements. The team's visits to schools undertaking WLI activities were uniformly positive, although chapter 3.1 notes some issues of sustainability that must be addressed.

In both cases, although these are direct, two-party CoAgs between recipients and USAID, the recipients submit their annual workplans to the REBs and the TWG for discussion and approval as part of the overall BESO team-based management mode. Recipients' quarterly and annual reports are submitted in a similar manner. Earlier, WLI experienced a one-year delay as the REB studied its workplan, but its program is now more-or-less on track. TDA is now experiencing a similar problem with workplan approval, and has been stalled for about four months. The assessment team encourages the parties to come to try to come to agreement as quickly as possible, so that the program can move forward and respond to needs that may arise in a post-border conflict environment. The assessment team endorses the participation of NGOs at this grass-roots level, and recommends that these BESO CoAgs be viewed as models by the GFDRE as the ESDP NGO and community participation guidelines are developed.

5.3 Program Management

5.3.1 USAID Management. As stated in chapter 4.2 above, BESO operates in a teambased management mode. The "core" USAID Strategic Objective (SO) team in Addis includes USAID, Ministry of Education, AED, and WLI representatives, with a TDA representative participating when he is in town. This core team provides day-to-day management of BESO, with frequent informal small meetings and/or telephone conversations.

The SO3 Team Leader is an American U.S. direct hire employee (USDH). The designated Contracting/Grant Officer Technical Representative (COTR/GOTR) with full formal, delegated technical authority for the AED, WLI, and TDA mechanisms is a senior Ethiopian USAID professional. The designated Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, with formal authority for maintaining SO3's Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP) and preparing SO3's annual Results Review and Resource Request (R4), is also an Ethiopian senior professional. Another USDH from USAID's Program Office provides management oversight and advice, and a senior Ethiopian Financial Analyst provides almost full-time support to the team, from his seat in USAID's Office of Financial Management. Thus the formal USAID-bureaucratic responsibilities have been well balanced among the Ethiopian and American USAID members of the SO3 core team.

To all reports, the functioning of the SO core team was smooth, and its relationship with the GFDRE's Technical Working Group and BCCC also went relatively smoothly. USAID was able, for the most part, to manage its proprietary USG responsibilities for BESO in a generally efficient, timely, responsive manner. (One notable exception was USAID's early procurement of vehicles for the AED contract, which was underplanned, underbudgetted and delayed by almost one year, but this is now past history).

Up until around May 1997, the core SO team met formally on a monthly basis to share information, exercise its decision-making responsibilities, and assure that BESO moved forward. At that time, following on some re-engineering training and team building exercises at the USAID mission, SO3 decided to break into "Results Package Teams" (RPT) to "provide closer management attention to three inter-related areas of activities." RPT#1 was to focus on IR1, improved quality and equity of the primary school environment; the Team Leader was to be a USDH from the USAID Program Office who was active on the SO3 core team. RPT#2 was to focus on IRs2 and 3, improved pedagogical effectiveness and quality of teachers, with the designated COTR/GOTR of AED, WLI and TDA as Team Leader. RPT#3 was to focus on IRs4 and 5, improved financing and administration of decentralized education, with the SO3 M&E specialist as Team Leader. The SO3 core team leader was designated as a "coach" for all RPTs.

The organization and responsibilities of the RPTs was presented in an organigram with supporting narrative, and approved by the USAID Mission Director in May 1997. The RPTs were not delegated any authority for managing either NPA or PA funds, although they were

given technical review responsibility. Since that time RPT#1 has met twice, RPT#2 has met once, and RPT#3 met for the first time the day the assessment team left Ethiopia. Unfortunately, due to the existence of the RPTs, the SO core team has stopped meeting on a regular basis. BESO oversight and management is now somewhat more *ad hoc*, with team members drawn in on a need-to-know basis. While this is efficient and may save some people from attending unnecessary meetings, it lacks clarity and does not foster USAID's core values of teamwork, participation, empowerment, and accountability.

The assessment team suggests that given the GFDRE's rapid movement into the ESDP mode of operation, USAID needs to re-form into a more unified management team to assure that the various parts of BESO at the center and the regions adapt to the ESDP mode as smoothly as possible. The RPTs can be retained as BESO-specific technical fora if they so decide, but the SO3 core team should re-unite and start holding more regular, monthly meetings. Because no financial or contractual authority was ever delegated to the RPTs, this should not pose any issues. Simply, there is fragmentation in overall "vision", and it needs to be brought together.

As discussed in chapters 3.4 and 3.5, and in 5.1 above, the team also notes that there has been some time-consuming and complex review of data in preparation of NPA disbursements and a number of time-consuming administrative delays in organizing RIF funding. The team recommends that USAID review the workload of the three key individuals in the Human and Institutional Development Office who lead the SO3 team to determine if responsibility can be spread more evenly. May of the delays may be due to having one person as COTR/GOTR holding formal administrative authority, and thus responsibility, for the AED contract and the TDA and WLI CoAgs. Simply, this is a very heavy administrative burden and leaves little time for technical analyses, policy dialogue, and/or donor coordination. HID may consider distributing the COTR/GOTR administrative responsibilities more evenly within the office, and/or sharing some of the technical analyses and policy dialogue -- particularly for NPA conditions -- either within the office or among other SO3 team members, especially in USAID's Program Office. Given planned USDH staff turnover in the Program Office, this action may need to wait and be undertaken in consultation when new personnel arrive and that team's management load is re-assessed. Also, USAID may consider utilizing USAID Field Support resources, such as the ABEL or IEQ activities, to assist (not undertake in isolation) in NPA reviews on an annual basis. The level of funding involved suggests that it deserves increased however it is worked out.

5.3.2 GFDRE Management. As described in chapter 4.2 above, the core team for USAID's SO3 relates to the BESO Technical Working Group (TWG), that includes members of the USAID core team plus representatives from ICDR, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation (MEDAC). The TWG is chaired by the Head of the Project Preparation and Monitoring Panel (PPMP) of PPD in the MOE. The TWG is supposed to meet quarterly to undertake periodic monitoring of NPA conditionalities and project activities, as well as to resolve specific problems as they occur. In practice, it

convenes less regularly, but still performs a valuable function as needed to review key management issues.

The GFDRE is in the process of reconfiguring to meet the demands of the ESDP and it was not clear to the assessment team as of this writing where operational coordination will ultimately reside. The assessment team reviewed the latest draft Programme Implementation Manual for the ESDP (29 May 1998), which states that regular government channels will be used. Particularly if this is the case, the TWG appears most appropriate as a continuing management locus at the center for BESO for the foreseeable future. Given the allocation of BESO resources to several offices at the center and in two regions, the committee or team approach, including membership from outside the MOE, seems most appropriate for overall management.

At the center, MOE/PPD Planning Panel serves as the primary point of contact for BESO. The new AED long-term Advisor may work with several departments or panels in the ministry, but it is likely that the Panel (or its ESDP successor) will still track overall BESO progress. In the regions, the REBs and the Regional Councils exercise the government management and oversight function of joint USAID/government-funded BESO efforts. This relationship has been rocky in both focus regions at different times during the course of BESO, relating to AED contract activities and to recipients TDA and WLI. Even after three years, the assessment team found a number of differing perceptions and expectations among REB staff about roles and behaviors of expatriate advisors and NGO recipients, and among expatriate advisors about REB staff. The assessment team encourages more frank and open exchange between and among REB professionals and advisors about professional expectations, roles, and responsibilities. Chapter 7 includes a recommendation for the TWG to sponsor (with USAID financing) professionally facilitated workshops in each focus region to help iron out differences in this regard, between and among AED advisors and their respective REB departments, and among REB departments themselves, in hopes of building stronger teams.

5.3.3 Managing for Results. Both USAID and its central and regional government, and contractor and recipient partners in the SO3 team are still concentrating on management of program and project inputs, instead of managing for results. "Managing for results" means focusing individual, team, or organizational efforts on achieving planned results via systematic work processes (ref. USAID Reform Glossary). With the exception of the annual USAID Results Review, most reports reviewed by the assessment team spent much more time on number of seminars attended, number of trainings held, and number of reports produced than on actual changes in the behavior of students, teachers, staff, or others as a result of such seminars, trainings, and reports. The "BESO culture" seems frequently to concentrate more on per diem levels, allocation of computers and cars, and presence of written reports rather than on trainees' post-test scores or utilizing computer or narrative analyses for operations. Again, chapter 7 includes the recommendation for professionally facilitated workshops to help reorient BESO teams -- USAID, MOE, REBs, AED, WLI, TDA, etc. -- to more of a results-oriented management style. Achievement of the ambitious ESDP targets demands such an

approach, and the existing teams need to figure out how to work more efficiently to achieve those targets.

5.4 Donor Coordination

As discussed in chapter 4.2 above, USAID and its BESO partners participate in a number of management and technical fora established to foster improved communications and coordination among various actors in education in Ethiopia. These range from the more technical EDGE to the Gender Core Group to the BESO-specific TWG and BCCC. Through these fora, USAID and its BESO partners keep informed of other donor and NGO activities in education at the national level, and are able to avoid redundant actions and increase efficiency of the USAID investment.

Increased donor coordination will be necessary as the ESDP gets underway, and will be facilitated through the CJSC and its Secretariat at PPD. Because BESO's TWG is chaired by PPMP of PPD, there should be little problem with future coordination at the national level. USAID has now been invited to participate on the combined education/health sector CJSC, so this bodes well for strengthening integration of USAID support into ESDP, both in the remaining years of BESO and in the future.

In spite of some gaps in communication (e.g. the ESDP indicators and benchmarks in the new World Bank loan were not shared among donors), donor coordination for the ESDP has been satisfactory. The new Donor Group for ESDP, or DG/ESDP, formed in January 1998, has as its functions:

- to provide a forum for and encouragement of the exchange of information on the donors' support to the education sector;
- to provide a focal point within the framework of the Ethiopian Government's overall development strategy for addressing donor related coordination issues in the ESDP;
- to seek as far as possible to establish and be responsive to the government priorities in which donor support is required;
- to support and liaise with the Development Assistance Group, chaired by the World Bank and with EDGE.

The membership of the DG/ESDP is open to all multilateral and bilateral funding agencies involved in education. USAID is a member of the Secretariat, along with representatives from the UNDP, European Commission, and Embassy of Sweden. The group meets every two months, and is already proving its worth. It has completed an up-to-date "donor mapping" for the education sector that provides detailed information on types, levels, and locations of donor support. This is of prime importance in term of providing for synergies in investments and in avoiding redundancy, and should continue to prove useful as ESDP progresses.

USAID and its partners are also engaged in donor coordination at the regional levels in Tigray and SNNPR, and will need to remain actively involved at this level as ESDP gets underway. Other donors active in these two regions include the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), Irish aid, GTZ (German Aid), and the World Bank-UNDP financed Ethiopia Social Rehabilitation and Development Fund (ESRDF). It is likely that World Bank and European Community resources will become available to Tigray and SNNPR in the future, for construction and/or equipment that USAID does not finance.

5.5 Monitoring & Evaluation

The BESO monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system is multi-level, multi-modal, multi-dimensional, and generally effective. At the highest level at USAID, the data feed into an SO-level Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP) developed by USAID in late 1996, which is used to assess progress toward Intermediate Results, sub-Intermediate Results, and SO3 overall. These data are provided to USAID/Washington annually as part of the Results Review exercise, and serve as the basis for the annual Results Request. The data are thus critical in terms of assuring future financing for BESO activities.

In the course of its work, the assessment team found a number of different impressions of USAID's PMP indicators, and we suggest that clearer definitions could help resolve any confusions or differing interpretation. In several cases, staff at the REBs in Tigray and SNNPR may have interpreted data requests differently, so data from the different sources are not comparable. A better comparative data base is also needed to assess progress in the focus regions again national progress and/or a composite of comparable regions, to determine if BESO is making a different. Also, although USAID's NGO partners TDA and WLI also provide useful data, some of their reporting points are perhaps unnecessarily complicated. Annex E includes a number of recommendations in this regard. We note, however, that the SO3 PMP is extremely well maintained and is a "living" system that aids decision makers throughout the year, as opposed to one that is only brought out when Washington so requests. In parallel to USAID's SO3 reporting, the GFDRE/MOE collates and synthesizes regional data on key education sector indicators such as gross enrollment rate, participation by gender, attrition, etc. These data are provided in part by the BESO focus region REBs, and the need for such data is likely to increase as the ESDP phases in. As described in chapter 3.4 above, BESO has provided funding to strengthen the M&E work in the focus regions as part of its assistance to REB planning units. The assistance in school mapping, to establish a stronger data base, has been particularly successful and EMIS in both regions are improving as a result. Future plans in making the learning assessment concept operational, and in improving the EMIS, should greatly improve the data for decision making in future years. Financial data for are also becoming more available and useful in Tigray, as the computerized budget and accounting system phases in.

These regional quantitative data are complemented by "mini-research" undertaken by various REB units in order to inform and improve technicians. One example includes the study of

predictive factors for TTI success undertaken at Adwa TTI to inform the recruitment process, resulting in 10 percent change in weighting for the ESLC criteria. A second is the Tracer Study of Graduates underway at Awassa TTI. In both cases staff determined that additional information was needed to improve system performance, and BESO is supporting their efforts. The assessment team strongly endorses such decentralized "mini-research" as an important part of the M&E process, and encourages BESO to continue financing such exercises where funds permit.

The assessment team's statement of work includes a specific question with regard to the possibility of utilizing the forthcoming national Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) for the education sector. Given experience with pre-set DHS questionnaires in other countries, we are not sanguine that significant additional data sets can be added. However, we suggest that the DHS designers consult with key personnel at the MOE/PPD, AED, and the planning departments of the focus region REBs in this regard.

6. PROGRAM IMPACT: PURPOSE/SO-LEVEL ACHIEVEMENT

BESO's purpose and the SO3 strategic objective is "improved quality and equity in an expanded (and expanding) system of primary education." (emphasis added). These three dimensions, e.g. quality, equity, and expansion, are measured by the following indices: primary gross enrollment ratio (GER, for expansion); Grade 8 leaving exam score (quality); and female enrollment, drop-out and repetition (equity). Figure 4 on the next page records progress on the indicators from the SO3 Results Framework, comparing baseline targets with planned and achieved targets reported in USAID's USFY 2000 Results Review and Resource Request (March 1998). Some updated figures have been provided by the Mission.

Figure 4 shows that primary school enrollment has increased, as predicted in the BESO PAAD/PP, with nearly 1.4 million more children enrolled in primary school in USFY 1997 than in USFY 1995. The gross enrollment ratio of has recovered to its reported pre-war level. from a USFY 1993 low of 22 percent. Since the USFY 1995 baseline year, the national GER has increased to a USFY 1997 GER of 35 percent. The gross enrollment ratio in the two focus regions both started at and has attained higher levels than the national average. In SNNPR, an area with historically low educational participation level and difficult-to-serve populations, the GER has increased sharply (about 41 percent), surpassing the national average. In Tigray, with a USFY 1995 GER nearly twice that of SNNPR, the percentage of children in school has increased modestly, barely matching population growth. Enrollment growth appears in many cases to be constrained by supply: from USFY 1995 to USFY 1996, it appears that relatively few classrooms were constructed nationally, although SNNPR reports an increase of over 2000 classrooms. More teachers were added to the system, with approximately 500 being trained annually in Tigray and about 1200 in SNNPR. The national standard for pupil:teacher ratio is 50:1. Tigray reports that it has reached this ratio, and SNNPR is planning to surpass it, at about 57:1 in order to accommodate the burgeoning demand in the region.

Figure 4: BESO Program Strategic Objective Level Achievements

SO Indicator	Base Year:	USFY 1997							
	1995	Planned	Actual						
Primary GER	Ethiopia: 26.2%	37.0%	34.7%						
	Tigray: 43.7%	46.0%	45.0%						
	SNNPR: 29.1%	39.0%	40.9%						
Girls' GER	Ethiopia: 20.4%	25.0%	26.0%						
	Tigray: 38.0%	42.0%	41.0%						
	SNNPR: 17.4%	25.0%	24.5%						
Average Score on Grade 8 National Exam	Tigray:	52.0%	53.4%						
	SNNPR:	41.0%	38.0%						
Female share of Grade 4 Enrollment	Tigray:	45.0%	45.2%						
	SNNPR:	32.0%	32.0%						
Percent of CSGP schools with female Grade 1 drop-out rate less than 28 percent	Tigray:	20.0%	22.2%						
	SNNPR:		70.0%						
Percent of CSGP schools with female Grade 4 repeater rate less than 11 percent	Tigray:	35.0%	36.8%						
	SNNPR:		33.0%						

To measure improvements in quality, the Mission uses as a proxy the average raw score for the Grade 8 national exam, as reported in the two focus regions. It acknowledges that the efficacy of this indicator is questionable, given that the major focus and intent of its program has been on the first cycle of primary school (grade 1-4), and that here are problems with the test itself. AED is working with the MOE and regions to develop criterion-referenced tests for the earlier grades. Nonetheless, Figure 4 shows that the average score rose slightly in Tigray (although this increase is of questionable statistical significance). In SNNPR, the score fell, possibly due to the large influx of students. Moreover, per student expenditures on non-salary recurrent inputs also fell over the period in the regions (and nationally) as discussed in chapter 3.5. Because of the many variables that affect quality, the Mission should consider using the Grade 4 completion rate as a better measure of both improved persistence and achievement (based on the assumption that four years of schooling will provide basic literacy and numeracy skills). This should be measured at both national and regional levels.

In gender equity, there has been some improvement, but it is still a mixed picture. Nationally girls' enrollment ratio has grown at a much slower rate than boys', at 27 percent over a three-year period, compared with 36 percent for boys, and the percentage point gender gap has increased from 11.3 to 17.0. The situation in the focus regions is more encouraging. In Tigray, girls' GER has increased, while that of boys has remained about the same, resulting in a slight decrease in gender disparity (a 3 percentage point decrease in the gap); girls now

account for 44 present of the students. In SNNPR, girls' GER has increased 41 percent, far surpassing the national growth rate in girls' GER, but in SNNPR boys' GER has increased 43 percent. While girls' enrollments are growing, they are outpaced by that of boys, with the gender gap widening from 22 points in 1995 to 32 points in 1997.

Using performance in the CSGP schools as a proxy for regional improvement in Tigray, the Grade 1 drop-out rate for girls decreased, and the Grade 4 repetition rate for girls also fell slightly. However, no figures were provided for comparison with boys. And while most of the schools in Tigray have been included in the first phase of the CSGP and may be representative of regional improvement, it is questionable that the same can be said for SNNPR, where less than half of the schools will participate in the CSGP. The Mission should consider collecting these figures on both a national and regional basis, and for boys as well as girls.

In summary, and with the exception of enrollment growth, the impact of system reform has not yet been significantly manifested either at a national or regional level. Chapter 7 includes some recommendations to refocus USAID resources, over time, to improve impact.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVED STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT

7.1 Overall Strategic Focus

Chapters 3 through 5 of the assessment include findings, conclusions, and recommendations to either continue solid progress to date and/or to improve efforts to assure that BESO's intermediate results and overall objective can be achieved in the time provided. This is important, particularly given the strong congruence of BESO and ESDP objectives. BESO can be viewed as an early, and key, contributor to the ESDP PAP. The detailed recommendations for the last two years of current mechanisms are summarized in 7.2 below.

Chapter 2 included a discussion, and graphic Figure 2, of the differences in phasing between USAID and GFDRE that may become important in the future. As a review, the ESDP's first five year Program Action Plan (PAP) started in mid-1997 and is to run through mid-2002; USAID's current Country Strategic Plan ends in October 1999, with the new Integrated Strategic Plan (ISP) to run from October 1999 through 2004; the current BESO bilateral agreements both terminate in December 2001; and existing BESO contracts/CoAgs with AED, WLI and TDA are generally targeted for completion in 2000.

Because USAID shares the ESDP objectives, USAID intends to support them in the longer term --beyond the current BESO contract/CoAgs -- in an efficient manner that meets GFDRE and USAID requirements. In order to do so in a rational manner, the assessment team proposes a two-track approach to be undertaken in parallel:

• Track One: Track One would continue activities through the existing completion dates of current BESO instruments, at planned funding levels, taking into account more detailed recommendations in chapters 3 to 5 of this report. TDA and WLI would continue to carry out the CSGP through their current CoAg completion dates. As directed in its contract, AED is already decreasing its long-term expatriate TA staff by two positions (Adwa TTI Advisor, School Leadership Training Advisor), and chapter 3.4.3 recommends consideration of eliminating a third (Financial Advisor for SNNPR). This would net a 25 percent decrease in expatriate TA positions, which should meet expressed MOE concerns.

Discussions with the REB were inconclusive on the future location of the Awassa TTI and therefore allocation of the TTI Advisor's time. Depending on the outcome of regional deliberations on the Awassa and Bonga TTIs, in consultation with the TWG and the SNNPR REB, AED should consider moving the Awassa TTI Advisor to Addis to help develop the Distance Education In-Service Training Program on a full-time basis to support this new priority of the Ministry. This way, his services would be available to the ESDP Distance Education Group on a more national, continuous basis. This contribution by USAID to the ESDP Distance Education Program will provide the MOE significant expertise for program development without incurring additional costs to USAID.

Other AED Advisors would remain at their current posts through planned periods, where feasible extending efforts across departments (and regions) for greater impact. Most have been successful in transferring knowledge and skills to their respective REB departments, and some absences to assist the center and/or other regions might be useful preludes to their ultimate departure. ICDR has expressed strong interest in having the AED Curriculum Advisors work with the center and other regions, and this assessment recommends consideration of having the Tigray Budget Advisor provide part-time assistance to SNNPR. REB and/or AED planning staff from SNNPR and Tigray might work with other regions on application of school mapping. The point is putting some "value-added" to the BESO-specific TA, for greater national efforts.

All existing project assistance mechanisms -- AED, WLI, TDA -- would plan to end on their current completion dates unless outcomes of Track Two suggest otherwise.

● <u>Track Two</u>: During the final two-to-three years of BESO, at the same time that results are being achieved on Track One, USAID would start to re-assess USAID assistance to education, and the ESDP, as part of development of USAID's Integrated Strategic Plan. Because the ESDP is based on the "systems approach" pioneered by BESO, it may not be necessary for USAID to continue assistance to the five sub-systems with which it currently works. If USAID were to decrease the breadth of its assistance in terms of sub-systems, it could increase depth in fewer sub-systems, but on a greater geographic (possibly national) basis.

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USAID would move toward integrating remaining BESO funding (PA <u>and NPA</u> resource streams) into an overall Strategic Objective Agreement (SOAG) for SO3 that would move SO3 beyond its project-based operating mode into a more integrated, strategic support mode for ESDP. The SOAG would probably include a combination of technical assistance and training (PA), and conditioned sector support (NPA), as before, but these tools and tactics would be more closely linked to achieve concrete, defined and definable, results. Given USAID's Congressional and other mandates and restrictions, USAID would not be able to provide funds to the desired "common pool" of the ESDP, but it would certainly define all new activities within the ESDP budget and plans.

We emphasize that Track Two planning should start immediately, to assure there is no gap in the productive USAID=GFDRE relationship. With two years remaining under the AED contract, there should be ample time to reformulate strategy, arrive at a new plan, determine appropriate mechanisms, and compete a new contract(s), if necessary, prior to the end of the current one. However, if delays occur, USAID should be prepared to undertake a modest "bridging" extension of the AED contract to allow for key positions to be covered prior to the new mechanisms phasing in.

In order for planning to move ahead, USAID and its planning partners need to thoroughly comprehend the GFDRE planning and budgeting cycle, and plan to program USAID resources within its parameters. GFDRE and regional partners need to understand the budget "offset" principal of USAID's in-kind assistance, and devise means to account for it within their respective SDPS. And most importantly, all involved need to undertake more rigorous and thoughtful analyses to assure that limited resources are allocated optimally to achieve shared results.

Figure 5, with the new SOAG highlighted, shows the proposed realignment achieved with Track Two.

FIGURE 5: MODIFIED BESO RESOURCE FLOW WITH NEW USAID SO#3 AGREEMENT

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7.2 Summary of "Track One" Recommendations

7.2.1 Summary of Recommendations, Chapters 3-5

IR1: Improved quality and equity of primary school environment (chapter 3.1)

CSGP: The priority of the CSGP over the remainder of BESO is to assure the continuation of its community and school support efforts, if not the program itself. To this end, some options are:

- WLI and TDA should work to improve linkages with the REB by involving them more in the CSGP;
- WLI and TDA should foster increased woreda support of schools in the CSGP. The NGOs could help the woredas develop their own school-community support action plans (in keeping with their budgets) and provide training;
- Both NGOs should increase community-community support. Future interaction could be encouraged by gathering all schools at a woreda-based meeting to discuss what the CSGP schools have done and how.
- USAID should facilitate increased national level support for CSGP, i.e. workshops.
- USAID should revisit the IR and sub-IR indicators so that they better reflect what is being achieved within the regional or national context, and not just the participating schools.

School Leadership:

- The AED Curriculum Advisor in the north and either the Curriculum Advisor or Awassa TT Advisor should mentor the School Leadership Coordinators as the program moves into the cluster school mode. The program is at the "take-off" point and will need careful shepherding to expand without losing its impact.
- AED and the REBs should work to strengthen the program's "fit" within the ESDP teacher training component in subsequent REB annual plans and budgets.
- USAID, in consultation with ICDR and the MOE Teacher Training Panel, should consider financing a "best practices" survey of in-service programs nationally, which would include an assessment of BESO's school leadership efforts, to find which models/methods are cost-efficient and effective.

IR2: Improved pedagogical effectiveness of the content and quality of educational materials. (Chapter 3.2)

Future progress to achieve this IR will continue the curriculum improvement process, but move more to a production and dissemination focus.

- The SNNPR REB needs to review its structure to assure that the most efficient means of production is found.
- Given the ESDP emphasis on equity, efficiency, quality, and relevance, especially in SNNPR but also in Tigray continued study of different cost options for regional desk-top or other types of production is merited, and should be supported by BESO.
- As the Curriculum Departments move toward camera-ready copy and, possibly, local production, as part of the SDP they must begin to provide more coordinated support to ongoing interactive radio instruction in their region.
- Within the strictures of the ESDP budget for the curriculum development component, and in keeping with the idea of "value-added" for expatriate TA, the AED long-term Advisors should be ready to provide assistance in script and complementary materials production to the interactive radio programs as part of their IR2 responsibilities.

IR3: Improved performance and equity of teacher training graduates. (Chapter 3.3)

- Pre-service training curricula and norms for both first cycle (Grades 104) and second cycle (Grades 5-8) must be assessed and harmonized on a national basis, with due attention to the up-coming 10+2 program, prior to embarking on any new initiatives in developing distance education or other training programs.
- In support of this harmonization exercise, the principals, instructors, and advisors from three BESO focus region TTIs should be encouraged to get together and develop a strategy, or strategy options, to help the national level reach closure on syllabi, curricula frameworks, and norms.
- USAID, through BESO, has spent money, time, and expertise working in the two regions. The fate of Awassa TTI should be decided prior to allocation of any further USAID funds for either Awassa TTI or TTC, or Bonga.
- In accordance with the terms of the BESO Project Grant Agreement, the use and disposition of commodities and equipment provided to Awassa TTI must remain devoted to the objectives of the project (e.g. strengthening TTIs) and USAID should carefully monitor their proposed disposition and use if Awassa TTI is closed.

- Similarly, the SNNPR ESDP indicates that one other existing TTI will be converted to TTC status in USCY 1999-2000. If the one chosen is the Arba Minch TTI, what will happen to USAID's investment in skills development of the TTI's staff?
- The assessment team recognizes that the BESO design did not adequately address training of second cycle teachers, and that USAID should consider their needs. We strongly recommend that USAID I) undertake an assessment of "best practices" for inservice teacher training in Ethiopia to determine what makes the most sense for USAID to finance (this is the same study as recommended under 3.1, School Leadership, above); and ii) carefully "manage for results" by identifying specific resources (funds, TA) that would achieve its stated IR, which relates to quality of teacher training graduates, in any future funding for pre-service training at TTIs or TTCs.
- The development objectives for first cycle (Grades 1-4) teacher training in the ESDP include:
 - "support the TTIs to offer summer programs to increase the output to at least 1800 teachers every other year." USAID assistance, if any, should be thoughtfully planned and budgeted in view of its quality-oriented results.
 - "upgrade unqualified instructors through distance and residential programs; a specially selected cadre of experienced TTI instructors should be trained as instructional leaders." BESO's contribution and mandate concerning this program must be clarified with respect to AED/BESO Advisors' time, and with regard to possible CPs and Covenants in the NPA agreement. A contract modification to formalize the change in the Awassa TTI Advisor's role may be in order.

IR4: Improved decentralized management and administration of primary education. (Chapter 3.4)

<u>IR vision and measurement</u>: The USAID Mission is cognizant that some measures must be devised. This should be done as soon as possible with MOE and REB partners, but depends in part on a unified vision of what will be supported in terms of institutional development at the center.

MOE capacity in policy analysis and planning: Some options for consideration are:

• Seriously re-assess chances for impact in this area. The new Advisor's scope of work should be supplemented within the first 30 days with a detailed, timebound workplan and schedule that identifies specific products to be produced (manual development has been mentioned), and specific capacities and skills to be transferred to identified individuals and/or units, through written "mentoring contracts."

- Consider diversifying the focus of BESO support. Some options are:
 - Work with other departments to assess policy options and build analytic capacity. Include these departments in the BESO advisor's workplan (see above).
 - Provide assistance to the Women's Affairs Office within the MOE. The national strategy and action guidelines need dissemination, and the regions need operational action plans. Targeted short-term/local assistance could help activate the national strategy.
- Continue the development of a capacity building plan for central MOE staff, and define it more broadly that the distance education master's degree program.

REB, Zone and Woreda Planning and Financial Management: As noted, although progress has been uneven, this component of BESO seems to be on track, assuming the BESO annual plans are implemented as plans. Some considerations are:

- Provide SNNPR with Budget/Finance assistance immediately. Given the fact that only two years are left in the AED contract, consider eliminating the position for a long-term advisor and utilizing punctual, focussed local or Africa-regional short-term assistance instead. Consider assigning some support or supervision duties to the Tigray advisor, and hire short-term staff to work with SNNPR.
- Integrate BESO planning and finance activities into REB operations by preparing joint annual plans with BESO plan as an annex (as done in the SNNPR Planning Department). Define BESO results annually as opposed to only listing steps to be undertaken to achieve a result.
- Use ESDP implementation and monitoring needs to complete BESO support on EMIS systems and development of planning model.
- Pursue transfer of BESO-funded local-hire REB positions (e.g. computer support, possible planning staff) to REB payroll.
- Develop Zone-specific support programs in planning and finance, and Woreda-specific support in budgeting, accounting and data collection.

IR5: Increased and more rational and efficient sectoral financing. (Chapter 3.5)

- Re-examine the sectoral investment framework to assess the congruency of some BESO goals with what has been planned and what will govern future resource flows, and revise targets.
- Monitor and measure the results of policy initiatives.

- Link project support more closely with some of the desired outcomes, such as studies, to ensure that the type of study produced responds to the intent of the conditions and that the MOE and regions are engaged in the analysis.
- Reinstate the result, or at least the indicators, on "reduced burden on public sector" (sub-IR 5.2). The reform objectives named are essential to a healthy sectoral investment packages.

Gender (Chapter 4.1):

- Expand outreach nationally by supporting with targeted technical assistance (short-term, local or international) the Women's Affairs Office within the MOE to help it help the regions develop their own strategies and action plans.
- Work with the MOE to develop a publicity campaign package that can be implemented in the regions to reach all sectors of society, not just educators.
- Extended the experience of all the TTIs (not just the focus regions) in supporting female trainees by compiling "best practices," developing a manual, and working with the MOE to develop certain actionable norms.
- Ensure that focus region planners include girls' issues in the further development and implementation of their ESDPs.
- Work specifically with zone and woreda personnel to develop action plans for their support of girls' education. Although they have been included in workshops and seminars, it appears that they have not been assisted or tasked with developing their own support strategy.
- Develop better indicators and track them. The current indicators at the sub-IR levels are much too input-specific. Report on TTI female admission and completion rates and class rank; on the share of female primary school teachers; on girls persistence. This should be done nationally and regionally.

Participation (Chapter 4.2)

- As the ESDP progresses, the utility of separate BESO-specific coordinating mechanisms should be periodically reassessed. Especially in the regions, it is likely that Regional ESDP Steering Committees will have the same role as the BESO-specific Coordinating Committees, and redundancy should be avoided.
- At the center, however, the proposed ESDP Central Joint Steering Committee (CJSC) may not be as useful to BESO as its own BCCC, particularly if the CJSC covers both the

health and education sectors. The BCCC may thus need to be retained, at least for review of annual plans, in future years.

• Given USAID's particular modes of operation and the efficacy of the TWG, it is also likely that the BESO-specific TWG will remain useful for the foreseeable future as a participator forum to solve mutual problems on a more operational level.

Institutional Sustainability (Chapter 4.3)

Most of the recommendations in chapters 3.1 - 3.5 include comments on sustainability. Those that the team wished to particularly highlight include:

- USAID should include requirements for workshops to discuss implementation of policies and to develop mini-action plans as part of any future policy conditionalities.
- AED should work to integrate its annual plans and budgets, and those of individual advisors, into those of the focus region REBs.
- AED and the REBs should work together to resolve differences in payment of honoraria and per diems for workshops and supervision missions; this is particularly important to avoid creating dependencies which would create difficulties when AED leaves.
- For TTIs that have received BESO assistance, USAID and the government must consult closely over the disposition and use of project-financed equipment, and the redeployment of trained instructors and staff, if the gains made to date are not to be lost.
- Regional Councils should assure that the energy and other resources of the independent sector, including NGOs, are brought to bear to help achieve the ESDP goals, without dampening the innovation inherent in NGO programs.
- The team strongly recommends that WLI's ability to sub-contract with local NGOs be reopened for discussion so that local NGOs' knowledge and capacities can be developed, and the innovative strategies and unique non-governmental contribution is not lost when WLI leaves, USAID should collaborate directly with WLI, the REB, and others to begin to develop a WLI "exit strategy' that would assure continuity of actions.

Non-Project Assistance (Chapter 5.1)

- Raise the standards of reporting by establishing guidelines on methodology and data used in documentation.
- Based the selection of future conditions and covenants on a revised and more focussed Policy Reform matrix that is congruent with the ESDP. If possible, reduce the number of

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conditions and covenants (although if considered separately for national and regional levels, they are not currently excessive). Develop a flowchart of the policy changes that need to occur in priority sub-systems, to ensure a tranche-to-tranche continuity.

- Link the project and non-project assistance more closely to increase the likelihood of results. Use AED TA and/or USAID Global Bureau resources to assist on required studies and policy dialogue.
- Re-examine the NPA disbursement schedule depending on choices made for the proposed new Strategic Objective Agreement ("Track Two"). Most of the performance conditions are or will be based on annual budgetary and resource allocation and cannot be accelerated to fit USAID "project" timing.
- Redefine how national impact is documented. Where appropriate, expand to include other regions in addition to the focus regions. In some cases, all regions could be included (e.g. for certain financial indicators); in other cases, representative regions could be selected (e.g. Amhara, Oromo).
- Make policy implementation a part of conditions. For example, rather than just calling for a study, call for "study undertaken, discussed at national level, consensus on action plan -- if indicated -- achieved."
- Base future BESO conditions for the focus regions on their ESDP and annual workplans, rather than using them as a "proving ground" for national-level reforms.
- Consider options for future conditions and covenants that would support curriculum development, school leadership and community support work at the national and (other) regional levels.
- In line with ESDP objectives, include other donors in the conditionality reviews and workshops, as discussants and observers. This could be particularly helpful in the regions where BESO and other donors may be pursuing similar objectives.
- Re-examine the sector investment and financing framework to revise and amend budgetary and resource allocation targets.
- Adjust the reporting requirements and the target levels for some of the conditions, and establish one base -- such as the Ethiopian Fiscal Year -- as the period of measurement. Use of different base years and/or different periods (one year, two years) has confused some of the measurements.

• Work with Regional Planning Departments in developing plans to address regional policy issues (through studies, consultant reviews, workshops, etc.).

Project Assistance Modes (Chapter 5.2)

- Assure that AED plans more visibly and specifically are tied to the regional and central ESDP documents as appropriate. For example, specific activities should be cross-referenced between the AED contract plans and government plans.
- Assure that future AED reports at regional and central levels are also cross-referenced and tied to ESDP planning and reporting needs. The team believes that this simple editorial effort will make subsequent integration of AED and REB efforts, plans, budget, and achievements much smoother and eliminate some past miscommunication.
- Consider developing "mentoring contracts" between individual advisors and counterparts or other personnel to be mentored. Formalizing arrangements into written, timebound individual "mentoring contracts," and tracking participation by both sides, might help AED better measure and report on the extent of "capacity building" that occurs.
- The assessment team endorses the participation of NGOs at this grass-roots level, and strongly recommends that these BESO CoAgs be viewed as models by the GFDRE as the ESDP NGO and community participation guidelines are developed.

USAID Management (Chapter 5.3.1)

- Given the GFDRE's rapid movement into the ESDP mode of operation, USAID needs to re-form into a more unified SO-level management team to assure that the various parts of BESO at the center and the regions adapt to the ESDP mode as smoothly as possible.
- USAID should establish, together with the REBs and the Management Committees, procedures for periodic review of joint progress and activities.

Government Management (Chapter 5.3.2)

The assessment team found a number of differing perceptions and expectations among REB staff about roles and behaviors of expatriate advisors and NGO recipients, and among expatriate advisors about REB staff to achieve more transparency. The assessment team encourages more frank and open exchange between and among REB professionals and advisors about professional expectations, roles, and responsibilities. Consideration should be given to the following:

- The TWG should consider sponsoring (with USAID financing) professionally facilitated workshops in each focus region to help iron out differences in this regard, between and among AED advisors and their respective REB departments, and among REB departments themselves, in hopes of building stronger teams.
- The TWG should consider sponsoring professionally facilitated workshops to help reorient BESO teams USAID, MOE, REBs, AED, WLI, TDA, etc. -- to more of a result-oriented management style, and develop procedures for periodic review of joint progress in achieving regional ESDPs. Achievement of the ambitious ESDP targets demands such and approach, and the existing teams need to figure out how to work more efficiently to achieve those targets.

Monitoring & Evaluation (Chapter 5.5)

- USAID needs to work with REBs, AED advisors, and other partners to develop clearer definitions of IRs and indicators to resolve existing confusions or differing interpretations. In several cases, staff at the REBs in Tigray and SNNPR may have interpreted data requests differently, so data from the different sources are not comparable.
- A better comparative data base is needed to assess progress in the focus regions against national progress and/or a composite of comparable regions, to determine if BESO is making a difference.
- Although USAID's NGO partners TDA and WLI also provide useful data, some of their reporting points are perhaps unnecessarily complicated.

7.2.2 BESO Congruence with ESDP

Chapter 2.2 summarized the congruence of BESO's <u>objectives</u> with those of the ESDP. Figure 6 which follows summarizes how the BESO project-financed activities align with ESDP components. As stressed in several sections, AED <u>must</u> assure that its workplans, and those of individual Advisors, follow government planning and budget line items for these components to assure that their activities are in support of the ESDP and are likely to be sustained.

FIGURE 6: Summary "Fit" of BESO PROJECT ASSISTANCE with ESDP CAPITAL and RECURRENT COMPONENTS

ESDP <u>CAPITAL</u> COMPONENTS	Via AED for CENTER	Via AED for TIGRAY REB	Via RIF for TIGRAY REB	Via AED for SNNPR REB	Via RIF for SNNPR REB
Primary					
Secondary					
Tertiary					
Tech/Voc					
TTIs		 Prior years procurement bus, resource center equipment for Adwa TTI; Current financing preparation Adwa TTI Master Plan for other donor financing of construction 		 Prior years assistance to physical upgrading Awassa TTI; Future continuing limited equipment, renovation assistance to Arba Minch TTI 	
NFE/Special					
Nat'l Inst.					
Capacity Bldg	• Possible limited equipment & commodities for PPD?	• Likely continuing limited procurement computers, printers, other equipment & commodities	• Procurement vehicles, computers, other equipment & commodities as determined by REB	• Likely continuing limited procurement computers, printers, other equipment & commodities	• Procurement vehicles, computers, other equipment & commodities as determined by REB

ESDP <u>RECURRENT</u> COMPONENTS	Via AED for CENTER	Via AED for TIGRAY REB	Via RIF for TIGRAY REB	Via AED for SNNPR REB	Via RIF for SNNPR REB
Teachers' salaries					
Textbooks & Ed. Materials	• Prior TA to EMA on IRI curriculum & materials	 Total 4 yrs TA from Curriculum Dev. Advisor; Funding for research, testing, training, development of prototypes, analysis of production options, production equipment. 		 Total 4 yrs TA via Curriculum Dev. Advisor; Funding for research, testing, training, development of prototypes, analysis of production options, production equipment. 	
Curriculum Dev.	 Prior TA to EMA on IRI curriculum (see above); Limited training, TA to ICDR for primary school and TTI curriculum 	• Total 4 yrs TA from Curriculum Dev. Advisor, training, research, development, tryouts, revisions, production (see above)		• Total 4 yrs TA from Curriculum Dev. Advisor, training, research, development, tryouts, revisions, production (see above)	

Education modules for inservice TT. Finished, financing of Master Plan for other donor capital investment; Ethiopian TA and other funding for inservice, site-based REB-managed TT program to grow from 19 initial schools to "cluster school" model. Education finished, financing of Master Plan for other donor capital investment; Ethiopian TA and other finished. Possible TA to new Bonga TTI under discussion. Possible TA for development of regional Distance Education for inservice TT under discussion. Ethiopian TA and other funding for inservice, site-based REB-managed TT program to grow from 60 initial schools to "cluster"

ESDP RECURRENT COMPONENTS	Via AED for CENTER	Via AED for TIGRAY REB	Via RIF for TIGRAY REB	Via AED for SNNPR REB	Via RIF for TIGRAY REB
National Inst's.					
Admin & Maint'nce		● Total 4 yrs Finance Advisor, equipment, training to REB to continue possible sharing with SNNPR and/or other regions		 Prior 2 yrs Finance Advisor, equipment, training, to REB follow-on now under discussion, possible sharing with Tigray 	
Monitoring & Eval.	• Prior long-term Policy & Planning Advisor at MOE/PPD, new one year Advisor just starting with related M&E capacity building and other activities	• 1 yr earlier, 2 yrs. new Planning Advisor, equipment, training to REB		• 1 yr earlier, 2 yrs new Planning Advisor, equipment, training to REB	

ANNEX A ASSESSMENT STATEMENT OF WORK

STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT OF THE BASIC EDUCATION SYSTEMS OVERHAUL PROGRAM IN ETHIOPIA (BESO) PROGRAM (663-0014), PROJECT (663-0015)



ARTICLE I. BACKGROUND:

During the latter half of the 1980s in Ethiopia, the former Government's coercive policies, civil war and economic crisis led to a drastic decline in enrollment and quality at all levels of the education system. Ministry of Education (MOE) data shows that gross enrollment rates (GER) at the primary level fell from 35% in 1987/88 to 22% in 1991/92, and that over 50% of students who enrolled in primary school dropped out before completing third grade. Indicators of poor quality included inadequately trained teachers and school directors, an overly complex curriculum largely irrelevant to rural life, a lack of focus on basic literacy and numeracy, severe under-funding with almost no resources available for essential quality-boosting inputs such as textbooks nor for the rehabilitation of dilapidated facilities, and totally inadequate analytic and planning capabilities at all levels of the system. Equity concerns included both serious gender and regional disparities.

Since 1991, and especially over the past three to four years, however, there have been encouraging signs of positive change. There was a formal "Education and Training policy" prepared and issued in 1994. The current government is committed to sector overhaul, including a genuine system decentralization in management and financial planning responsibility as well as in regionally relevant instructional design reform. There has also been an astonishing upsurge of primary enrollments and community-level actions to foster initiative and involvement in local-development issues in general and school-based issues in particular. The government has just completed a comprehensive Educational Sector Development Program (ESDP) which lays the foundation for the medium and long term goals of the 1994 policy, striving to make education more efficient as well as relevant to the needs of the economy. During the next five years, the ESDP plan will emphasize the expansion of primary education, improvements in its quality, and a more equitable distribution of educational opportunities. acknowledging the interdependence of other education sub sectors, the ESDP program will address high priority needs, but defer major investments in secondary and tertiary education beyond the initial five years of the program.

USAID/Ethiopia's program has the goal of "Peace, prosperity and physical well being for the majority of Ethiopians", and a sub-goal of "Smaller, healthier and better educated families." In support of the government's efforts to overcome the challenges facing the Ethiopian education system, the Basic Education System Overhaul (BESO) program combines non-project (\$50 million) and project resources (\$30 million) in a coordinated seven-year approach to both policy and institutional reforms to help the primary system boost quality and enhance equity in an environment of expanding access. An underlying premise of the BESO program is that reform and progress throughout the sector will occur, in part, through an improved and decentralized education delivery system that effectively and in a sustainable way provides quality primary education to a significant proportion of Ethiopia's school-aged population. To this end, the five key BESO program areas include i) improved quality and equity of the primary school environment, ii) improved efficiency and effectiveness of key qualityrelated services, iii) improved quality of pre-service teacher training, iv) improved decentralized management and administration of primary education, and v) increased and more rational and efficient sectoral financing.

The BESO program employs a systems approach, working simultaneously in two directions: from top-down and bottom-up. Non-project assistance is primarily utilized in order to ensure that central policies and resources are being mobilized to provide sufficient support to the school-level and to those institutions that are charged with providing support to schools. Since BESO resources are not adequate to assist all regions equally, two regions - Tigray and the Southern Nations and Nationalities Peoples Region (SNNPR) - have been selected as target regions and non-project and project resources are used here to support these more geographically concentrated efforts. Working with the regional administrations (regional, zonal and woreda offices) in defining and implementing their roles in managing and supporting an improved primary system constitutes an important focal point for assistance under the BESO program. Furthermore, within the two target regions, geographic areas are being selected where grass-roots approaches are being taken to promote school and community-level innovations. BESO also supports activities aimed at spreading gains and lessons from the target regions to the other regions of the country.

The expected achievements and impacts of BESO are categorized in four areas: (1) improvements in school-level quality and equity; (2) improvements to quality-related school inputs; (3) improvements in teaching force quality and equity; and (4) improvements in regional and sub-regional administrative and management capacity. These achievements all depend on a further factor of crucial importance to the BESO program: increased and more rational and efficient sectoral financing at national, regional and sub-regional levels. Achievements and impacts in each of these areas can be viewed in the short, medium, and long-term and in terms of policy, institutional, and school-level achievements.

BESO has been designed as a seven-year program. However, experience in other countries and the magnitude of the task in Ethiopia suggest that significant impact on children and their communities will require sustained efforts over a longer term. Even assuming BESO's success in achieving its purpose, by the end of the program much will remain to be done. Therefore, it is anticipated that a follow-on effort will be needed in order to continue the momentum established by BESO and realize substantial systemwide gains in the quality of the learning experience available to children in their classrooms.

At this time, some three and one half years have transpired since the initiation of the project. In the last BESO Central Coordinating Committee meeting, in July, 1997, the committee indicated a need for an evaluation of project progress and an audit of project expenditures. Also, over the past year, the government has led interested partners in development of a comprehensive Education Sector Development Programme. The objective of the programme is "to improve overall educational attainment of the population while achieving greater social equity and universal basic education by 2015." This "comprehensive programme affecting all levels of education with special focus on Regions so as to expand basic education and reduce disparity" is of five years duration, with a completion date that roughly corresponds to the BESO program. Some of the objectives over the initial five years of the ESDP include the achievement of a 50% GER nationwide, more than doubling of primary school enrollment (from 3.1 to 7 million pupils), and an overall coefficient of efficiency for the sector of 80%. Both the BESO and the ESDP have utilized the government's 1994 Education and Training Policy as the foundation document for the development of their respective programs.

The ESDP, of which the BESO program is a part, underwent a third review, and appraisal by donors and other government offices in February, 1998. This final review was a culmination of a year long effort, and concluded a three week fourteen-donor mission intended to provide final guidance to the effort. Now, all the "actors" in the sector are expected to design their interventions so they contribute effectively to the attainment of the long term and mid-term objectives of the plan. USAID anticipates that its priorities, as outlined in the Country Strategic Plan and S.O. strategic framework planning efforts will be highly complementary to the twenty year program and five year Programme Action plan.

ARTICLE II. OBJECTIVES OF THE CONSULTANCY

This consultancy is a comprehensive assessment of the BESO Program (No. 663-0014), BESO Project (No. 663-0015), including activities implemented directly by the government, the prime contractor, Academy for Educational Development (AED), and NGOs, Tigray Development Association (TDA) and World Learning, Inc. (WLI) and of the current education environment. The general objective of the consultancy is to provide guidance on how best to proceed with the implementation of BESO so as to

BESO Alignment SOW (02/26/98)(revised 3/6/98)(3/20/98) u:\docs\besoass.sow

achieve USAID/E's Strategic Objective #3 "Improve the Quality and Equity of Primary Education in an Expanded (and Expanding) Primary Education System" over the period 1994-2001, given the continuously changing educational environment and needs, and how best to strategically align BESO with the country's ESDP. The assessment will consider *inter alia* progress towards achieving the SO; effectiveness of implementation mechanisms; effectiveness of Project/Program management (including participation by partners and beneficiaries); as well as, responsiveness to a changing environment and government priorities for the education sector. Weakness, strengths and opportunities will be identified as a basis for providing recommendations for future action. The consultancy will also review the BESO results framework and the development hypothesis to identify implementation gaps and provide suggestions on whether the approach adopted to achieving the SO requires reconsideration.

Finally, as the USAID Mission is initiating a review of its existing country support strategy (CSP) this year, with the objective of reconfirming or modifying the overall strategy by the end of this calendar year, this review and assessment is opportune in providing appropriate information for input on the education sector.

The assessment is expected to provide recommendations (if necessary) regarding modifications to the BESO results framework; suggest improvements to Project/Program management to ensure responsiveness to a changing environment and enhance participation among partners; options for implementation mechanisms should be suggested; and, comment made on the impact to date and progress towards achieving the SO. Since the review and assessment will look at the performance of all actors associated with implementing and managing the program (USAID, GFDRE and Grantees), and will produce the source documentation necessary to modify the BESO project and program agreements, an external consultancy well versed in USAID reengineering efforts, and recent changes in USIAD strategic framework development and planning was considered most appropriate.

ARTICLE III. SCOPE OF WORK

An external team will conduct an assessment of the BESO Program and Project, to assess how well BESO is aligned with the current realities of the sector and with the government's ESDP, and respond in a written report to all the points and questions included in this scope of work. The external team will be supported by the managers and implementing agencies of the BESO at every level who will serve as resource persons to the consultancy.

Following are illustrative questions and issues:

 Basic Education System Overhaul in Ethiopia (BESO) Results Framework: Review the validity of the original results framework (which includes the development hypothesis, assumptions, performance monitoring plan etc.). Suggest a course of action for addressing the implications of failed assumptions, inappropriate indicators and particularly if there is a need to adjust the results framework. (This will require considering progress under each Results Package - Item 2 below).

- a. How have government policies and strategies changed since the design and start up of BESO? How has the pace of implementation of government policies/strategies affected BESO's performance [e.g. enabling environment for NGOs and other private sector initiatives; decentralization].
- b. Does the SO statement adequately capture the solution to the core problems of education, and is it appropriate in terms of contributing to the overall goal of the Mission (healthier and smaller families). Do the indicators for the SO appropriately measure results?
- c. Are the IRs well stated and defined? Do they appropriately imply that their achievement will necessarily lead to realization of the SO? If not, what changes to the results framework is necessary to achieve the SO or alternatively, is there a need to reconsider the scope of the SO? Conversely, does the SO as stated indicate the achievement of the IRs? Are the indicators appropriate to measure results?
- d. Are assumptions still valid and how have they affected overall impact?
- e. What changes, if any, should be considered by USAID/E to the results framework to improve the possibility of achieving the SO?
- 2) Progress towards Impact: Examine progress made to date towards achieving each Intermediate Result. Review actual versus planned progress toward achieving the BESO purpose; what outputs were achieved and what activities/conditions were implemented? Identify flexibility in approach and new opportunities taken as well as problems and delays. Consider national versus focus region impact. Provide recommendations as to whether to increase activities in those areas which are demonstrating greater success.
 - a. What results have been achieved collectively by the program/project to increase the quality and equity of basic education in the focus areas and nationally?
 - b. How well do the activities undertaken respond to the SO and its intermediate results? Have the expected outputs been achieved in a timely

manner? (e.g. Has long-term training promoted the achievement of sub-IRs?)

- c. What have been the successes and problems encountered during Program/project implementation? What were the causes and how have these been addressed?
- d. Should the focus areas be maintained as they are or should they be expanded or reduced?
- e. Should those activities demonstrating better results be expanded; and conversely, how should those activities which are lagging seriously behind schedule be dealt with?
- Response to GFDRE's Education Sector Initiatives: Review USAID/Ethiopia's interventions to assess conformity with GFRDE's plans, in particular with regard to the comprehensive national Education Sector Development Programme (ESDP). Assess the program/project's contribution to the reform process. Review and comment on various possible modalities for supporting education sector reforms, particularly those requiring intervention at the regional level, other than the focus region.
 - a. How could the Mission better support the government's Education Sector Development Program (ESDP)? How would this potential support change the direction and scope of the BESO project/program?
 - b. Are BESO's interventions responsive to GFDRE needs and priorities in general? To expressed needs of the local population?
 - c. What can be done within the current framework to strengthen policy implementation and program impact nationwide?
- 4) Non-Project Assistance: Assess the effectiveness of the Conditions Precedent (CPs) to disbursement of Tranches 1 and 2 of NPA resources in achieving their desired impact and furthering the SO; assess whether the present mechanism for development, negotiation and implementation of CPs ensure a national impact.
 - a. How effective is the NPA in making significant contributions to the SO? What approach is recommended to make the most out of the NPA under BESO?

- b. How has project assistance helped achieve conditionalities and what project support should be provided to assist in the achievement of the conditionalities? How has it hurt?
- c. How can USAID best participate in the process for negotiation and implementation of conditionality?
- d. What has been the process leading to policy/budgetary reform within Ethiopia and what have been the causes for delay? Given the influence of decentralization on how policy is implemented, is it realistic to measure the impact of the NPA at the national level?
- e. Has the NPA created any disincentives for any of the key players in the sector?
- 5) **Contractor/Grantee Performance:** Review the role and performance of the prime contractor together with the sub-contractors, and each of the grantees.
 - a. Have the contractor and grantees' workplans been consistent with BESO's objectives? To what extent have workplans been implemented in a timely fashion? [e.g. Has technical assistance (TA), short-term training, delivery of commodities been provided in a timely and cost-effective manner?]. If there have been delays, how might these problems be overcome in the future?
 - b. Have the implementing agencies' staff composition, duties and level of effort been sufficient to comply with program/project's requirements?
 - c. To what extent have the implementing agencies contributed towards improving capacity and institutional strengthening in both the public and private arenas they are working in? To what degree do the recipients of such TA show signs of improving productivity or quality in their capacity to execute their respective roles and responsibilities?
 - d. What has been the performance of the executing agencies from the perspective of government and client partners, including their degree of satisfaction with and results achieved through the technical assistance received, and participation in program/project committees?
 - e. To what extent are CA's monitoring systems adequate for assessing performance and masuring impact? Has reporting on results by CA's been sufficient for Mission management requirements?

- f. To what extent have the CA's coordinated, planned jointly, and communicated activities and results to appropriate government counterparts and between themselves? Is there scope for such coordination to integrate activities across Results Packages?
- 6) Recently instituted Mechanisms: Recently, activities such as World Learning's Community Schools Grants Program and the Regional Incentives Fund have been/are being initiated. While their progress to date cannot be fully evaluated, given that activities have in some part only just started, assess whether the expected results can be achieved or whether there are alternatives that should be considered.
 - a. What have been the implications, in terms of achieving BESO's results, of delay in starting these activities?
 - b. Are there alternative mechanisms for implementing such activities that would reduce the management burden, be more cost-effective and yield similar/better results?
- 7) Participation: Assess participatory process in planning for and implementation of BESO activities and provide recommendations for improved participation in a decentralized system.
 - a. How effectively has the government (at all levels) participated in the implementation and monitoring of BESO both in planning, implementation and follow-up of activities? Have appropriate government counterparts been identified during planning, implementation, and monitoring of activities?
 - b. Have significant participation problems arisen and if so, are there better ways of engaging partners? Has implementation of BESO been responsive to felt needs and how have differences been reconciled while keeping within the BESO Results Framework?
 - c. What are the mechanisms that have been set to ensure effective participation by partners (government, NGOs and Mission)? How effective are the BESO (Central and Regional) Coordinating Committee, the BESO Technical Working Group(s), and the Gender Core Group, the Results Package Teams, and the S.O. Team? Is there scope for improvement of such mechanisms? Can their functions be streamlined? How?

- d. How effectively have concerns of beneficiaries been included in workplans and activities?
- e. Are there any partners that should have been involved, not included?
- 8) Institutional Sustainability: Assess what progress has been achieved under the program/project in terms of institutional sustainability.
 - a. To what degree are the partners (including both NGOs and government institutions) dependent on USAID financial assistance to continue providing services support, including the purchase of educational materials and community support for example? What is the perspective for lessening this dependency, if any, by the end of the program/project? Include recommendations for increasing institutional sustainability if needed.
 - b. To what degree are the partners fulfilling the roles envisioned for them under the program/project? Are these roles still valid given changing circumstances since the launching of the program/project?
- 9) **USAID Program/Project Management**: Assess program/project management within USAID. Assess USAID's relationship with its partners. Determine whether management of Results Packages are effectively carried out. Determine effectiveness of planning for and financial management of the program/project.
 - a. How could USAID better manage the program/project so as to maximize results over the remaining life of project/program?
 - b. How has Strategic Objective Team #3 (SOT#3) coordination and communications been with core and virtual team members? How well has the Mission fostered partnerships with the governmnt and NGOs working in the sector?
 - c. Has the procurement process been managed efficiently:
 - d. How has the availability of funds under the program/project affected the delivery of project assistance?
 - e. Has USAID/E coordinated with other cooperating agencies, contractors and field support as required? How has USAID/E performed in terms of providing guidance to the prime contractor and NGOs?

- f. Could the Results Packages or their teams be reconfigured to allow better management of the program/projects?
- g. How can USAID correct any problems identified?
- 10) Donor Coordination: There are many donors providing assistance to Ethiopia. In order to maximize the efficacy of donor assistance and avoid duplication of effort, coordination is necessary. In addition, the GFRDE, in line with their Sectoral Development Program, Program Action Plan has requested coordination of donor inputs.

How has USAID/E promoted donor coordination? Have benefits to the sector been a result of this role? Are there additional opportunities and challenges in this respect?

- 11) Gender: In general terms, the consultancy team should analyze how well the project has addressed gender issues and how successful it has been in this regard.
 - a. Is the program/project helping to improve access to primary education opportunities?
 - b. To what extent has the choice of activities taken into account gender relationships and their implications for achievement of results? Has operational research contributed towards this?
 - c. Do indicators provide gender dis-aggregated information on achievement of results appropriately?
- 12) Monitoring and Evaluation: Examine the effectiveness of the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) systems developed at all levels. Assess progress toward developing a system for collecting the required information?
 - a. Have implementors as well as USAID/E established reasonable monitoring and evaluation systems to gather the information/data needed to monitor progress and impact indicators?
 - b. There is a DHS planned for Ethiopia. How can this be utilized also for the education sector? Is national data available for effective M&E; what has been the effect of decentralization?
 - c. Is there effective collaboration among various actors in the education sector that ensures accessibility of information for M&E purposes?

13) Lessons Learned and Opportunities: Address lessons learned from the program/project to date. Assess whether there are areas of intervention that USAID would have a comparative advantage should we choose to support them.

Which lessons learned can be used for the remaining life program/project and in future USAID program/project/activity design? How?

- 14) Future Implementation Mechanisms: Given status of program/project implementation and the approaching completion of various existing CA's mechanisms, determine opportunities for future implementation.
 - a. Should the project continue with existing mechanisms? If so, in what manner?
 - b. Are there more effective (in terms of cost and management requirements: alternatives for continuing support to the sector?
 - c. Is there scope for expanding activities under existing mechanisms? For example, what are the implications of undertaking a non-formal "community schools" type, effort in the SNNPR?
 - d. What actions are necessary to ensure continuation of activities if a change in mechanisms is recommended and/or required as a results of changes in Agency procurement and GFDRE concerns?

CRI will take the lead on 1 (BESO Results Framework); 5 (Contractor/Grantee performance); 7 (Participation); 9 (USAID Program Management), 10 (Donor Coordination), and 12 (Monitoring and Evaluation).

Africa Bureau's Education Economist would specifically take the lead on 2 (Progress towards impact); 3 (Response to GFDRE's Education Sector Initiatives); 4 (Non-Project Assistance); 6 (Recently Instituted Mechanisms); and 11 (Gender).

CRI and the AFR Economist will collaborate closely on 8 (Institutional Sustainability), 13 (Lessons Learned and Opportunities) and 14 (Future Implementation Mechanisms).

ARTICLE IV. LEVEL OF EFFORT, TEAM COMPOSITION AND TIMING

USAID Ethiopia will use a performance based contract as a contracting instrument to conduct this assessment. Hence, it is incumbent upon the contractor to determine the number of persons as well as their areas of expertise for USAID Ethiopia and the BESO

TWG's consideration. However, it must be stressed that Ethiopian expertise be included on any contractor team.

Duty Post: The contractor shall perform all work under this activity in the U.S. and Ethiopia.

The contractor is strongly encouraged to utilize local experts whenever possible.

Access to Classified Information: The contractor shall have no access to classified information.

Logistical Support: The contractor is responsible for providing in-country transportation and secretarial support while in Addis Ababa. Field trip travel will be provided by USAID Ethiopia or through local partners.

It is anticipated that the consultancy will be for six weeks (one week preparation and four weeks in country, one additional week to complete the document), beginning May 10, 1998 and ending June 20, 1998. The contractor will be authorized to work a six-day week. Travel expenses and other communications costs incurred during the course of duty are authorized.

ARTICLE V. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS/DELIVERABLES

It is suggested that team spend an estimated 5 - 10 days in the field, outside Addis Ababa. These trips will be finalized during the preliminary week of the team's preparation before their in-country arrival. USAID/E/HID Office will facilitate arrangements for field trips together with government counterparts and appropriate executing agencies.

1. Workplan and methodology

Five working days after the beginning of the consultancy, the team will submit to USAID a draft version of their workplan and methodology for conducting the assessment. USAID and the Ministry of Education will review the documents and recommend changes as appropriate within one working day, and discuss with the team o/a May 19.

2. First Draft Report

Five working days after completion of the assessment field work, the team will submit a first draft report to USAID. Three working days after this submission, the team will make a presentation of the first draft to representatives of USAID and the GOE. The presentation will briefly describe the methodology and summarize the preliminary

findings, conclusions and recommendations of the assessment. The team will take note of the oral questions and comments from meeting participants. USAID will forward written comments from USAID and other reviewers of the draft to the consultancy team within five working days after the presentation.

3. Second Draft Report

Five days after receipt of written comments from USAID and the GOE, the contractor shall provide a second draft to USAID, detailing main findings, conclusions, and recommendations, and reflecting comments and changes requested by USAID and the GOE. Both a hardcopy and an electronic file in wordperfect 5.2 of the second draft report must be submitted, o/a June 19.

4. Final Report

Ten working days after notification of approval of the second draft by USAID Ethiopia, the contractor shall deliver the final report to the USAID office. The final report shall address all of USAID/Ethiopia's and GOE comments and conform to the reporting guidelines required/ Twenty hardcopies and an electronic file version in Wordperfect 5.2 must be submitted.

The final report shall be organized as follows:

- Executive Summary: An executive summary no more than ten (5) pages in length

Statement of Conclusion and Recommendations: the conclusion shall be succinct, with the topic identified by a short sub-heading related to the questions posed in this statement of work.

Recommendations must correspond to the conclusions and, whenever possible, the recommendations shall specify who, or what agency, should take the recommended actions.

- Body of the Report: must describe the country context in which the project was developed and carried out, and provide the information (evidence and analysis) on which the conclusions and recommendations are based.
- Annexes: that include a current status and attainment of original inputs and outputs if these are not already indicated in the body of the report; technical and management issues raised during the assessment requiring greater elaboration; a copy of the assessment scope of work; a description of the methodology used in the assessment; bibliography of documents reviewed; list of agencies contacted and individuals interviewed and other relevant information.

Upon completion of the first draft of the consultant's report, the team will give a presentation and distribute the draft report to the appropriate USAID/E and government representatives and be willing to discuss the review findings and recommendations. The consultancy team shall incorporate any questions or issues raised at the review meeting into the draft report.

ARTICLE VI. RELATIONSHIPS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The Contractor shall perform the tasks described above under the general guidance of the S.O. #3 and HID Office Chief. The consultancy team will work closely with the USAID/Ethiopia Evaluation Coordinator and other S.O. #3 Team Members involved with the program/project. USAID/E/HID Office and the designated government counterpart will provide the team with a draft list of initial meetings with relevant persons prior to their arrival in-country and the HID office will assist in setting up these meetings prior to the team's arrival. Further meetings will be set up at the team's request. The team is expected to review all relevant program documents and other background materials prior to arrival in-country. These will be provided by the USAID/E/HID office.

ARTICLE VII. TENTATIVE CALENDAR

Consultation of relevant documents; preliminary meetings; development of review and evaluation instruments; preparation and submission of workplan and methodology; etc.

1 week

Field work (interviews, site visits, collection of secondary data)

3 weeks

Analysis of data, preparation, submission and oral presentation of first draft report

1 week

Preparation of second draft report and final report

1 weeks

Total

6 weeks

ANNEX B ASSESSMENT TEAM WORKPLAN & SCHEDULE

CRI Workplan and Schedule

Week 1

[Sat. May 16 Tietjen arrives Addis]

Wed May 20-Fri May 22: McPherson travel Miami-Addis (Lufthansa 1 day delay in Cairo)

Sat May 23- Sun May 24: In-briefing, workplanning, team building

Week 2

Mon May 25-Sat May 30: ETEC team member Ato Debebe Tegegne hired, team complete

Documents review, data collection, key informant interviews

(USAID, MOE, BESO COP) in Addis

Trip planning & logistics with USAID, MOE, BESO

DEL#1: DRAFT Workplan and Methodology submitted

to USAID and MOE Tuesday 26 May.

Week 3

Sun 31 May-Thu 4 June : Field travel (USAID vehicles), interviews with all Departments of

Awassa REB; Awassa TTI Principal and Advisor; Arba Minch TTI Principal and Advisor; WLI Field Personnel; Arba Minch Zonal Education Office, Arba Minch Woreda Office, selected schools in

Awassa and Arba Minch woredas

Fri 5 Jun-Sat 6 June : Travel to Mekele not possible due to border conflict; follow-up

interviews in Addis

Week 4

Mon 8 Jun-Thu 11 Jun : Follow-up interviews, Drafting

Fri 12 Jun : DEL#2: First Draft Report submitted to USAID

Sat 13 Jun : Team planning for GFDRE Presentation

Week 5

Mon 15 Jun/Tue 16 Jun : Edits, revisions to Draft Wed 17 June : Presentation to TWG

Thu 18 June : McPherson and Tietjen depart Addis

Later

NLT Tue 23 June : USAID/GOE comments provided to CRI

NLT Tue 30 June : DEL#3: CRI forwards Second Draft report to USAID

NLT Fri 10 July : USAID provides comments on Second Draft to CRI

NLT 15 July : DEL#4: CRI forwards Final Report to USAID

BESO ASSESSMENT - DRAFT Outline/Table of Contents 5/24/98

SOW Ref.	Lead Drafter	Pages (Cum)	Section	
Art.IV.4	LM	ii	Executive Summary	
	LM/KT	ii (iv)	Table of Contents	
	LM	i (v)	Glossary of Terms Used	
	USAID	i (vi)	Map of Ethiopia	
	LM	2 (2)	1. INTRODUCTION (Assessment purpose, methods)	
Art.IV.4		6 (8)	2. BESO CONTEXT	
Art.IV.4 & Art.III.1 (partial)	LM		2.1 Summary Evolution of Program: USAID - 1 p. narrative - Chart PAAD/PP Objectives. vs. RF SO/IRs - Chart Modes/Inputs/\$\$	
Art.IV.4 & Art.III 1 & 3 (partial)	LM		2.2 Summary Evolution of Program: GFDRE - early policy, ESDP process	
Art.IV.4 & Art.III. 1 & 3 (partial)	КТ		2.3 Levels of Intervention - nat'l, focus regions	
Art.IV.4		20 (28)	3. FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS: PROGRAM OBJECTIVES/RESULTS	
Art.III. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 13	KT- CGSP, DT-Sch. Ldrship		3.1 Support Objective/IR1: School Environment - Original Design/Plans - Evolution & Achievements to Date (ref. "reform" and "project" objectives for each sub- objective, and ref. IR Indicators) - Lessons Learned & Opportunities for Future	
Art.III. 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 13	LM/DT		3.2 Support Objective/IR2: Pedagogical Effectiveness - Original Design/Plans - Evolution & Achievements to Date (ref. "reform" and "project" objectives for each sub- objective, and ref. IR Indicators) - Lessons Learned & Opportunities for Future	

Art.III. 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 13	DT		3.3 Support Objective/IR3: Teacher Training - Original Design/Plans - Evolution & Achievements to Date (ref. "reform" and "project" objectives for each sub- objective, and ref. IR Indicators) - Lessons Learned & Opportunities for Future
Art.III. 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 13	KT		3.4 Support Objective/IR4: Decent. Mgmt. & Admin Original Design/Plans - Evolution & Achievements to Date (ref. "reform" and "project" objectives for each sub- objective, and ref. IR Indicators) - Lessons Learned & Opportunities for Future
Art.III. 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 13	KT		3.5 Support Objective/IR5: Rational Sectoral Finance - Original Design/Plans - Evolution & Achievements to Date (ref. "reform" and "project" objectives for each sub- objective, and ref. IR Indicators) - Lessons Learned & Opportunities for Future
		5 (32)	4. FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS: SPECIAL CONCERNS
Art.III.11	KT		4.1 Gender
Art.III.7	LM		4.2 Participation
Art.III.8	KT		4.3 Institutional Sustainability
AFR RF	KT		4.4 Effective Schooling
AFR RF	KT		4.5 Systemic Reform
		12 (44)	5. FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS: MODALITIES & MANAGEMENT
Art.III.4	KT		5.1 NPA
Art.III.5	LM		5.2 TA Contractor and Grantees
			5.3 Program Management
Art.III.9	LM		5.3.1 USAID
	LM		5.3.2 GFDRE
Art.III.10	DT		5.4 Donor Coordination
Art.III.12	LM		5.5 Monitoring & Evaluation

Art.III, 1 and 2	KT	3 (47)	6. PROGRAM IMPACT: PURPOSE/SO-LEVEL ACHIEVEMENT - per BESO PAAD/PP EOPS (table) - per RF SO-level indicators (table) - other quality statements
Art.III, 1, 13, and 14	all	3 (50)	7. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVED STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT - mid-course corrections (program, operational) - ESDP implications - resource allocation issues
Art.IV, 4	сору		ANNEX A: ASSESSMENT STATEMENT OF WORK
Art.IV.4	LM		ANNEX B: ASSESSMENT TEAM WORKPLAN & SCHEDULE
Art.IV.4	all		ANNEX C: LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Art.IV.4	all		ANNEX D: SELECTED DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
	KT		ANNEX E: POTENTIAL REVISIONS TO SO3 RESULTS FRAMEWORK (IRs and Indicators)
	LM		ANNEX F: COMMENTS ON USAID INTERNAL MANAGEMENT & RP TEAMS
			OTHERS TBD

ANNEX C LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED



ANNEX C LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

<u>BESO Central Coordination Committee</u> - Representative from Prime Minister's Office Ato Manzingia Makonnen, Social Sectors Coordinator

Ministry of Education - Addis Ababa

H.E. Genet Zewdie, Minister

H.E. Dr. Teklehaimanot Haileselassie, Vice-Minister

Ato Teferi Hagos Desta, Head, Planning and Projects Department (PPD)

Ato Girma Asfaw, PPD, Head, PPD Project Preparation and Monitoring Panel (BESO TWG Chair)

Ato Hailie Selassie Kebede, Head, PPD Planning and Programming Panel

W/O Belaynesh Wolde-Giorghis, PPD Project Preparation and Monitoring Panel (BESO TWG Secretary)

Ato Damte Demeke, PPD Project Preparation and Monitoring Panel (BESO TWG)

Ato Befikadu Gebre-Tsadik, Teachers Training Panel, Head (BESO TWG) W/O Yelfign Worku, Head, Women's Affairs

Ministry of Finance

Ato Asrat Kelemework, Head of Budget Department (BESO TWG)

Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation

Ato Demelash Megersa (BESO TWG)

Ato Mekbib Tilahun (BESO TWG)

Institute for Curriculum Development and Research - Addis Ababa

Ato Derege Terefe, Head, ICDR

Ato Abraham Hagos, Head, ICDR Teacher Education Panel

Ato Kedir, Head, ICDR Curriculum Development Panel (BESO TWG)

Regional Education Bureau - Awassa, SNNPR

Ato Mammo Ketti, Head

Ato Baharu Shikur, Head, Plan, Program, Project & Statistics Service

Ato Neguissie, Administration & Finance Service Department

Ato Kebede Sima, Head, Curriculum Development and Research Department

Ato Markos Mekuria Delebo, Head, Education Program Department

Ato Shanka Biramo, Teacher Training, Education Program Department

Ato Berhanu Bekele, Education Support Department

Arba Minch TTI

Ato Kiflemariam Bassa, Principal

Ato Wondimagegn Tora, Dean of Students

Arba Minch Zonal Education Office

Ato Haile Gabriel Adebo, A/Head ZED

Ato Solomon Asrat, Secondary Education

Ato Haile Makel Gibre, Teacher Training and Adult Education

Ato Kasa Akhana Aknawe, Primary Education

Arba Minch Woreda Education Office

Ato Darge Dabolo, Representative

Awassa TTI

Ato Francua Dalacha Principal

Adwa TTI

Ato Yitbarek Melese G. Giorgis, Principal

Academy for Educational Development

Dr. Marcia Ellis, BESO Project Director (Washington, D.C.)

Dr. Tom Tilson, BESO Chief of Party, Addis Ababa (BESO TWG)

Ato Tsegaw Chekol, BESO Project Manager, AED, Addis Ababa (Alt- BESO TWG)

Dr. Donna Kay LeCzel, School Leadership (split position, Awasa and Tigray)

Awassa Team

Dr. Nebiyu Taddese, Planning Advisor

Ms. Eileen St. George, Curriculum Development Advisor

Dr. Johnson Odharo, Teacher Training Advisor

Arba Minch Team

Dr. Bernard Gagne, Teacher Training Advisor

Tigray Team - interviewed in Addis

Dr. Elizabeth Leu, Curriculum Development Advisor

Dr. Barbara Junge, Teacher Training Advisor

Dr. Frank Van Buer, Finance Advisor

Dr. Joseph Bastian, Planning Advisor

W/O Maekelech Gidey, School Leadership

<u>Tigray Development Association</u> -- telephone interview

Ato Germai Aberra, TDA/BESO Acting Director

World Learning International

Dr. Dunham Rawley, Head BESO/World Learning International Ato Adanech Holie, Deputy Head BESO/WLI

Fura School: School Management Committee, Headmaster, Teachers, Parents, Community Members, Woreda Officials

Rufo Waeno School: School Management Committee, Headmaster, Teachers, Parents, Community Members, Woreda Officials

USAID Ethiopia

Mr. Keith Brown, Director

Mr. David Eckerson, Deputy Director

Mr. William H. Douglass, Program Officer

Ms. Stephanie Funk, Program Office & BESO RP #1 Team Leader

Ms. Laketch Mikael, Program Economist

Mr. Kevin Mullally, Chief, Human and Institutional Development (HID)

Dr. Tassew Zewdie, BESO RP#2 Team Leader & AED COTR

Ato Aberra Makonnen, BESO RP#3 Team Leader & M&E Specialist

Ms. Elisabeth Getahun, SO3 Core Team

Ms. Ashton S. Douglass, Democracy & Governance

Ms. Carina Stover, Chief, Health, Population, Nutrition

Dr. Ayana Yeneabat, AIDS/HIV RP

Mr. Jack Winn, Chief, Office of Financial Management (OFM)

Mr. Evasu Tihlahun, OFM and SO3 Core Team

ANNEX D SELECTED DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Academy for Educational Development, Contractors Quarterly Performance Reports, submitted for Basic Education System Overhaul (BESO) Project under AID Contract No. 663-0015-C-00-5500-00, all time periods 1996 to January-March 1998.

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- Amendment Number One dated September 23, 1996;
- Amendment Number Two dated September 5, 1997.

and Program Implementation Letters No. 1 - ___ issued thereunder.

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- Amendment Number One dated September 30, 1995;
- Amendment Number Two dated September 23, 1996.

and Project Implementation Letters (PILs) No. 1 - No. 18 issued thereunder.

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ANNEX E

POTENTIAL REVISIONS TO SO3 RESULTS FRAMEWORK (IRs and Indicators)

POTENTIAL REVISIONS TO SO3 RESULTS FRAMEWORK (IRs and Indicators)

The main body of the BESO assessement, August 1998, includes numerous suggestions for clarification of the SO3 Results Framework (RF) which are summarized below. The team emphasizes that these comments pertain to the existing RF and would be applied to the "Track One" management efforts. If/when the SO Team moves into the "Track Two" planning mode as part of USAID's ISP, although the SO statement could easily remain the same, the assessment team sincerely hopes that the IRs will be changed to provide for more focus.

For "Track One" modifications:

IR1: Improved quality and equity of primary school environment

Chapter 3.1 recommends that USAID revisit the IR and sub-IR indicators.

- The Mission should consider regional-level rather than CSGP-specific measures at the IR level, as these would be a more meaningful measure of impact on the primary school system overall.
- For sub-IR1.1, the Mission should consider substantially reducing those at the sub-IR level, at a) through j) are too management-intensive to be useful for on-going decision-making. The Mission might consider using the current IR-level indicators for sub-IR 1.1, and then using similar measures for the <u>regional</u> school population at the IR level.
- For sub-IR1.2, per our Table 3.1, the team emphasizes that the denominator should be <u>all</u> primary schools in Tigray and SNNPR and not just t he schools in the pilot School Leadership effort. Other NGOs and the REBs are providing leadership training, and this should be captured, with USAID's contribution highlighted.
- For sub-IR1.3, "leadership position" needs definition. The working definition suggested to the team was either Principal, Vice Principal, or Unit Head. The numerator needs to be defined. The denominator should be <u>all</u> principals, vice principals, and unit heads (or whatever comprises the "leadership position definition") in each region.

IR2: Increased pedagogical effectiveness of the content and quality of educational materials.

Chapter 3.2 includes recommendations about improving definition and measurement of indicators, and establishing targets.

- The IR-level indicators should be expressed in either absolute value or in percent change per region. The current expression as a percentage does not make sense. What would "100% of student-centered content" mean?? Etc.
- Sub-IR2.1 has been fully achieved if USAID continues to use only ICDR try-out schools as the denominator. USAID and the REB curriculum teams should consider use of some other indicator and/or denominator to get at some higher-level achievement, such as cost-effectiveness of different combinations of media and materials, or should consider the sub-IR met and drop it.

IR3: Improved performance and equity of teacher training graduates.

Chapter 3.3 includes a number of recommendations for USAID to consider regarding changing its support to teacher training, given the government's clear move toward emphasizing TTCs in favor of TTIs...

- Given the fact that Adwa TTI has lost its advisor; Awassa TTI may or may not close this year; USAID's relationship with Bongo TTI, if any, is not yet defined; and Arba Minch TTI may become a TTC in two years, the value of measuring BESO accomplishments based only on those 3 TTIs is questionable, at best.
- For the remainder of "Track One", USAID might consider assessing performance of the "BESO-supported" TTIs in comparison with all TTIs in the country; or
- USAID might also consider looking at performance and gender gaps in both TTIs and TTCs in the focus regions.
- If it is retained, the indicator for sub-IR3.3 should be reframed in terms of absolute value rather than percentages. As with IR2 above, what would a 'good' score be?? 100%??

IR4: Improved decentralized management of primary education.

Chapter 3.4 includes a number of serious recommendations regarding the potential for results under this IR. As stated therein:

IR vision and measurement: The above discussion focused on the sub-IRs, in part because no reform objective, benchmarks or measures were provided by which to gauge overall progress toward improved decentralized management and administration. The policy matrix in the original BESO design described in general terms the policy and operational changes desired, but the indicator suggested for the support objective/IR level (capital budget expenditure rate) neither captured the scope of reformed operations or the specific impact of the BESO activity. The USAID Mission is cognizant that some

measures must be devised. This should be done as soon as possible with MOE and REB partners, but depends in part on a unified vision of what will be supported in terms of institutional development at the center.

MOE capacity in policy analysis and planning: This failure of BESO to have appreciable impact in this area has been attributed to its concept as "being ahead of its time" in expecting a greatly curtailed MOE to readily embrace national planning and policy analysis as it is trying to grapple with its new role. To some extent, it appears that one means of dealing with its reduction of centralized planning authority has been to abrogate or downplay its proactive planning function. This component of BESO has also been criticized as "too late", in that the ESDP has already been formulated. The implication is that the MOE defines policy as policy declarations, does not consider that it has a role in informing policy choices that occur at the strategy formation stages, and that ESDP, while a blueprint and policy map, cannot anticipate all the strategic and operation decisions that will occur over the next five years. Some options for consideration are elaborated in section 3.4.

IR5: Increased and more rational and efficient sectoral financing.

As stated in Chapter 3.5, "restate the result, or at least the indicators, on reduced burden on public sector (sub-IR5.2). The reform objectives named are essential to a healthy sectoral investment package. Although cost recovery may not be as significant to the REBs, because higher education does not figure in their portfolio, it does impact primary education and should not be dropped. Similarly, a key component of the BESO program is to enable schools to attract more community support and is measurable (a least on a sample basis); it is puzzling why these objectives have been dropped, particularly since the US\$7 million in cooperative agreements to NGOs for the CSGP has not been."

NPA IMPACT: CPs and COVs Clusters	Action Taken	BESO Link	National Impact	Regional Impact
IR 1: School Environment				
Constraints to school-based decision-making, revenue generation and management have been removed (2-CP4)	a) MOE official guidance for School Committees	a)BESO CP b)CSGP schools use in training	a)nation-wide policy	a/b) schools allowed to raise, retain resources
Girls' education strategy and action plan developed (3-CP5)	a)draft strategy, guidelines	a)BESO CP b) SchLdrsp, CSGP, TTI	a)none yet	a)awareness, no action plan yet
IR 2: Pedagogical Effectiveness				
Conduct studies, analyses and discussions of cost effectiveness of inputs, services and channels of production of pedagogical inputs (1-COV5, 2-COV1)	a)Reg'l study of textbook production b)PHRD textbook production study c)AAU/IER study of EMPDA d)ICDR workshops on new role e)EMA-ESDP study distance ed.	a)USAID commissioned b)none c)?? d)AED advisors participate e)conducted by AED advisor	a)none b)draft textbk policy/strategy c)Inconclusive, controversial d)ICDR aligns role e)ESDP strategy includes	a)none yet b)none yet d)ICDR provides assistance e)Reg'l ESDP
Encourage private sector provision of educational goods and services (2-CP10)	a) GOE Policy Proclamation	a)BESO CP	a) RFQ issued for books	a)EMPDA soliciting work from regions
Develop plan for improved effectiveness of inputs (3-COV2)	a)REB Curric. Depts conduct classroom surveys	a) AED advisors assist	a)	a)not reported

IR #: CPs and COVs Clusters	Action Taken	BESO Link	National Impact	Regional Impact
IR 3: Teacher Training				
Produce plan for teacher certification (1-CP4)	a)MOE produces plan	a)predates BESO	a) plan exits; not implemented	a)focus TTls explore in-service tr'g options
Reform and improvement of TTI curriculum (2-CP6, 3-COV4)	a)ICDR produces framework b)nat'l workshop c)focus TTIs develop curric	a/b)AED advisor assists c)AED advisors assist	a)Nat'l plan debate underway	c) focus TTI develop curric
Increase TTI intake and support of female trainees (1-COV1,2-COV3,3-COV3)	a)MOE raises quota b)focus TTIs lower adm. standard c)focus TTIs dev. support package	a)BESO CP b)AED advisors assist c)AED advisors assist	a) Nat'l Quota Policy	b)favorable female adm. standards c)female support package
Greater TTI autonomy and control of recruitment, selection, admission (2-COV2)	a)MOE creates policy b)focus TTI operationalize	a)BESO CP b) AED advisors assist	a)Nat'l Policy and Guidelines authorizing TTIs	b)focus TTI criteria est'd
Increased TTI non-salary recurrent budget for improved student support/instruction (2-CP7,3-CP1)	a)focus TTIs raise budget	a)BESO CP	a)none reported	a)increased budget for supplies,etc.

IR #: CPs and COVs Clusters	Action Taken	BESO Link	National Impact	Regional Impact
IR 4: Decentralized Management and Adminis	stration			
Government entities have financial, policy, institutional and/or administrative authority (1-CP1)	a)MOE submits detailed statement	a)done prior to BESO CP	a)Nat'l and Reg'l authorities articulated (restatement)	a)Regional authority articulated (clarified)
Regional strategic plans for primary education linking capital and recurrent budget (2-CP8)	a)focus region ESDPs link	a)AED advisors support	a)Nat'l ESDP includes better reg' plans	a)focus regions have better ESDPs, and planning systems
Increased regional budgets for Wereda school support functions. (2-CP9)	a)Tigray staffs Weradas, but retains school fees b)SNNPR increases zone budget;mandates zones/weredas give budget to schools	a/b)BESO CP	a)none	a)Tigray-unclear b)SNNPR-unclear

IR #: CPs and COVs Clusters	Action Taken	BESO Link	National Impact	Regional Impact
IR 5: Rational and Efficient Sector Financing				
Share and allocation of <u>national education</u> <u>budget</u> increases (1-CP2,2-CP1,3-COV1)	a) budget allocation	a) BESO CP b) debt relief	amt increases in 94- 98; share grows to 16% in 96; falls in 97	amt increase in 94- 96; shares fall in 94- 96
Share and allocation of <u>national primary</u> budget increases (1-CP3,2-CP2,3-CP3)	a)budget allocation	a)BESO CP b)debt relief	amt increases in 94- 98; share grow to 51% in 96; falls in 97	amt increases in 94- 96; shares grow 94- 96
Focus region unit non-salary recurrent expenditure on primary school quality inputs increases (2-CP3,3-CP4)	a)budget allocation	a)BESO CP	amt increases in 94- 96; share falls 94-96; per unit falls	amt falls 94-96; unit falls 95-96
Analysis conducted and budget share of administration cost of education reduced in focus regions (1-COV6, 2-COV6)	a)Tigray-reduce # of weredas b)SNNPR-none	a)BESO CP	amt increases	no data provided
National MQS defined for primary education, implementation strategy and plan developed (1-COV2,2-COV4,3-CP2)	a)MOE initiates MQS def'n b)REBs initiate action	a)BESO CP b)AED advr. introduces idea	none yet, although basic standards formulated for ESDP	none yet, although basic standards formulated for ESDP
Evaluation of cost-effectiveness and improvement in teacher hiring, assignment, and career structure to improve quality of instruction (1-COV4,2-CP5 & COV5,3-CP6)	a) no evaluation b)career structure developed	a)BESO CP	b)career structure adopted	b)none reported
MOE/PPD policy analysis capacity increased with more budgetary resources (3-COV5)	a)tbd	a)BESO CP		

Education Sector Resource and Budgetary Alllocations (per BESO Gonditions)

ın million bırr¹	USFY94	EFY86)		USFY95 (EFY	87)		USFY96 (EFY	'88)		USFY97 (EFY8	39)		USFY98 (1	EFY9	0)
	Nat'l	Reg'l		Nat'l	Reg'l		Nat'l	Reg'l		Nat'l	Reg'l		Nat'l	Reg	,'I
		Tigray	SNNPR		Tigray	SNNPR		Tigray	SNNPR		Tigray	SNNPR		Т.	s
National TGB Budget -Interest Payments -Discretionary Budget -% annual increase, DBudget	8447.1 1003.8 7443.3	na na 279.9	па па 471.6	9964 6 1292.6 8672.0 16.5%	na na 327.8 17.1%	na na 608.0 28.9%	9667.4 1441.5 8225.9 -5.1%	па па 342.9 4.6%	na na 682.0 12.1%	10923.5 ² nd nd 15.5% est	nd	nd " "	12037.7 ³ 1229.est 10808.7 15.5% ⁴		
I. Nat'l Education Budget a amount (R+C) b amount (R) c. % Nat'l Budget (R+C) -per 1997 PER ³ d % annual increase (R) e. % annual increase (R+C)	1102.5 785.7 14.81% 13.0%	79.4 33.5 28.0% na 	142.6 115.1 30.2% na 	1297.2 885.3 14.96% 13.3% 12.7% 17.7%*	88.5 42.1 27.0%% na 25.6% 11.4%	183.3 136.6 30.1% na 18.7% 28.5%	1333.5 938.8 16.21%* 14.5% 6.0% 2.8%	90.9 50.2 26.5% na 19.2% 2.7%	190.9 141.0 27.9% na 3.1% 4.1%	14976 nd 15.7%* 14.3% nd 11.9%	nd nd " "	nd nd "	1693.5'n d 14.0%@ nd nd 13.1%		
2. Primary Ed. Budget a. amount (R+C) b. per student, R+C ⁸ c. per student, R d. % of Nat'l Ed. Budget -with TTIs -per 1997 PER e. % annual increase	521.1 nd nd 47.3% na nd	35.2 nd nd 44.3% nd nd	90.5 nd nd 63.4% nd nd	645.1 208.2b 158.0b 49.7%* 52.1% 58.7% 23.8% 2.3pp	39.5 130.1b 86.3b 44.6% na nd 12.2%	108.1 R 144.5b 117.4b 58.9% na nd 19.4%	681.6 179.9b 137.9b 51.0%* 53.3% 59.7% 5.7% 1.3pp	44.0 138.2 101.6b 48.4% nd nd 11.4%	127.0 123.9b 85.7b 66.5% nd nd 17.4%	688.0 153.9b nd 45.9%* 48.9% 53.7% <1.0%-5 1pp	nd " " "	nd			
3. Non-Salary Recurrent (Primary Education) a. amount b per student c. % of RecurrentBudget -per 1997 PER o/w Ops/Maintenance d %annual increase	35.9 nd 8.47% nd nd 	3.05° nd 13.8% nd nd	7.36 nd 9.4% nd nd	38.8 12.5b 7.92% 12.7 6.2 8.0%	3.34 11.0b* 12.8% nd nd 9.5%	7.9 10.6b* 9.0% nd nd 7.3%	41.0 10.8b 7.84% 11.1% 5.9% 5.7%	2.49 7.82b* 7.7% nd nd -4.4%	nd nd* nd nd nd 13.5%est	nd nd nd 12.9% 8.4% nd	3.03 9.3b* nd nd nd 21.6%	10.07 8.45b* nd nd nd 13.5%			

in million birr¹	USFY94 ((EFY86)		USFY95 (EFY	(87)		USFY96 (EFY	(88)		USFY97 (EFY	39)		USFY98 (EFY90))
	Nat'l	Reg'l		Nat'l	Reg'l		Nat'l	Reg'l		Nat'l	Reg'l		Nat'l	Reg	'1
		Tigray	SNNPR		Tigray	SNNPR		Tigray	SNNPR		Tigray	SNNPR		T.	s
4. TTI non-salary recurrent ¹⁰ a. amount b. per student c. % of TTI budget d. % annual increase	nd nd nd 	.695 nd nd 	1.041 nd nd 	nd nd nd nd	.907* 1649b 70.1% 30.5%*	1.188* 974.6b 51% 14%*	nd nd nd nd	.952* 1730.9b 67.0% 4.9%*	1.513 1198b nd 27%*	nd nd nd nd	.797* 1446.0b 63% -16.3%*	1.995* 2007b 53% 31.8%*			
5. Wereda Allocations for School Function a. amount b. amount per student c. % of REB budget d. % annual increase	nd nd nd														
6. Reduction of adm, costs a. amount b. % budget	nd nd			38.8 nd			59.6 nd			85.0 nd					
7 Donor Sector Financing a. amount o/w USAID b. % of Ed. budget c. % of P. Ed. budget	nd nd nd ad												\$76409 ¹¹ 14,425 45.9% nd		

KEY: *=BESO Performance Condition; @=BESO Performance Covenant; na=not applicable; nd=no data; nr=not responsive to condition/covenant; tbp=to be presented for Tranche 3.

BESO Conditions

	Tranche 1			Tranche 2			Tranche 3		
	Condition (CP) Covenant (COV)	Nat'l	Reg'I ¹	Condition Covenant	Nat'l	Reg'l	Condition Covenant	Nat'l	Reg'l
IR 1:School Environment				CP4. Demonstrate that constraints to school-based local decision-making, revenue generation and management have been removed.	х		CP5. Develop national girls' education enhancement program and implementation plan	Х	
IR 2:Pedagogical Materials (privatization)	COV5. Conduct studies of barriers to the use of varied (private sector) channels for production and distribution of ed' goods and services, ad cost effectiveness of current goods and services.	х		CP10. Undertake steps to encourage private sector procurement of educational goods and services and barriers to market entry.	х				
(service efficiency)	Ç			COV1. Carry out analyses and discussions throughout system on evaluation of the pedagogical and costeffectiveness of EMPDA, ICDR and EMA services.	X				
(input efficiency)							COV2. Develop plan for improved pedagogical and cost effectiveness of inputs		х



	Tranche 1			Tranche 2			Tranche 3		
	Condition (CP) Covenant (COV)	Nat'l	Reg'l¹	Condition Covenant	Nat'l	Reg'l	Condition Covenant	Nat'l	Reg'l
IR 3:Teacher Training (certification) (curriculum)	CP4. Produce an acceptable plan of action for teacher certification	Х		CP6. Establish Nat'l plan for reform and improvement of TTI curriculum as demonstrated by focus TTIs	х	(X)	. COV4. TTIs develop new curriculum reflecting new primary curriculum		x
(female trainees)	COV1. Increase proportion of female TTI entrants	x		COV3. All TTIs will develop prof'l, academic and personal support systems for female trainees	х	(X)	COV3. Include prof'l, academic and personal support system for females in TTI programs	х	(X)
(budget)				CP7. Demonstrate an increase over EFY88 in recurrent budget provided to TTIs for improvement of supplies, maintenance and improved operation (focus regions as proof)	x	(X)	CP1. Demonstrate an increase over EFY89 in recurrent budget provided to TTIs for improvement of supplies, maintenance and instructional materials (focus regions as proof)	x	(X)
(recruitment)				COV2. Region permit greater TTI autonomy and control of recruitment, selection and admission of trainees.	х	(X)			



	Tranche 1			Tranche 2			Tranche 3		
	Condition (CP) Covenant (COV)	Nat'l	Reg'l ¹	Condition Covenant	Nat'l	Reg'l	Condition Covenant	Nat'l	Reg'l
IR 4: Decentralized Mgt	CP1. Demonstrate Gov't entities have financial, policy, inst'l and/or adm. authority in BESO-related areas	X							
(school management)				CP8. Develop strategic national plans for the REBs for comprehensive development of primary education linking capital and recurrent financing needs.	х	(X)			
(financial management)				CP9. EFY88 Regional budgets demonstrate increases in allocations for school support functions in Wereda offices.		x			
(budget)								1	

12.

	Tranche 1	Tranche 2			Tranche 3				
	Condition (CP) Covenant (COV)	Nat'l	Reg'l ¹	Condition Covenant	Nat'l	Reg'l	Condition Covenant	Nat'l	Reg'i
IR 5: Sector Financing									
(ed. budget)	CP2. Demonstrate total education budget allocation increase over previous year by same percentage as total Gov't budget (net debt payments) of by 15% (whichever greater).	х		CP1. Demonstrate total education budget allocation be maintained at 16% of total gov't budget (excluding debt payment).	х		COV1. Demonstrate total education budget allocation be maintained at 16% of total gov't budget (excluding debt)	х	
(primary ed. budget)	CP3. Demonstrate government budget allocation for primary education has increased over previous year's allocation so as to grow progressively toward 60% of total education budget by EFY94.	х		CP2. Demonstrate government budget allocation for primary education has increased progressively since EFY1990 toward 60% of total education budget in EFY1994.	х		CP3.Demonstrate government budget allocation for primary education has increased progressively since EFY1990 toward 60% of total education budget in EFY1994	х	
(non-salary recurrent)				CP3. Demonstrate an increase in unit non-salary expenditure on school-level quality enhancing inputs for primary education in focus regions.		х	CP4.Demonstrate an increase in unit non-salary expenditure on school-level, quality enhancing inputs for primary education in focus regions.		x
(MOE policy mandate)							COV5: MOE demonstrates commitment to build policy analysis capacity through more resources to policy and planning function.	х	

	Tranche 1			Tranche 2			Tranche 3		
	Condition (CP) Covenant (COV)	Nat'l	Reg'l ¹	Condition Covenant	Nat'l	Reg'l	Condition Covenant	Nat'i	Reg'i
(mınımum quality standards)	COV2. Adopt plan for developing a MQS for primary education.	х		COV4. Adopt initial national definition of MQS for primary education and submit to strategy for its application to planning in two focus regions.	х	(X)	CP2. Develop plan for implementing Minimum Quality Standards on national and regional basis	х	(X)
(private schools)	COV3. Implement policy for promotion of private schooling.	x							
(teacher terms of service/norms)	COV4. Conduct evaluation of primary teacher hiring, assignment, and transfer policies, placement and workload.	х		CP5. Provide evidence of adoption of new career structure for teachers that improves terms and conditions of service and encourages improved quality of instruction	х		CP6. GFDRE conducts study of cost-effectiveness of primary teaching force	х	
				COV5. Undertake measures to support implementation of teacher hours, assignment and transfers norms in regions		х			
(ed. adm. costs)	COV6. Conduct analysis of administrative expenditures and cost in ed. sector	X	(X)	COV6. Reduce the share of budget allocated to admin istration of education.	х	(X)			